大乘義章 15.5

15.5

次辨其相。先論苦集滅道四智。宗別不同，所說各異。若依《毘曇》，知有漏果，苦與無常、空與無我四義冥通，名為苦智。知有漏因，因集有緣四義冥通，名為集智。知無漏果，盡止妙出四義冥通，名為滅智。知無漏因，道如迹乘四義冥通，名為道智。若依《成實》，了知四諦用名虛假無性之空，名為苦智乃至道智。大乘法中有止有觀，若入止門，於四真諦不收一相。故《地持》云「不於身等妄想觀苦、若妄觀集，亦不於斷起滅妄想，不於得因起道妄想，亦復不取一切非性。」若入觀門，種種悉知，於中所說開合不定。如就苦中，或總為一、或分為二。如《地持》說「如離言性，及知無量處方便法。」知離言性，猶是真諦，故《涅槃》云「菩薩之人解苦無苦而有真諦。」無量方便，猶是世諦，故《涅槃》云「分別是苦有無量相，是名上智。」或分為三，如《涅槃》說「所謂知苦、知諦、知實。了知三苦及八苦相，名為知苦。知彼苦法因緣有無，名為知諦。知苦實性，名知苦實。」此實即是如來之藏，故《勝鬘》云「於聖諦處，說如來藏。」亦是法身，故《涅槃》云「不知如來祕藏法身，是名為苦，不名聖諦。若知如來常住法身，名苦聖諦。」此名苦實以為諦矣。亦是如來虛空佛性，故《涅槃》云「如來非苦非諦是實，虛空佛性亦復如是。」凡佛同體，據佛望之，從本已來清淨無染，不須更滅，是故苦實即是如來。據凡望之，現為惑染，與後顯時淨德為本，是故此實名為佛性。就體離相，故復名空。菩薩於此皆如實知。或分為五：一知苦事，苦者實苦，不可令樂。二知虛假，假有四重：一因和合假，攬別成總；二法和合假，苦無常等同體相成；三妄相虛假，如幻如化；四妄相虛假，如夢所見，但從心現心外無法。此是第二。三知苦空，空有五種：一知苦法，非我我所，故名為空；二因和合中無性名空；三法和合中無性名空；四妄相法無相名空，如陽炎水，近見全無；五妄想法無實名空，如夢所見，於寤全無。此是第三。四知苦實，謂如來藏。於中有二：一如實空，從本已來離一切相、離一切性；二如實不空，從本已來具足無量過恒沙法。此義如前四諦章中具廣分別。此是第四。五知苦用，知如來藏不染而染緣起生死。或分為十，如《地經》說「始從世諦乃至第十如來智諦，廣則無量，菩薩於此悉如實知，名為苦智。」知苦既然，餘諦類爾。法智、比智，宗別不同，所說亦異。毘曇法中，時通處別。並知三世苦集滅道，故曰時通；處分上下，名為處別，法智唯知欲界之法，比智唯知上二界法。問曰：何故知欲界法偏名法智，知上界法偏名比智？《毘婆沙》云「初入聖道必在欲界，於欲界苦有二現見：一知苦現見、二知輕重現見，具此二現故名現智。於上界苦但有一種知苦現見，不知輕重，故不名現，說之為比。」故彼立喻如二擔物，一則自持、二令他持。於自持者有二現知：一知是物、二知輕重。於他持者但知是物，不知輕重。知欲界苦，如自持物，故名現智。知上界苦，如他持物，少一現知，故不名現，但得稱比。知苦既然，集等亦爾。若依《成實》，義別有二：第一約就時處分別。法比二智，處通時別。並通三界，名為處通；法智唯知現在之法，比智唯知過未之法，說為時別。何故法智唯知現在？現有法體易現知故。何故比智偏知過未？過未之法現無其體，難可現見，要依現在比度知故。二約法分別，時處俱通。於現法中隨觀一法虛假無性，比類三世一切諸法虛假無性，悉名為比。現見三世一切法空，同名為現。前門之中先現後比，此後門中先比後現。如牧象人先觀象跡後見象身，觀跡如比，見身如現。大乘法中，義別三階：一據修治。法智一種，時處俱別，唯知現在同處法故。比智一種，時處俱通，於一切時一切處法比度知故。故彼《相續解脫經》言「現前得相，知現在世苦無常等。依現得相，比知餘處及他世事中苦無常等。」現前得相，猶是現智。依現得相，猶是比智。良以始修，現智難成，故唯知於現在世中同處法矣。二據修次。法智一種，時處不定，於一切時一切處法，在前知者即名為現；以此類餘三界三世一切諸法，悉名為比。以修轉勝，於一切時一切處法能現知故。三據修成。唯一現智，通知三世一切處法，更無比知。故《地持》云「十方諸佛，於一切生、一切諸法現知見覺。」問曰：至佛若無比智，佛智應少。釋言：比度方能知法，此智微劣，少復何患。又佛雖不假比知法，而知諸法彼此相似，如此比智諸佛最多，故知不少。問曰：法比不異前四，何勞別說？釋言：辨義，有二種門：一攝相門，舉前四種即攝法比，不須更立；二分義門，前之四種約境別智，法之與比約時約處約修別智，與前義異，故須別說，《成實》約時，《毘曇》約處，大乘約修。於一切法，先觀名現，後知稱比。所言盡智、無生智者，依如《毘曇》，用前六智以之為體。若以苦智斷非想結，彼惑盡已，即說彼智為盡無生；集滅道智，類亦同然。若觀欲界滅道二諦斷非想惑，即用滅道法智為體；若觀上界苦集滅道斷非想惑，即用四比以之為體。此前諸智至無學果，在鈍根人唯名盡智，此人不能保已當結永更不生，非無生智。利根人得，初名盡智，後名無生。若出觀後重更入中，則名無學等見之智，非盡無生，於十智中前六收故。若依《成實》，用彼四諦現智為體，現觀諦空盡諸結故。於彼宗中，比智但伏，不能永斷，是故不說為盡、無生。彼盡、無生，同體義別，無學聖智能盡有因即名盡智，令苦不生即名無生。大乘法中，亦用四諦現智為體，現見諦實，盡諸結故。比伏不永與《成實》同，同體義分亦似《成實》。問曰：盡智及無生智，不異前六，何須別說？為分果德異前因故。如前四眼，至佛果德名為佛眼，此亦如是。言等智者，成實法中名名字智，在聖非凡。聖人以其名用之解，知於世俗假名之法，名名字智。毘曇法中不簡凡聖，以有漏慧等知諸法名為等智。大乘法中，義有通別，通如《毘曇》說，故《涅槃》云「一切眾生有三等智，別則知法幻有名等。」此知何等？解脫有通有別，通則能知二諦諸法。問曰：等智云何能知第一義諦？雖不能證，非不能解，故得知之。別則唯知世俗等諦。問曰：等智二諦俱緣，云何說言唯知等諦？釋言：等智於世俗法緣而能了，故說為知；於第一義緣而不了，故不名知。他心智者，依如《成實》，聖人以其名用之解了知他心，名他心智。凡夫之人雖知他心，是他心通，非他心智，以取著故。毘曇法中不簡凡聖，但知他心悉皆名為他心智也。大乘法中，通如《毘曇》，別如《成實》。問曰：此智唯知他心？亦知所緣？論說不同。毘曇法中，唯知他心不知所緣；若知所緣，不得名為他心智矣。成實法中，通知所緣。故《成實》云「通知何咎？」若知所緣，何故偏名他心智乎？依彼解釋，知有兼正，正知他心、兼知所緣，從正立稱，名他心智。大乘法中，文無定判，多同《成實》。

Next is to distinguish their characteristics. First, we discuss the four cognitions of suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path. Because the tenets of the traditions differ, what they state varies. According to the Abhidharma, knowing tainted fruition, where the four aspects of suffering, impermanence, emptiness, and non-self are profoundly penetrated, is called the cognition of suffering. Knowing tainted causes, where the four aspects of cause, origin, arising, and condition are profoundly penetrated, is called the cognition of the origin. Knowing untainted fruition, where the four aspects of cessation, pacification, excellence, and escape are profoundly penetrated, is called the cognition of cessation. Knowing untainted causes, where the four aspects of path, correctness, attainment, and emancipation are profoundly penetrated, is called the cognition of the path. According to the Tattvasiddhi, fully knowing that the functions and designations of the four truths are nominal, empty of self-nature, is called the cognition of suffering, and so on up to the cognition of the path. