大乘義章 18.23

18.23

次就大小明具不具。大乘涅槃備具四義，已如上釋。小乘涅槃，四義不定。據小說小，小乘涅槃有常樂淨，唯無有我。何故如是？涅槃無為，四相不遷，故說為常；又復所斷，永滅不起，故亦名常。寂滅永安，故次名樂。絕離垢染，故得稱淨。小乘涅槃以空為體，未證有性，故不名我。彼涅槃中身智俱亡，用不自在，故不名我。問曰：《涅槃》初德中說「聲聞之人說佛涅槃，但有常淨而無我樂，名煩惱習。」彼聲聞人自見涅槃具常樂，何故說佛涅槃？釋曰：聲聞自見涅槃有寂滅樂，類佛亦然。據斯以論，不言如來涅槃無樂。但彼自見涅槃之中身智永亡無覺智樂，謂佛亦無，故說無樂。據小說小，其義如是。據大說小，義則不定。或時全奪，四義悉無。故《涅槃經》初德中言「聲聞所得無常無樂無我無淨，是故不得名大涅槃。諸佛涅槃常樂我淨，故得名大。」於此門中，聲聞所得少故稱無，如河水少名之無水。又得非真故亦名無，如得物名為非物。如來或復隨別奪之，宣說二乘所得涅槃但有樂淨而無我常。如《涅槃經》第七德說「聲聞緣覺以得無漏八聖道故，故有樂淨。又滅惑因，故說有淨。離分段苦，故言有樂。彼小涅槃，體不真實、用不自在，故不名我。所滅身智當復更生，故不名常。」問曰：身智滅之已竟，何緣復生？釋言：彼生即變易果。由本所修無漏業因，無明為緣，可以更生。無明緣者，入涅槃時妄識心在，妄七識心是無明地，以此妄心不斷絕故，依之報起，如依睡心夢中身生。問曰：聲聞所得涅槃滅去身智復更生者，所滅煩惱後亦應起。釋言：不類。煩惱源由見理故滅。二乘無餘涅槃之後，心想生時亦必見理，是故本昔所斷煩惱不得更生，所未斷者後得現起。身智源非見理斷滅，但是息滅非治滅故，後得更起。又復二乘所得涅槃體不究竟，終須遷轉趣向大乘，故不名常。若後遷轉不名常者，亦應不得名樂名淨，何故說之有樂淨乎？理亦應齊，齊義如上。但樂與淨非恒定義，故於得處隨分說之。常是定義，始終不遷方便名常，彼終向大而非永定，故不名常。大小相對明具不具，辨之略爾。四義如是。

Next is the clarification of completeness and incompleteness in relation to the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That the Mahāyāna nirvāṇa fully possesses the four meanings has already been explained above. In the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa, the four meanings are variable. According to the Hīnayāna speaking of the Hīnayāna, the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa possesses permanence, bliss, and purity, lacking only self. Why is this? Nirvāṇa is unconditioned, and the four marks do not change it, so it is called permanent; furthermore, what has been severed is eternally extinguished and does not arise again, so it is also called permanent. Being tranquil and eternally at peace, it is next called bliss. Utterly separated from defilements, it obtains the designation of purity. Because the Hīnayāna nirvāṇa takes emptiness as its essence and has not realized the nature of existence, it is not called self. In that nirvāṇa, both body and consciousness are extinguished, and functions lack mastery, so it is not called self. Question: In the section on the first virtue of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, it says: 'When śrāvakas speak of the Buddha's nirvāṇa as possessing only permanence and purity without self and bliss, this is called the residue of afflictions.' Since those śrāvakas themselves see their own nirvāṇa as possessing permanence and bliss, why would they speak thus of the Buddha's nirvāṇa? Explanation: Śrāvakas themselves see that their nirvāṇa has the bliss of cessation, and assimilate the Buddha to the same. Discussed on this basis, it does not mean they say the Tathāgata's nirvāṇa lacks bliss. However, because they themselves see that in nirvāṇa both body and consciousness are eternally extinguished without the bliss of awakened consciousness, they assume the Buddha is likewise, and therefore say it lacks bliss. According to the Hīnayāna speaking of the Hīnayāna, its meaning is like this. According to the Mahāyāna speaking of the Hīnayāna, the meaning is variable. Sometimes it is completely denied, so that all four meanings are absent. Therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra states in the section on the first virtue: 'What the śrāvakas attain is impermanent, non-blissful, non-self, and impure; therefore it cannot be called great nirvāṇa. The nirvāṇa of the Buddhas is permanent, blissful, self, and pure; therefore it can be called great.' In this section, because what the śrāvakas attain is minimal, it is called 'non-existent,' just as when a river has little water it is called 'waterless.' Furthermore, because what they have attained is not real, it is also called non-existent, just as an imitation object is called 'not an object.' Or the Tathāgata may deny them individually, proclaiming that the nirvāṇa attained by the two vehicles possesses only bliss and purity, but lacks self and permanence. As stated in the seventh virtue of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: 'Because śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have attained the untainted eightfold noble path, they have bliss and purity. Moreover, having extinguished the causes of delusion, they are said to have purity; being free from the suffering of portioned death, they are said to have bliss. That small nirvāṇa is not real in essence and lacks mastery in function, so it is not called self. The body and consciousness that have been extinguished will arise again, so it is not called permanent.' Question: Since body and consciousness have already been extinguished, due to what conditions could they arise again? Explanation: That arising is the fruit of transformation. By virtue of the untainted karmic causes originally cultivated, with ignorance serving as condition, they can arise again. As for the condition of ignorance: when entering nirvāṇa, the deluded consciousness remains; the deluded seventh consciousness is the ground of ignorance, and because this deluded mind is not cut off, the retribution arises relying upon it, just as, relying on the sleeping mind, a body is produced in a dream. Question: If the body and consciousness extinguished in the nirvāṇa attained by the śrāvakas arise again, the extinguished afflictions should also arise subsequently. Explanation: They are not comparable. Afflictions originate and are extinguished because of seeing the principle. After the two vehicles attain nirvāṇa without residue, when conceptual thoughts arise, they will inevitably also see the principle; therefore, the afflictions originally severed in the past cannot arise again, while those not yet severed may appear subsequently. The body and consciousness were not originally severed and extinguished because of seeing the principle; they were merely brought to rest, not eradicated by an antidote, and therefore they can arise again subsequently. Furthermore, the essence of the nirvāṇa attained by the two vehicles is not ultimate; it must eventually transform and turn toward the Mahāyāna, and therefore is not called permanent. If it is not called permanent because it will transform later, then it should also not be called bliss or purity; why then are bliss and purity attributed to it? In principle they should be equal, and their equality is as stated above. However, bliss and purity are not definitions of permanence, so they are spoken of partially in accordance with what is attained. Permanence is a definitive term; only when it remains unchanged from beginning to end is it properly termed permanent. Since they ultimately turn toward the Mahāyāna and are not permanently fixed, it is not called permanent. Clarifying completeness and incompleteness through the contrast of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna has been briefly distinguished thus. The four meanings are like this.