因明義斷 1.29

1.29

有人解似宗過中俱不極成云：執我是思，即蘊計我，無思極成。其義云何？答：亦不得然。亦應我為因緣，即蘊計我，無因極成。若云猶計我與和合作因緣，不俱言因緣，何得相例者。本來執異，何須前例？故知說神我，佛法不許，非極成；若假我者，佛法即許，非不成。今言我與和合作因緣，和合即實有，大乘不許，俱不極成。亦不得云立我是思，非外道宗，故是極成。論云「如數論師對佛弟子，若立佛法宗，是第九過故，何云所別？亦不得言二十五諦不立思故，非外道宗。以即計我是思，何得更立思耶？以許有實思故極成，不許實和合故不成。」

Someone, explaining ubhayāprasiddha among the fallacies of the pratijñā-ābhāsa, said: 'Holding that the self is thought (cetanā) is imputing a self to the aggregates; that there is no thought is prasiddha.' What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too cannot be accepted. One could also say that the self is an indirect cause (pratyaya), imputing a self to the aggregates; that there is no cause is prasiddha. If one argues: 'Since one still posits the self as forming the indirect cause with inherence (samavāya), and does not use the word "pratyaya" for both, how could they be treated analogously?' Since their initial views differ, why must there be the previous analogy? Thus we know that when a spiritual self (puruṣa) is spoken of, the Buddha-Dharma does not accept it, so it is not prasiddha; if it is a nominal self, the Buddha-Dharma does accept it, so it is not asiddha. Now, to say that the self and inherence form an indirect cause, inherence is held to be substantially existent, which the Mahāyāna does not accept; hence both are ubhayāprasiddha. Nor can one say: 'Stating that the self is thought is not the doctrine of the non-Buddhists, and therefore it is prasiddha.' The treatise states: 'As when a Sāṃkhya, facing a Buddhist, sets forth a thesis of the Buddha-Dharma, this is the ninth fallacy.' Why speak of the qualificand (viśeṣya)? Nor can one say: 'Because thought is not posited among the twenty-five principles (tattvas), it is not the doctrine of the non-Buddhists.' Since they precisely impute that the self is thought, why would they need to posit thought additionally? Because they accept substantial thought, it is prasiddha; because they do not accept substantial inherence, it is asiddha.