大乘起信論義記 2.212

2.212

Question: The three subtle marks pertain to the ālaya, and the six coarse marks pertain to mental consciousness (manovijñāna). Why is the manas consciousness not mentioned? Answer: There are two intended meanings: First, since the ālaya has already been spoken of, manas necessarily conjoins with attachment [to it]; thus it is not separately spoken of. Hence the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: "The arising of the ālaya consciousness necessarily conjoins with two consciousnesses." Furthermore, when the mental consciousness takes external objects as conditions, it necessarily relies internally on the manas as the defiled faculty before it can arise. Therefore, when the six coarse marks are subsequently explained, because they necessarily rely internally on the manas, it is also not separately spoken of. Second, because it is theoretically inconvenient, it is omitted and not mentioned. The characteristics of this inconvenience are: the avidyā-entrenchment stirs the fundamentally quiet mind, causing it to arise and form the composite ālayavijñāna; since manas lacks this meaning, it is omitted and not mentioned among the preceding three subtle marks. Furthermore, external objects draw forth and arouse the empirical consciousness, but manas lacks the function of taking external objects as conditions; hence it is also omitted and not mentioned among the six coarse marks. It can also be said that grasping within as the self pertains to the preceding three subtle marks, while grasping without as what belongs to the self pertains to the subsequent six coarse marks; hence it is omitted and not discussed. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra also agrees with this statement. Thus that sūtra states: "Mahāmati! Briefly spoken there are three kinds of consciousness, and extensively spoken there are eight aspects. What are the three? They are the true consciousness, the manifesting consciousness, and the differentiating empirical consciousness," and so on up to the extensive explanation. The 'manifesting consciousness' in the sūtra is precisely the manifesting mark among the three subtle marks; the 'differentiating empirical consciousness' is precisely the six coarse marks below. How do we know this? In the subsequent explanation of the differentiating empirical consciousness, that sūtra actually says: "Conditioning external objects, it gives rise to the empirical consciousness," and so forth. Thus we know that the empirical consciousness is not manas. The subsequent text of this treatise is entirely consistent with this; this should be kept in mind.