大乘起信論裂網疏 1.2

1.2

佛祖之道，以心傳心，菩薩造論通經，亦唯此一大事，故云：十方諦求，更無餘乘。縱令曲為群機，循循善誘，從實施權，說種種道。譬如三草二木，受潤不同，而能潤之雨，原只一味。故云：如食石蜜，中邊皆甜。又云：粗言及細語，皆歸第一義。豈應封文失旨，橫執名相，剖判虛空也哉。且如彌勒世尊，迹居補處，本必難思。無著、天親既是龍華輔弼，則與文殊、普賢何異？至於馬鳴、龍樹，並屬金口授記，傳佛心宗，其所著述，決定不當互相乖異。乃後世講師，輒妄判曰：天親《識論》是立相始教，龍樹《中論》是破相始教，馬鳴《起信》是終教兼頓，並未是圓。嗚呼！其亦不思甚矣。夫天親宗瑜伽而立唯識，先以唯識破我法二執，次明識亦如幻、非真實有，故亦名為破色心論。今乃目之為立相教，可乎？龍樹依甚深般若，遍蕩四性情執以顯法性，故曰：欲具足一切佛法者，當學般若；又曰：若以無此空，一切無所作，以有空義故，一切皆得成。今乃目之為破相教，可乎？馬鳴以一心真如門，顯甚深般若隨智說；以一心生滅門，顯瑜伽八識隨情說。真如，即一真法界，統事理而泯絕事理者也；生滅，即全理所成之事，全事無性之理也。二門不離一心，則無一生滅而非全體真如，無一真如而不全具生滅，即事事無礙法界也。今乃謂其不同《唯識》、《中論》，仍非圓極一乘，可乎？況經論中，並謂真如與一切法，如水與波，不一不異，誠證具在，何容偏執？蓋若言定一，則真如不生滅應一切法亦不生滅，或一切法生滅應真如亦生滅，固為不可；若言定異，則真如非即一切法之實性，應在一切法外別有方隅，不常不遍，尤為不可。故《起信》謂真如受熏者，譬如觸波之時即觸於水，所以破定異之執，初未嘗言真如隨熏轉變也。《唯識》謂真如不受熏者，譬如波動之時濕性不動，所以破定一之執，初未嘗言別有凝然真如也（《唯識論》云「不同餘宗，離色心等有實常法，名曰真如。」又云「真如即是唯識實性。」明文彰灼若此，後人乃以凝然真如誣謗唯識，罪何如哉）。然則《唯識》所謂真故相無別，即《起信》一心真如門也。《唯識》所謂俗故相有別，即《起信》一心生滅門也。《楞伽經》云「諸識有三種相：謂轉相、業相、真相。」《宗鏡》釋云「起心名轉，八俱起故，皆有生滅，故名轉相；動則是業，八識皆動，盡名業相；八之真性，盡名真相。」由此觀之，《起信》、《唯識》皆宗《楞伽》明矣。宗本既同，則諸名義，自不相違，乃註疏家不能以義定名，漫爾依名定義，致令二論乖同水火，可不哀哉。此《大乘起信論》，藏有二本：一是梁真諦譯，一是唐實叉難陀譯。二譯對閱，唐本更為文顯義順。但舊既流通梁本，私心弗敢自專，敬以鬮決於佛，拈得宜解唐本，遂殫一隙微明，剖盡兩宗迷執，名之為「裂網疏」云。癸巳十月十有八日下筆故敘。

