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大乘義章 17.20

大乘義章 17.20

Language
Classical Chinese

17.20

次約前後論得論捨。先論捨義。問曰:須陀得果之時,為捨前向?為當不捨?若依《毘曇》,證果之時定捨前向。捨有二種:一約行修,不行名捨,道比智時前十五心不現行故。二約得修,得斷名捨,因得斷已果得生故。若依《成實》,亦捨。以實細分,因心謝已,果心現前,名之為捨;相續論之,因滿為果,非捨前得,名為不捨。問曰:須陀修增進道,向斯陀時捨前果不?釋言:不捨。何故如是?證果心深,所以不捨。又復須陀雖起勝行,唯依前果而自息止,為是不捨。次論得義。問曰:須陀證初果時,為得前向合為後果?為當不得?此如前釋,依如《毘曇》,修有二種:一是行修、二是得修。若據行修,果中唯有道比智心,無前十五。若據得修,得於前向合為後果。是義云何?證初果時,捨前向中十五別得,一總得生得道比智,并得向中十五無漏,合為須陀。問曰:為當直得向中所得功德合為後果?亦得向中能得之得為後果乎?義解不定。一義釋之:唯得所得無漏功德合為後果,不得能得。何故如是?所得法體,體有彼此通成之義,故復得之。能得之得非正法體,彼此局別,無有彼此通成之義,為是不得。又復所得心法為主,心法寬通,一起之者必有種類成在未來,未來有其可起義故,後復得之,合以為果。得非心法,無有寬通在未來義,故後不得合成其果。以有此別,是故論中說捨前得更起果得,得於前法合為果矣。又更解釋:正得前法,兼得前得,合為後果,理亦無傷。故論中問曰:若得有得,有無窮過。論自釋言:無窮何苦?問曰:若使果得起時通得前得,何名為斷?何名為捨?雖復得之,非彼種類,故得名捨。《毘曇》如是。若依《成實》,唯立行修,無得修修義,是故不說得於前向合為後果。問曰:須陀起於勝行,向斯陀時有得前果成後向不?釋言:不得。起後向時,前果不捨,故無異得。得捨如是(此二門竟)。

Next, acquisition and abandonment are discussed in terms of before and after. First, the meaning of abandonment is discussed. Question: When the srotāpanna attains the fruit, do they abandon the previous approach, or do they not abandon it? According to the Abhidharma, at the time of realizing the fruit, one definitely abandons the previous approach. There are two kinds of abandonment: First, in terms of practice-cultivation, non-functioning is called abandonment, because at the time of the subsequent cognition of the path, the previous fifteen minds do not manifest. Second, in terms of acquisition-cultivation, the cessation of acquisition is called abandonment, because the cause-acquisition having ceased, the fruit-acquisition arises. According to the Tattvasiddhi, one also abandons: distinguishing finely according to reality, when the causal mind has passed away and the fruit mind is present, this is termed abandonment; discussing it in terms of continuity, the culmination of the cause becomes the fruit, and it is not an abandonment of the previous acquisition, which is termed non-abandonment. Question: When the srotāpanna cultivates the advancing path approaching the sakṛdāgāmin, do they abandon the previous fruit or not? It is explained: They do not abandon it. Why is this? The mind realizing the fruit is profound, which is why it is not abandoned. Moreover, although the srotāpanna gives rise to superior practice, they rest securely relying solely upon the previous fruit, and for this reason they do not abandon it. Next, the meaning of acquisition is discussed. Question: When the srotāpanna realizes the first fruit, do they acquire the previous approach to combine it into the subsequent fruit, or do they not acquire it? This is as explained before: according to the Abhidharma, there are two kinds of cultivation: first, practice-cultivation; second, acquisition-cultivation. In terms of practice-cultivation, in the fruit there is only the mind of the subsequent cognition of the path, without the previous fifteen. In terms of acquisition-cultivation, one acquires the previous approach to combine it into the subsequent fruit. What is this meaning? When realizing the first fruit, one abandons the fifteen distinct acquisitions in the previous approach, and a single overall acquisition arises, acquiring the subsequent cognition of the path and together acquiring the fifteen untainted [minds] in the approach, combined as the srotāpanna. Question: Does one directly acquire only the merits acquired in the approach to combine them into the subsequent fruit, or does one also acquire the acquisitions capable of acquiring in the approach as the subsequent fruit? The theoretical explanations are not uniform. One explanation: One acquires only the untainted merits that were acquired to combine them into the subsequent fruit, but does not acquire the acquisitions capable of acquiring. Why is this? The essence of the dharmas that are acquired has the quality of mutually completing one another, hence one re-acquires them. The acquisitions capable of acquiring are not the primary essence of the dharmas; they are mutually restricted and distinct, lacking the quality of mutually completing one another, and for this reason they are not acquired. Furthermore, the mental dharmas acquired are primary; mental dharmas are broad and universal, and once one arises, its kind will definitely be established in the future; because in the future there is the potential for it to arise, one subsequently re-acquires it, combining it to make the fruit. Acquisition is not a mental dharma, lacking the quality of being broad, universal, and residing in the future, hence it is not subsequently acquired to combine into its fruit. Because of this distinction, the treatises state that one abandons the previous acquisitions and further generates the fruit-acquisition, acquiring the previous dharmas to combine them into the fruit. It is further explained: One primarily acquires the previous dharmas and concurrently acquires the previous acquisitions, combining them into the subsequent fruit, and in principle there is also no flaw. Thus the treatise asks: If an acquisition has an acquisition, there is the fault of infinite regress. The treatise itself explains: What harm is there in an infinite regress? Question: If when the fruit-acquisition arises it universally acquires the previous acquisitions, why is it called cutting off, and why is it called abandonment? Although one re-acquires them, they are not of that same category, hence it is termed abandonment. Thus it is in the Abhidharma. If according to the Tattvasiddhi, it posits only practice-cultivation and has no doctrine of acquisition-cultivation; therefore it does not speak of acquiring the previous approach to combine it into the subsequent fruit. Question: When the srotāpanna generates superior practice, approaching the sakṛdāgāmin, do they acquire the previous fruit to establish the subsequent approach or not? It is explained: They do not acquire it. When the subsequent approach arises, the previous fruit is not abandoned, so there is no different acquisition. Acquisition and abandonment are like this (this concludes the second gate).

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