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, there are śamatha and vipaśyanā. If one enters the gate of śamatha, one does not seize a single mark within the four noble truths. Thus the Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "One does not, by false conceptualisation, contemplate suffering in the body and so forth, nor falsely contemplate the origin; neither does one give rise to the false conceptualisation of cessation regarding eradication, nor give rise to the false conceptualisation of the path regarding the causes of attainment; nor does one grasp at the non-nature of all things." If one enters the gate of vipaśyanā, one knows the various kinds in their entirety, and what is explained therein varies in its analytical expansion and synthesis. For example, regarding suffering, it is sometimes synthesized as one, or divided into two. As the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: "Such as the nature ineffable, and knowing the methods of immeasurable spheres." Knowing the ineffable nature is still the ultimate truth; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "The person who is a bodhisattva understands suffering to be without suffering, yet having the ultimate truth." Immeasurable methods are still the conventional truth; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "To distinguish suffering as having immeasurable characteristics is called supreme cognition." Or it is divided into three, as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Namely, knowing suffering, knowing the truth, and knowing reality. Fully knowing the characteristics of the three kinds of suffering and the eight kinds of suffering is called knowing suffering. Knowing the presence or absence of causes and conditions for those dharmas of suffering is called knowing the truth. Knowing the true nature of suffering is called knowing the reality of suffering." This reality is precisely the tathāgatagarbha; hence the Śrīmālā [Sūtra] says: "Where the noble truths are, the tathāgatagarbha is taught." It is also the dharmakāya; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Not knowing the hidden treasury of the Tathāgata, the dharmakāya, is called suffering, not the noble truth. If one knows the Tathāgata's eternally abiding dharmakāya, it is called the noble truth of suffering." Here, this reality of suffering is taken to be the truth. It is also the Tathāgata's empty-space Buddha-nature; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "The Tathāgata is neither suffering nor the truth, but is reality; the empty-space Buddha-nature is likewise so." Ordinary beings and the Buddha share the same essence. Looking from the vantage point of the Buddha, it has been pure and unstained from the beginning, without needing further cessation; therefore the reality of suffering is precisely the Tathāgata. Looking from the vantage point of ordinary beings, it is presently defiled by afflictions, serving as the basis for the pure virtues when manifested later; therefore this reality is called the Buddha-nature. In terms of essence it is free of marks, and so is also called emptiness. The bodhisattva knows all these as they truly are. Or it is divided into five: First, knowing the phenomenal matter of suffering: that what is suffering is truly suffering and cannot be made into pleasure. Second, knowing nominal provisionality, where the provisional has four levels: (1) provisionality through the combination of causes, drawing particulars together to form a whole; (2) provisionality through the combination of dharmas, where suffering, impermanence, and so forth are constituted of the same essence; (3) provisionality of false marks, like an illusion or an apparition; (4) provisionality of false marks, like what is seen in a dream, appearing solely from the mind with no dharma outside the mind. This is the second. Third, knowing the emptiness of suffering, where emptiness is of five kinds: (1) knowing that dharmas of suffering are not self or mine, and thus are called empty; (2) within the combination of causes, the absence of self-nature is called empty; (3) within the combination of dharmas, the absence of self-nature is called empty; (4) in dharmas of false marks, their signlessness is called empty, like water in a mirage which disappears entirely when approached; (5) in dharmas of false thoughts, their lack of actuality is called empty, like what is seen in a dream which is completely absent upon waking. This is the third. Fourth, knowing the reality of suffering, which refers to the tathāgatagarbha. Within this there are two aspects: (1) truly empty, being from the beginning free of all marks and free of all natures; (2) truly not empty, possessing from the beginning immeasurable dharmas surpassing the sands of the Ganges. This meaning was distinguished extensively in the preceding chapter on the Four Truths. This is the fourth. Fifth, knowing the function of suffering, knowing that the unstained tathāgatagarbha becomes stained through conditioned arising, producing birth and death. Or it is divided into