起信論疏筆削記 7.19

7.19

However, as I foolishly examine this section of the śāstra, the four lines beginning with "Because all [speech]..." properly belong to the explanation of the reason within the previous heading on the marks to be transcended. The commentary's division and sectional analysis are both not smooth and unobstructed, so I will now offer a brief supplementary explanation outside the commentary. Someone might ask: "Why is the essence of tathatā free from the aforesaid marks of speech and so forth?" Therefore the śāstra explains: "Because all speech consists of provisional names and lacks reality." These two lines explain the reason for the previous transcendence of the two marks of speech and names. That is to say, the nature of the mind is real and does not correspond with the illusory; speech and names are merely illusory and provisionally existent, lacking real essence, and do not unite with the real; therefore they are transcended. The two lines beginning with "merely following..." have a phrasing that admits two applications: First, they explain the reason for the previous transcendence of the mark of mental cognition. Because the mark of mental cognition merely arises following those deluded thoughts, and thoughts lack intrinsic nature, how could the cognized mark exist? Therefore it says: "Because it merely follows deluded thoughts and cannot be grasped." The word "because" carries through to the preceding passage. Because the real essence is devoid of thought, and thought contravenes the real, it is therefore transcended. Second, they explain the reason for the preceding "provisional names lack reality," which is as explained in the commentary. The translator strove for conciseness, using one explanation for both sections; this is the skillful brevity of this text. From "What is called tathatā" onwards, it only then resolves the doubt. The doubt states: "Previously you said that it is free from the marks of speech and so forth to reveal that tathatā has no marks. Now you conclude again: 'Therefore it is called tathatā.' Is this not the mark of speech and so forth?" Therefore, taking this up, it sets forth: "What is called tathatā also has no marks." The doubter says again: "Explicitly stating 'tathatā' is precisely a name and a mark; why do you call it without marks?" Therefore the śāstra explains: "It means the ultimate limit of speech, using words to discard words." The intended meaning is: it does not mean that establishing this single name 'tathatā' causes one to stagnate in marks; it is by resorting to this provisionally established ultimate name that the marks of words are discarded. Let those with wisdom who arrive here examine this carefully. The rest of the text is as in the commentary.