起信論疏筆削記 7.34

7.34

"The four schools of non-Buddhists": First, the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being identical with the dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of existence. Therefore they are refuted: this clinging is not real. Why? If colors such as blue were identical with the nature of form, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of form. If sounds such as the five musical notes were identical with the nature of sound, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of sound. If sense faculties such as the eye were identical with the nature of faculties, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of faculties: each single faculty should grasp all objects, and each single object should correspond to all faculties. Furthermore, if all dharmas were identical with the nature of existence, their substances should all be the same, just like the nature of existence. Second, the Vaiśeṣika non-Buddhists, who say that the nature of existence and so forth is not identical with dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of non-existence. This too is not real. Why? If colors such as blue were different from the nature of form, they should, like sound and so forth, not be the domain of the eye; sound and so forth would likewise be so. Furthermore, if all dharmas were different from the nature of existence, they should be like the horns of a hare, fundamentally devoid of substance—and so on through extensive refutations. Third, the Ahrīka non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being both identical with and different from those dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of both existence and non-existence. This too is not real. Why? If the nature of existence and so forth were identical with form and so forth, it would share the fault of the Sāṃkhyas; if it were different from form and so forth, it would share [the fault of] the Vaiśeṣikas. The natures and marks of oneness and difference contradict each other; to say that their substance is the same cannot be rationally established. Oneness should be non-one, because being identical with difference it is like difference; difference should be non-difference, because being identical with oneness it is like oneness—and so on through extensive refutations. Fourth, the Ājīvika non-Buddhists, who cling to the nature of existence and so forth as being neither identical with nor different from those dharmas; this corresponds to the proposition of neither existence nor non-existence. This too is not real. Why? Is what you describe as neither identical nor different merely negative exclusion (apoha), or does it specifically have positive affirmation? If it specifically has positive affirmation, it should not doubly negate; if it is merely negative exclusion, there should be nothing clung to. To have both exclusion and affirmation is logically contradictory; to have neither exclusion nor affirmation reduces words to frivolous discourse (prapañca)—and so on through extensive refutations. In this way, the worldly generate four kinds of slander, namely existence, non-existence, asserting both, and negating both, which correspond in order to superimposition, deprecation, contradiction, and frivolous discourse; therefore, what the worldly cling to is not real.