ten, as the Daśabhūmika Sūtra says: "Beginning from the conventional truth up to the tenth, the truth of the Tathāgata's cognition; extensively speaking, they are immeasurable, and the bodhisattva knows all these as they truly are, which is called the cognition of suffering." As it is with knowing suffering, so it is analogously with the other truths. As for dharma-cognition and inductive cognition, because the tenets of the traditions differ, what they state also varies. In the Abhidharma doctrine, they are universal in time but distinguished by realm. Because both cognize suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path across the three times, they are called universal in time; because they distinguish higher and lower realms, they are called distinguished by realm: dharma-cognition knows only the dharmas of the desire realm, whereas inductive cognition knows only the dharmas of the upper two realms. Question: Why is knowing the dharmas of the desire realm specifically called dharma-cognition, while knowing the dharmas of the upper realms is specifically called inductive cognition? The Vibhāṣā says: "When first entering the noble path, one must be in the desire realm. Regarding the suffering of the desire realm, there are two direct perceptions: first, the direct perception of knowing suffering; second, the direct perception of knowing lightness and heaviness. Possessing these two direct perceptions, it is called direct cognition. Regarding the suffering of the upper realms, there is only one kind, the direct perception of knowing suffering, without knowing lightness and heaviness; hence it is not called direct, but is spoken of as inductive." Therefore, they set up the analogy of two carrying loads: one carries it oneself, and the second has another carry it. Regarding the one who carries it oneself, there are two direct cognitions: first, knowing it is a thing; second, knowing lightness and heaviness. Regarding the one carried by another, one only knows it is a thing, not knowing lightness and heaviness. Knowing the suffering of the desire realm is like carrying the load oneself, and is thus called direct cognition. Knowing the suffering of the upper realms is like the load carried by another, lacking one direct cognition; hence it is not called direct, but can only be termed inductive. As it is with knowing suffering, so it is with the origin and the rest. According to the Tattvasiddhi, there are two different meanings: First, distinguishing them by time and realm. Dharma-cognition and inductive cognition are universal in realm but distinguished by time. Both extending through the three realms, they are called universal in realm; dharma-cognition knows only present dharmas, while inductive cognition knows only past and future dharmas, and thus they are stated as distinguished by time. Why does dharma-cognition know only the present? Because present dharmas have an existing substantial entity and are easily known directly. Why does inductive cognition specifically know the past and future? Because past and future dharmas presently lack a substantial entity and are difficult to see directly, requiring inferential induction based on the present to be known. Second, distinguishing them in terms of dharmas, both time and realm are universal. In present dharmas, when contemplating any single dharma as nominal and lacking self-nature, to infer analogously that all dharmas across the three times are nominal and lacking self-nature is entirely called inductive. Directly seeing that all dharmas of the three times are empty is collectively called direct. In the previous approach, the direct comes first and the inductive later; in this latter approach, the inductive comes first and the direct later. Just as an elephant tracker first observes the elephant's footprints and later sees the elephant's body: observing footprints is like the inductive, and seeing the body is like the direct. