因明義斷 1.6

1.6

有人云：陳那既乖古說，何故竟無論文破斥？其事云何？答：此亦不然。陳那明古說，非可須破斥，但取義異，故不破斥。如世親說五能立，亦不非於舊陳。陳那雖三分能成，何假非於古說？設云破古因明師者，餘不正者非瑜伽等。然有說彼瑜伽等非，自餘之過，非前所引疏家之咎。若云三分說宗等三者，既許陳那宗亦所成，能立之中豈唯三也。若云：據宗在能立，說為三分者。若宗在所立，即應唯二分。若爾，何故虛設唯言？二亦能故。若云：宗在所立，即開喻為三者。由此故知，言三分者，但一因二喻。又復古師宗為能立，陳那順古言中不違，所以《理門》等中能立，皆言宗等，文同意異。乃翻譯之主，能知陳那宗許能成，亦是先德已了。但為今造論意，正明宗在所立之中，釋宗為能立之言，疏中亦以具解，餘者不悉，執說皆同，未悟作者本意有別。疏主既當入室親承指撝，況復大小因明明說。故《理門》頌云「是中唯取隨自意樂為所成立，說名宗」。不說能立說名宗，故釋中云「故此多言，於論式等說名能立。」即顯順古。正釋即云：言是中者，是簡持義。是宗等中，故名是中。言唯者，是簡別義。簡別能立，說為所立。此正明說若今宗亦能立，何故須唯？又云「樂為所立，謂不樂為能成立性。」又云「若爾，既取智為了因，是言便失能成立義。此亦不然，令彼憶念本極成故。」及此論中，皆無正釋宗為能立。既云唯此三分說名能立，故知一因二喻。以立宗時他智未生，要待因喻他方解故、藉因三相比智生故。故此論云「言比量者，謂藉眾相而觀於義」，乃至云「由彼為因，於所比義有正智生。」《理門》云「謂智是前智，餘從如所說能立因生，是緣彼義，不說從彼能立宗生。又宗不共許，立時他智不生，因喻共成引證，彼智方起。」故《理門》云「唯有共許決定言詞，說名能立。」又《理門》云「又比量中唯見此理。若所比處，此相定遍於餘同類，念此定有；於彼無處，念此遍無。是故由此生決定解。」故知所比即是所立。由此解生，即因三相。又云「故定三相，唯為顯因。由此道理，雖一切分皆能為因，顯了所立。然唯一分，且說為因。」故唯三言，定目因喻。若言陳那定判其宗在能成者，釋中何無正說？但見標結順古之文，即定判為能立，其若船行逐水處異船同。執此定判能成，可謂見船執依舊水。昔聞刻舟求劍，斯之謂矣。

