大乘義章 13.36

13.36

言體具者，如《毘曇》說。就彼初禪五支之中一心支者，是禪是支。言是禪者，是禪體也；言是支者，是支別也。餘四是支而非是禪，是其支別，非禪體也。問曰：此五望何說支？釋言：總望初禪之位故說為支，一切經論悉同此說。唯《瓔珞經》說有第六默然之心以為禪體，五支為因。何故不同？當應彼經凡聖通說，故為此論。前五是其世俗禪心說之為因，第六是其聖默然心說為定體。《成實》云何？論無定判，人釋左右。有人釋言：與《瓔珞》同，亦用第六默然為體，以一心等名為支因，故是因非體。若依《瓔珞》，凡聖通論，理亦無傷。若當直就世俗禪中言用第六默然為體，是義不然。云何知非？如彼論中解三昧義，言心住一緣名三昧相。解一心支，言離覺觀喜一緣中住是名為禪。與解三昧其義相似。若一心外別立第六默然為體，則三昧外亦應別立三昧之體。而三昧中住一緣外不可更立三昧之體，禪中亦爾，住一緣外何為更立默然為體？若言經中說一心等為禪支故更立體者，是則經中說七覺支，應七覺外別立覺體。又復經中說八道分，應八道外別立道體。彼既別無，此亦應然，何得更立？問曰：若用一心為體，何故名支？釋言：此望初禪總位，說支何妨？如望見位，八正名分；望修道位，七覺名支。此亦同彼，於中別分，前四是支、後一是體。亦如八正，正見是體，餘者是因。問曰：若爾，則同《毘曇》，云何得別？釋言：《成實》但非《毘曇》五支同時，不非一心以為禪體，明知共用。初禪五支體具既然，餘禪類爾（此三門竟）。

Regarding the completeness of the essence: it is as stated in the Abhidharma. Among the five limbs of the first dhyāna, the limb of one-pointedness of mind is both dhyāna and a limb. It is said to be "dhyāna" because it is the essence of dhyāna; it is said to be a "limb" because it is a distinct limb. The other four are limbs but not dhyāna: they are distinct limbs, not the essence of dhyāna. Question: In relation to what are these five called limbs? Answer: They are called limbs in relation to the overall stage of the first dhyāna; all sūtras and treatises agree with this statement. Only the *Yingluo jing* states that there is a sixth mind of silence that serves as the essence of dhyāna, with the five limbs serving as causes. Why is this different? Presumably because that sūtra speaks broadly of both ordinary beings and noble ones, it makes this formulation: the former five are the worldly dhyāna mind, spoken of as causes, while the sixth is the noble silent mind, spoken of as the essence of samādhi. What is the view in the *Tattvasiddhi*? The treatise has no definitive judgment, and commentators explain it in divergent ways. Some explain: It is the same as the *Yingluo jing*, also using the sixth silence as the essence, and taking one-pointedness of mind and the rest as the causal limbs; hence they are causes, not the essence. If one relies on the *Yingluo jing* as a general discourse covering ordinary beings and noble ones, the reasoning does no harm. But if one speaks strictly within worldly dhyāna and says that the sixth silence is used as the essence, this meaning is not correct. How is this known to be incorrect? As when that treatise explains the meaning of samādhi, stating that the mind abiding on a single object is the characteristic of samādhi; and when it explains the limb of one-pointedness of mind, it states that abiding in a single object free from initial inquiry, investigation, and joy is called dhyāna. This is similar in meaning to its explanation of samādhi. If, apart from one-pointedness of mind, a sixth silence were separately established as the essence, then apart from samādhi, an essence of samādhi should also be separately established. Yet in samādhi, apart from abiding on a single object, one cannot additionally establish an essence of samādhi; so too in dhyāna, apart from abiding on a single object, why should one additionally establish silence as the essence? If one says that because the sūtras speak of one-pointedness of mind and the rest as limbs of dhyāna, an essence must be established in addition, then when the sūtras speak of the seven factors of awakening, one should separately establish an essence of awakening outside the seven factors of awakening. Furthermore, when the sūtras speak of the eightfold path factors, one should separately establish an essence of the path outside the eightfold path. Since neither exists separately there, the same should apply here; how could one establish another? Question: If one-pointedness of mind is taken as the essence, why is it called a limb? Answer: What harm is there in calling it a limb in relation to the overall stage of the first dhyāna? Just as, in relation to the stage of vision, the eight right factors are called components; and in relation to the stage of cultivation, the seven factors of awakening are called limbs. This is also like that: within them they are distinguished, the former four being limbs and the last one being the essence. It is also like the eightfold right path, where right view is the essence and the remainder are causes. Question: If so, it is the same as the Abhidharma; how does it differ? Answer: The *Tattvasiddhi* merely denies the simultaneity of the five limbs in the Abhidharma, but does not deny that one-pointedness of mind is the essence of dhyāna; thus it is clear that they share this view. The completeness of the essence of the five limbs of the first dhyāna being thus, the remaining dhyānas are analogous (this concludes the third gate).