因明義斷 1.39

1.39

有人解不共不定中云：有人云自不共者，如佛弟子對聲論云：聲是無常，所聞性故。不然。何以故？以虛空為共異品，瓶等為共同品，因皆非有，何故非俱耶？判云：理唯是俱不共過者。其義云何？答：亦不然。亦是自不共過。除佛，餘大乘人以他方佛色為自同品，真如無為為自異品，因俱不轉，何得唯俱？若云并佛色亦所聞故唯俱者。亦不然。以空非所聞，唯他獨許，大乘准佛無非所聞。若云據小乘人說，為唯俱不共者。理亦不然。小乘擇滅為自異品，實無表色等為自同品，因亦非有故。

Someone explains regarding the asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika: Someone says regarding an asādhāraṇa [incurred only] by oneself: For example, when a Buddhist says to a Śabdavādin: "Sound is impermanent (pratijñā); because of being audible (hetu)." This is not so. Why? Because taking space as the common vipakṣa and jars and the like as the common sapakṣa, the reason exists in neither; why would it not be [incurred by] both? If one determines: "In principle it is only the flaw of being universally asādhāraṇa." What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too is not so. It is also the flaw of being asādhāraṇa to oneself. Except for the Buddha, other Mahāyānists take the form of Buddhas of other directions as their own sapakṣa, and true suchness / unconditioned dharmas as their own vipakṣa; since the reason applies to neither, how could it be only universal? If one says: "Since even a Buddha's form is also audible, it is strictly universal"—this too is not so. For space is inaudible only according to the other school's acceptance; in the Mahāyāna, on the model of the Buddha, there is nothing that is inaudible. If one says: "It is spoken of as strictly universally asādhāraṇa on the basis of the Hīnayāna"—this in principle is also not so. In the Hīnayāna, pratisamkhyānirodha is one's own vipakṣa, and real unmanifest form (avijñaptirūpa) and the like are one's own sapakṣa; the reason is not present in them either.