Someone asks: Since Dignāga diverged from the ancient teachings, why is there no text in his treatises refuting them? How is this matter to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. Dignāga clarified the ancient teachings; there was no need to refute them—he merely took a different meaning, and therefore did not refute them. Just as Vasubandhu spoke of five sādhana and yet did not fault what was formerly stated, although Dignāga had three parts that are sādhaka, why would he need to fault the ancient teachings? Even if one were to speak of his refuting ancient masters of hetuvidyā, he faulted others who were incorrect, not the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the like. Yet as for some claiming that he faulted the *Yogācārabhūmi* and so forth, that is an error of other people, not the fault of the commentator cited earlier. If one says that the three parts refer to the three [members] beginning with the pratijñā: since it is conceded that for Dignāga the pratijñā is also sādhya, how could there be only three among the sādhana? If one says, "He spoke of three parts on the basis that the pratijñā is included in the sādhana"—if the pratijñā were in the sādhya, then there should be only two parts. If so, why was the word "only" fruitlessly posited? Two would also be able [to serve as sādhana]. If one says, "When the pratijñā is in the sādhya, the udāharaṇa is then expanded into three"—from this we know that when he spoke of "three parts", he meant merely the one hetu and the two udāharaṇa. Furthermore, for the ancient masters the pratijñā was a sādhana, and Dignāga, following the ancients, did not contradict them in his words; therefore, when speaking of sādhana in the *Nyāyamukha* and other texts, he consistently spoke of "pratijñā and so forth"—the wording is the same, but the meaning is different. It is the master of translation who was able to know that Dignāga conceded that the pratijñā can be a sādhaka; this was also understood by previous virtuous masters. It was merely for the sake of the intention in composing the treatise at present, which directly clarifies that the pratijñā falls within the sādhya, that he explained the phrasing which made the pratijñā a sādhana—this has also been explained fully in the commentary. Others, not having thoroughly grasped this, adhere to the claim that all [teachings] are the same, failing to realize that the author's original intention had a distinction. Since the commentator himself entered the inner chamber and personally received instructions, how much more so when the greater and lesser works on hetuvidyā state it explicitly! Thus the verse of the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Among these, taking only what is followed according to one's own intention as that which is to be established is called the pratijñā." It does not say that taking a sādhana is called the pratijñā; therefore, in the commentary [to the verse], it says: "Therefore, these multiple statements are called sādhana in the *Vādavidhi* and other texts." This precisely shows that he conformed to the ancients. The primary commentary then states: The words "among these" have the meaning of selection and exclusion. It means "among the pratijñā and so forth"; hence it is called "among these". The word "only" has the meaning of delimitation and exclusion. It delimits and excludes the sādhana, stating that it is the sādhya. This explicitly clarifies that if the present pratijñā were also a sādhana, why would "only" be necessary? Furthermore, it says: "'Wishing it to be the sādhya' means not wishing it to have the nature of being a sādhaka." Furthermore, it says: "If so, since one takes cognition as the jñāpakahetu, these words would lose their meaning of being a sādhaka. This too is not so, because they cause the other to recall what is originally prasiddha." In this treatise as well, there is no direct explanation of the pratijñā being a sādhana. Since it states that "only these three parts are called sādhana", we know it means the one hetu and two udāharaṇa. Because when the pratijñā is posited, cognition has not yet arisen in the other party, and one must wait for the hetu and udāharaṇa before the other will understand, [and] inferential cognition arises by relying upon the trairūpya. Therefore this treatise says: "'Anumāna' means observing an object by relying on multiple characteristics," down to: "With that as hetu, correct cognition arises with regard to the inferred object." The *Nyāyamukha* says: "Cognition means the former cognition; the subsequent cognition arises from the sādhaka-hetu as stated, and it cognizes that object—it is not said to arise from that sādhaka-pratijñā. Furthermore, the pratijñā is not mutually accepted; when it is posited, cognition does not arise in the other party; only when the hetu and udāharaṇa are mutually established and adduce proof does that cognition arise." Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Only words that are mutually accepted and definitive are called sādhana." Again, the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Moreover, in anumāna one observes only this principle: if at the locus of what is to be inferred, this mark definitely pervades other sapakṣa, one recalls that it definitely exists; where that is absent, one recalls that it is completely absent. Therefore, from this, definitive understanding arises." Hence we know that what is to be inferred is precisely the sādhya. That from which this understanding arises is precisely the trairūpya. It also says: "Therefore, determining the three characteristics is solely for the purpose of clarifying the hetu. By this principle, although all members can serve as hetu to make the sādhya clear, nevertheless only one member is provisionally called the hetu." Therefore, the phrase "only three" definitely designates the hetu and udāharaṇa. If one says that Dignāga definitively judged the pratijñā to belong to the sādhaka, why is there no explicit statement in his commentary? Merely seeing the passages where he introduces and concludes by conforming to the ancients, one then definitively judges it to be a sādhana—this is like a boat traveling with the current: the locations differ, but the boat is the same. Clinging to this to definitively judge it a sādhaka may be called seeing the boat and clinging to the former waters. In the past one heard of notching the boat to search for the sword; this is precisely what it means.