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, there are three distinct levels: First, in terms of cultivation and training. Dharma-cognition alone is distinguished by both time and realm, because it knows only present dharmas in the same realm. Inductive cognition alone is universal in both time and realm, because it knows dharmas across all times and all realms by inferential induction. Thus the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra states: "Acquiring the sign before oneself, one knows suffering, impermanence, and so forth in the present world. Relying on the sign acquired in the present, one inductively knows suffering, impermanence, and so forth in other realms and other lifetimes." Acquiring the sign before oneself is still direct cognition. Relying on the sign acquired in the present is still inductive cognition. Truly because it is initial cultivation, direct cognition is difficult to accomplish, so it only knows dharmas in the same realm within the present world. Second, in terms of the stages of cultivation. Dharma-cognition is indeterminate in time and realm: among dharmas of all times and all realms, that which is known first is called direct; taking this to analogize the rest of all dharmas of the three realms and three times is entirely called inductive. Because cultivation becomes increasingly superior, one can directly know dharmas of all times and all realms. Third, in terms of the completion of cultivation. There is only a single direct cognition, which universally knows dharmas of all realms across the three times, with no further inductive cognition. Hence the Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "The Buddhas of the ten directions have direct cognition, vision, and awakening regarding all births and all dharmas." Question: If upon reaching Buddhahood there is no inductive cognition, the Buddha's cognition would be deficient. The explanation: Inferential induction is required only to know dharmas when cognition is weak and inferior; what harm is there in its absence? Moreover, although the Buddha does not depend on inductive cognition to know dharmas, he knows the mutual similarity of dharmas; such inductive cognition is possessed most abundantly by the Buddhas, so we know it is not deficient. Question: Dharma-cognition and inductive cognition are not different from the previous four; why bother explaining them separately? The explanation: In explaining the principles, there are two gates: First, the gate of subsuming characteristics: raising the previous four already subsumes dharma-cognition and inductive cognition, without needing further establishment. Second, the gate of differentiating meanings: the previous four distinguish cognitions according to the objective sphere, whereas dharma-cognition and inductive cognition distinguish cognitions according to time, realm, and cultivation, which differs from the previous meaning; thus they must be explained separately—the Tattvasiddhi focuses on time, the Abhidharma focuses on realm, and the Mahāyāna focuses on cultivation. Regarding all dharmas, contemplating first is called direct, and knowing later is called inductive. Regarding the cognition of exhaustion and the cognition of non-arising, according to the Abhidharma, they take the previous six cognitions as their essential nature. If one uses the cognition of suffering to sever the bonds of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, when those afflictions are exhausted, that cognition is called the cognition of exhaustion and the cognition of non-arising; the cognitions of the origin, cessation, and the path are analogously the same. If one contemplates the two truths of cessation and the path in the desire realm to sever the afflictions of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one uses the dharma-cognition of cessation and the path as their essential nature; if one contemplates suffering, the origin, cessation, and the path in the upper realms to sever the afflictions of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one uses the four inductive cognitions as their essential nature. When these preceding cognitions reach the fruition of non-learning, in a person of dull faculties they are called solely the cognition of exhaustion; such a person cannot guarantee that their future bonds will never arise again, so it is not the cognition of non-arising. When attained by a person of sharp faculties, it is first called the cognition of exhaustion and later called the cognition of non-arising. If after emerging from contemplation one re-enters it, it is then called the cognition of conventional views of the stage of non-learning, not the cognition of exhaustion or non-arising, because it is subsumed under the first six among the ten cognitions. According to the Tattvasiddhi, they take the direct cognition of the four truths as their essential nature, because directly contemplating the emptiness of the truths exhausts all bonds. In that tradition, inductive cognition only suppresses and cannot permanently sever; hence it is not spoken of as the cognition of exhaustion or non-arising. Those cognitions of exhaustion and non-arising share the same substance but differ in meaning: when the noble cognition of non-learning can exhaust the causes of existence, it is called the cognition of exhaustion; when it causes suffering not to arise, it is called the cognition of non-arising. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, they likewise take the direct cognition of the four truths as their essential nature, because directly seeing the reality of the truths exhausts all bonds. That inductive cognition suppresses without permanently severing is the same as the Tattvasiddhi; that they share the same substance with distinguished meanings is also similar to the Tattvasiddhi. Question: Since the cognition of exhaustion and the cognition of non-arising are not different from the preceding six, why must they be explained separately? It is to differentiate the fruition virtues from the preceding causal stage. Just as the previous four eyes are called the Buddha-eye when reaching the Buddha's fruition virtues, this is also like that. Regarding conventional cognition, in the Tattvasiddhi tradition it is called cognition of names, existing in the noble and not ordinary beings. Because noble ones use their understanding of names and functions to know the nominal dharmas of conventional worldly reality, it is called cognition of names. In the Abhidharma doctrine, no distinction is made between ordinary beings and noble ones: tainted wisdom that universally knows all dharmas is called conventional cognition. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, the meaning has a universal and a particular aspect: the universal is as explained in the Abhidharma; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "All sentient beings have three conventional cognitions; the particular refers to knowing dharmas to exist like an illusion, which is conventional." What does this know? In liberation there are universal and particular aspects: universally, it can know the dharmas of both truths. Question: How can conventional cognition know the ultimate truth? Although it cannot directly realize it, it is not unable to understand it, and thus can know it. Particularly, it knows only the conventional and equivalent truth. Question: Conventional cognition takes both truths as its object; why is it said to know only the conventional truth? The explanation: Conventional cognition takes conventional dharmas as its object and can comprehend them, so it is said to know them; regarding the ultimate truth, it takes it as its object but cannot fully comprehend it, so it is not called knowing. Regarding the cognition of others' minds, according to the Tattvasiddhi, a noble one's comprehension of another's mind through understanding names and functions is called cognition of others' minds. Although ordinary beings know another's mind, that is the supernormal power of knowing others' minds, not the cognition of others' minds, because of their grasping and attachment. In the Abhidharma doctrine, no distinction is made between ordinary beings and noble ones; merely knowing another's mind is in all cases called the cognition of others' minds. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, the universal is like the Abhidharma, and the particular is like the Tattvasiddhi. Question: Does this cognition know only another's mind, or does it also know the object cognized by it? The treatises explain this differently. In the Abhidharma doctrine, it knows only another's mind and does not know its object; if it knew the object, it could not be called the cognition of others' minds. In the Tattvasiddhi tradition, it universally knows the object. Hence the Tattvasiddhi says: "What fault is there in universally knowing?" If it knows the object, why is it specifically called the cognition of others' minds? According to their explanation, knowing has primary and secondary aspects: knowing another's mind is primary, and knowing its object is secondary; its title is established from the primary, so it is called the cognition of others' minds. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, the texts have no fixed determination, but mostly agree with the Tattvasiddhi.