The path of the Buddhas and Patriarchs is to transmit mind with mind. The bodhisattvas composing treatises and expounding sūtras also did so solely for this one great matter. Therefore it is said: "Searching across the ten directions, there is no other vehicle." Even if they bent [the teachings] for the sake of myriad capacities, skillfully and gradually guiding them, employing expedient means derived from the real, and speaking of various paths—it is, for example, just as the three herbs and two trees receive moisture differently, while the rain that can moisten is originally of only one taste. Therefore it is said: "Like eating rock sugar, middle and edge are both sweet." It is also said: "Coarse words and subtle speech both revert to the ultimate truth." How could one cling to the text and lose the underlying intent, obstinately adhere to names and marks, and carve up empty space? Moreover, take the World-Honoured Maitreya: while his traces abide in the stage of succession, his fundamental nature is surely inconceivable. Since Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are his assistants at the Dragon Flower Tree, how do they differ from Mañjuśrī and Samantabhadra? As for Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, both received predictions from the Buddha's golden mouth and transmitted the Buddha's mind school; their writings certainly ought not to conflict with one another. Yet lecturers of later generations rashly and erroneously judged, saying: "Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is the initial teaching establishing characteristics; Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is the initial teaching refuting characteristics; Aśvaghoṣa's Awakening of Faith is the final teaching combined with the sudden, and neither is the complete [teaching]." Alas! How exceedingly unreflective they are! Vasubandhu took Yogācāra as his source and established vijñaptimātra, first refuting the two attachments to self and dharmas through vijñaptimātra, and next clarifying that consciousness is also like an illusion and not truly existent; thus it is also named the "Treatise Refuting Form and Mind." Can one now classify it as the "teaching establishing characteristics"? Nāgārjuna relied on profound Prajñāpāramitā, universally clearing away emotional attachments to the four natures in order to reveal the dharmatā. Thus he said: "Those who wish to be fully endowed with all Buddha-dharmas should learn Prajñāpāramitā"; and he also said: "If one maintains that there is no such emptiness, nothing at all could be accomplished; because the meaning of emptiness exists, all things can be accomplished." Can one now classify it as the "teaching that refutes characteristics"? Aśvaghoṣa used the one mind aspect of tathatā to reveal profound Prajñāpāramitā spoken in accordance with wisdom; he used the one mind aspect of arising and ceasing to reveal the Yogācāra eight consciousnesses spoken in accordance with sentiment. Tathatā is just the one true dharmadhātu, which subsumes phenomena and principle while eradicating phenomena and principle; arising and ceasing is just phenomena constituted entirely of principle, and principle whose complete phenomena are devoid of self-nature. The two aspects do not depart from the one mind, so there is no single arising and ceasing that is not the complete essence of tathatā, and no single tathatā that does not completely possess arising and ceasing—this is precisely the dharmadhātu of unimpeded phenomena and phenomena. Can one now claim that it differs from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and is still not the ultimate, complete One Vehicle? Furthermore, both sūtras and treatises state that tathatā and all dharmas are like water and waves, neither identical nor different; authentic proof is fully present, so how can one tolerate one-sided attachment? For if one asserts that they are definitely identical, then because tathatā neither arises nor ceases, all dharmas should also neither arise nor cease; or because all dharmas arise and cease, tathatā should also arise and cease—this is inherently inadmissible. If one asserts that they are definitely different, then tathatā would not be the real nature of all dharmas, and should exist outside all dharmas with a separate location, being neither permanent nor omnipresent—which is even more inadmissible. Thus, when the Awakening of Faith says that tathatā receives perfuming, it is like touching water at the very moment one touches a wave, which serves to refute the attachment to definite difference; it never said that tathatā transforms in accordance with perfuming. When the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says that tathatā does not receive perfuming, it is like the nature of wetness not moving when the wave moves, which serves to refute the attachment to definite identity; it never said that there is a separate immutable tathatā (The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "Unlike other schools, [we do not hold that] apart from form, mind, and so forth, there is a real, permanent dharma named tathatā." It also says: "Tathatā is precisely the real nature of vijñaptimātra." The clear text is manifest like this; how grave is the fault of later people who falsely slander Vijñaptimātra with immutable tathatā!). Therefore, what the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi calls "because of the real, marks have no difference" is the one mind aspect of tathatā in the Awakening of Faith. What the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi calls "because of the conventional, marks have differences" is the one mind aspect of arising and ceasing in the Awakening of Faith. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "The consciousnesses have three kinds of marks: transforming marks, karmic marks, and true marks." The Zongjing [lu] explains: "The arising of mind is called 'transforming'; because the eight arise together, all have arising and ceasing, hence they are called 'transforming marks'. Movement is karma; the eight consciousnesses all move, and all are named 'karmic marks'. The true nature of the eight is entirely named 'true marks'." Viewed from this, it is clear that both the Awakening of Faith and the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi take the Laṅkāvatāra as their source. Since their fundamental source is identical, their terms and meanings naturally do not conflict. Yet commentators could not define names according to meaning, and haphazardly defined meaning according to names, causing the two treatises to clash like water and fire—how lamentable! In the canon, there are two versions of this Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra: one translated by Paramārtha of the Liang, and one translated by Śikṣānanda of the Tang. Comparing the two translations, the Tang text is clearer in expression and smoother in meaning. But since the Liang version had long circulated, I did not dare act on private authority, so I reverently cast lots before the Buddha to decide, and drew the result indicating that I should comment on the Tang text. Thereupon, exhausting this tiny chink of light, I have dissected away the deluded attachments of both schools, naming it the "Net-Rending Commentary." Written on the eighteenth day of the tenth month in the year guisi (1653); hence this preface.