因明義斷 1.60

1.60

問：若不是散，何名無記？答：通二性，以為利樂及遊戲，故非全是散；復不全定，然屬定類。問答中云：安慧八識皆悉有執，悉名非量。此判不爾。諸經論中皆令依於三量觀法。《理門》復說「諸修定者，及於貪等諸自證分，皆名現量。見相遍計，可許非量。自證非妄，許通現量故。」又云：似現通比非量攝，以《理門》云「由此即說憶念比度悕求等皆非現量。」非量所攝，亦即無違。比量所攝，此即成過。《理門論》中云皆非現量，且簡取現，不云此等名為似現。後出似現，云「如是一切世俗有中，瓶等、數等、舉等，有性瓶性等智，皆似現量。」不說憶念比度即為似現，不障悕求疑智等說名似現。又設憶念比度名似現者，亦非比量。比量智者，是決定故、憶無謬故、為定量故。似現不爾，云何比收？正釋文中云：現量心離教分別，何故《瑜伽》七十七云「若菩薩修所成慧，亦依於文、亦不依文。」七十二云「名是聞思所成，是三慧境界。」解云：大小因明，據隨轉理說。《喻伽》據大乘盡理為論。又因明據不自在說，《伽論》約自在者說。此非善釋。因明現量離名分別者，非謂不緣名句文等云離名分別。以不如名定執其義，亦不謂義定屬其名，及外道教諸邪名言，云離於名。《瑜伽》等論與此相似。

Question: If it is not distracted, why is it called indeterminate? Answer: It extends to two natures: because it brings benefit and happiness as well as playful enjoyment, it is not entirely distracted; nor is it entirely meditative absorption, but rather belongs to the category of meditative absorption. In the questions and answers it is said: Sthiramati holds that all eight consciousnesses have clinging, and all are called non-pramāṇa (apramāṇa). This judgment is not so. The various sūtras and śāstras all enjoin one to contemplate dharmas relying on the three pramāṇas. The Nyāyamukha also says: "All practitioners of meditative absorption, as well as the self-awareness part (svasaṃvitti-bhāga) of attachment and so forth, are all called pratyakṣa. The conceptual construction of the seen part and the appearing part may be admitted as non-pramāṇa, but because self-awareness is not erroneous, it is admitted to extend to pratyakṣa." Furthermore, it is said: pseudo-pratyakṣa (pratyakṣābhāsa) extends to being subsumed under anumāna and non-pramāṇa, because the Nyāyamukha says, "By this it is explained that recollecting, inferring, desiring, and so forth are all not pratyakṣa." Subsuming them under non-pramāṇa is without contradiction; but subsuming them under anumāna is a fault. The Nyāyamukha says they are all not pratyakṣa, merely eliminating them from being taken as pratyakṣa, without stating that these are called pseudo-pratyakṣa. Later, presenting pseudo-pratyakṣa, it says: "All such cognitions of pots and the like, numbers and the like, motions and the like, existence-nature, pot-nature, and so forth among conventional existents are pseudo-pratyakṣa." It does not state that recollecting and inferring are pseudo-pratyakṣa, nor does it prevent cognitions of desiring, doubting, and so forth from being called pseudo-pratyakṣa. Moreover, even if recollecting and inferring were called pseudo-pratyakṣa, they would not be anumāna. The cognition of anumāna is determinate, recollection is non-erroneous, and it serves as a valid measure. Pseudo-pratyakṣa is not like this; how could it be subsumed under anumāna? In the text of the main explanation, it is said: the mind of pratyakṣa is free from the conceptualisation of teaching. Why then does the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle seventy-seven, state: "If it is a bodhisattva's wisdom born of cultivation, it both relies on the letter and does not rely on the letter"? Fascicle seventy-two says: "Names are born of hearing and reflection, and are the domain of the three wisdoms." It is explained: the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna hetuvidyā are expounded according to the provisional principle (anuvṛtti-nyāya); the Yogācārabhūmi is formulated in terms of the Mahāyāna's ultimate principle. Furthermore, hetuvidyā is expounded according to those who lack mastery, whereas the Yogācārabhūmi is explained in terms of those who possess mastery. This is not a good explanation. When hetuvidyā speaks of pratyakṣa being free from conceptualisation of names, it does not mean that it does not take names, phrases, and syllables as objects; rather, it is called free from names because it does not rigidly grasp their meaning in conformity with the name, nor does it hold that the meaning rigidly belongs to its name, and it is free from the erroneous words and expressions of the heterodox teachings. The Yogācārabhūmi and other treatises are similar to this.