起信論疏筆削記 13.18

13.18

In the question, Commentary: Regarding "if cognitive objects and so forth": It was stated above: "Depending on the tathāgatagarbha, there is the mind of production and cessation." Now it states again that the mind ceases. If the mind ceases, then the nature of the garbha ceases; this challenges the specific essence by invoking the common name, suspecting that the essence of the concomitant mind ceases. If the essence ceases, one should become a Buddha in the eighth stage, because lacking mind as a support, the three subtle [marks] would perish; perishing, there would be nothing left to sever, so how could one wait to achieve it? Regarding "if it is said and so forth": because avidyā exists depending on the essence of mind, and the essence of mind is permanent, avidyā is also permanent; hence the three subtle [marks] that depend upon it could never cease. This suspects that the non-concomitant mind could never be extinguished.