大乘起信論別記 1.117

1.117

問：此識境界寬狹云何？此論中但說五塵。《楞伽經》云「阿梨耶識分別現境自身資生器世間等，一時而知，非是前後。」《瑜伽論》說「此由了別二種境故轉，一由了別內執受者，謂了別遍計所執自性，妄執習氣，及諸色根、根所依處，謂有色界、若無色界，唯有妄執習氣了別；二了別外無分相器者，謂了別依止，緣內執受阿梨耶識，故於一切時無有間斷器世界相，譬如燈炎生時，內執受識，外發光明。如是阿梨耶識，內緣執受境，外緣器世界境，生起道理，應知亦爾。」《中邊論》云「此識所取，四種境界：謂塵、根、我及識所攝。所取既無，能緣本識亦爾得生。」若依《中邊論》及《楞伽經》，則習氣等非此識境。若依《瑜伽論》，聲塵及七種識等非其所緣。依此論說，現根及識等亦非此識所現境界。如是相違，云何和會？答：此非相違。何以故？不以言唯緣如此法故，不言餘法非境界故。問：雖無相違，而有不同，不同之意，可得而聞乎？答：不同之意，各有道理。如《中邊論》「欲明現起諸法，皆是本識所現，離識之外，更無別法。」是故唯說現行諸法，習氣種子其相不顯，與識無異，是故不說。《瑜伽論》等，為顯諸相無有離見自相續者故，除心心法以外，諸餘相續之法，說為此識所了別。諸心之法，離塵不立，其義自顯故不別說。諸餘論顯沒之意，准此可知，不可偏執一隅，以謗通方之說也。且止傍論，今釋大文。

Question: What is the extent—broad or narrow—of the cognitive sphere of this consciousness? In this treatise, only the five sensory dusts are mentioned. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'The ālayavijñāna discriminates and manifests objects—one's own body, means of subsistence, the receptacle world, and so forth—knowing them simultaneously, not sequentially.' The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: 'This operates because of cognizing two kinds of objects: first, cognizing what is grasped within, which means cognizing the parikalpita nature, the vāsanā of erroneous graspings, and the material faculties along with the bases of the faculties—meaning that in the form realm or the formless realm, there is only cognition of the vāsanā of erroneous grasping; second, cognizing the receptacle without partitioned characteristics externally, which means cognizing the ālayavijñāna that serves as a support and takes inner appropriation as object, whereby at all times the characteristics of the receptacle world are uninterrupted. Just as when a flame arises, it takes fuel within and casts light without; the manner in which the ālayavijñāna takes grasped objects within and takes the receptacle world as object externally should be understood to be just the same.' The Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'What is grasped by this consciousness comprises four kinds of spheres: namely, dusts, faculties, self, and consciousness. Since what is grasped is non-existent, the fundamental consciousness that is able to apprehend can also arise in this way.' If one relies on the Madhyāntavibhāga and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, then vāsanā and the like are not the domain of this consciousness. If one relies on the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, sound dust and the seven kinds of consciousness and so forth are not what it takes as objects. If one relies on this treatise, manifesting faculties and consciousness and so forth are also not the spheres manifested by this consciousness. These being in contradiction, how are they to be harmonized? Answer: This is not a contradiction. Why? Because it does not say that it takes only such dharmas as objects, nor does it say that the remaining dharmas are not its sphere. Question: Although there is no contradiction, there are differences; may we hear the intention behind these differences? Answer: There is a reason for each differing intention. For instance, the Madhyāntavibhāga wishes to explain that all dharmas arising in the present are manifested by the fundamental consciousness, and apart from consciousness there is no separate dharma. Therefore, it speaks only of currently active dharmas; the characteristics of vāsanā seeds are not overt and are non-different from consciousness, so it does not mention them. The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra and so forth, in order to reveal that characteristics have no continuous series of their own apart from the seeing [aspect], exclude the mind and mental factors and state that all remaining dharmas of continuity are cognized by this consciousness. The dharmas of mind cannot be established apart from dusts, so their meaning is self-evident and thus not stated separately. The intention behind what is revealed and concealed in other treatises can be known by analogy with this; one must not cling one-sidedly to a single corner and thereby slander comprehensive expositions. Let us stop this digression and now explain the main text.