因明義斷 1.27

1.27

有人會《對法》、《瑜伽》云：《對法》中合，即《瑜伽》同類。自解：《對法》合支，如遮破我，類遣執常。復云：《瑜伽》同類等，即此同喻等。其義云何？答：不相當。既云《瑜伽》同類，即此同喻，云何得與《對法論》中合支相似？彼類餘法以為合故，如先德釋，可同因明。又許如實能立，異《瑜伽》等。不許陳那造意少別，豈獨陳那解因明理，天親不悟？愛憎與奪，何太不倫。

Someone reconciles the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Yogācārabhūmi, saying: “The application in the Abhidharmasamuccaya is precisely the similar class in the Yogācārabhūmi.” He explains on his own: “The member of application in the Abhidharmasamuccaya is like refuting a self, analogously dispelling the clinging to permanence.” He also says: “The similar class and so forth in the Yogācārabhūmi are precisely this similar example and so forth.” How is its meaning to be taken? Answer: They do not correspond. Since you say that the similar class in the Yogācārabhūmi is precisely this similar example, how could it resemble the member of application in the Abhidharmasamuccaya? Because in that [treatise], drawing an analogy to other dharmas constitutes application; as explained by former masters of virtue, it can conform with hetuvidyā. Moreover, one allows that the sādhana of the Tarkaśāstra differs from the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, but does not allow that Dignāga’s intention in composition differed slightly; could it be that Dignāga alone understood the principles of hetuvidyā, while Vasubandhu did not comprehend them? Why is this attachment and aversion, granting and taking away, so utterly disproportionate?