大乘義章 2.28

2.28

成實法中心數不定，攝末從本有三十七，隨末別論則有無量。云何從本有三十七？如彼論說，通數有十，思、觸、念、欲、喜、信、懃、覺、觀、憶，前四後一與《毘曇》同，餘五別異。所言思者，如思品說，愛分願求名思。不同《毘曇》愛為煩惱，思為通數。觸者，論言三和名觸。彼以心識依根觸塵，故名為觸，不說心外別有觸數。理實觸義遍通四心，今就行心說為觸矣。念者，論言作發名念，作意起後名為作發。欲者，論言心有所須名欲。喜者，論言心樂名喜，欲中增上說為喜也。《毘曇》無此。信者，論言必定名信。此通三性；《毘曇》唯善，不善中者即名不信。懃者，論言心行發動名之為懃。此通三性，入善法中返名精進；《毘曇》唯善。言覺觀者，論釋多種：一隨定以說，麁思名覺、細思名觀。二隨慧以說，未知事中比知名覺、現知稱觀。三就亂心以說，散心數起名覺、散心微少稱觀。憶者，論言知先所更名憶。以此十種，處遍三界、體通三性，故名通數。善數有十，通前二十。所謂定，慧，無貪、瞋、癡，慚，愧，猗，捨及不放逸。定者，義釋有通有別。通而論之，遍在三性，淨定是善、垢定不善、報定無記，別唯在善。論主就別，說為善數。慧者，義釋亦有通別。通而論之亦在三性，正智是善、邪智是不善、汎知世事是其無記。別而論之，無漏之慧說為慧數，有漏善慧說之以為無癡善根，顛倒之慧說為邪見，餘不善慧及無記慧說為覺觀。論主就別，說無漏慧為慧數也。無貪、無瞋、慚、愧、猗、捨及不放逸，與《毘曇》同。無廢善者，毘曇法中體是慧數，更不別分；《成實》分取有漏善慧為無癡故，所以別說。以何義故不說解脫？彼宗之中說慧為脫，更無別法，是以不論。不善之中數有十四，通前合為三十四也。何者十四？十使煩惱相從為六：五見之心合為邪見即以為一，貪、瞋、癡、慢及與疑使復以為五，通前六也。十纏之中別數有五，謂無慚、愧，掉，悔及覆，通前十一。以何義故不說慳纏？是貪分故。以何義故不說忿嫉？是瞋分故。以何義故不說睡眠？無明分故。問云：覆纏應是貪分，何故別論？釋言：覆者不偏屬貪。或有眾生怖畏打縛割截等事覆藏己過，或為財利，是義不定，所以別說。六垢之中有諂及誑，通前十三，何故不說惱恨害等？是瞋分故。何不說高？以慢分故。問曰：諂誑應是貪分，何故別論？諂義不定，或貪故諂、或畏故諂。誑亦不定，或貪故誑、或瞋故誑、或畏故誑，以不偏在，所以別論。加其放逸，通前十四，不善如是。無記有三，謂識、想、受。彼宗之中，行前三心唯無記故。以此通前為三十七，據要如是。隨別以論，心法無量。如一貪心，隨別眾多，所謂惡欲、多欲、無厭、慳、著、現相、擊切、以利求利、羅波那等，如是非一。害他求利名惡欲。廣求多利稱多欲。更無多利名無厭。所有一切不與他共名慳。纏愛不捨名著。以貪利故現欲得相名現相。讚彼毀此而取其利名擊切。說餘所得以招此利名以利求利。心貪其利口悅人意名羅波那。瞋中隨別亦有無量，所謂瞋、恨、憎、嫉、忿、恚、惱、害、迷、悷、專執、不忍、暴急、不悅、不調，如是非一。無明隨別亦有眾多，所謂闇、鈍、囂、騃、迷、妄、愚、拙、睡、眠、單致利等。緣而不了名闇。悟解不速稱鈍。損而不覺名囂。無心分別曰騃。翻此謂彼名迷。得而還失稱妄。不辨是非曰愚。所作不巧名拙。心重欲眠重名睡。攝心離覺名眠。憙睡之病名單致利。隨此等別，故有無量。此等別數，論中雖不一一具論，義實有之。

In the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi, the caittas are not fixed: subsuming the branches into the root, there are thirty-seven; if discussed distinctly according to the branches, they are immeasurable. How are there thirty-seven from the root? As that treatise says, there are ten universal caittas: volition (cetanā), contact (sparśa), mindfulness (smṛti), aspiration (chanda), joy (prīti), faith (śraddhā), exertion (vīrya), gross investigation (vitarka), subtle analysis (vicāra), and memory. The first four and the last one are identical with the Abhidharma, while the remaining five are different. Regarding what is called volition: as the Chapter on Volition states, wishing and seeking as a part of craving is called volition. This differs from the Abhidharma, where craving is a defilement and volition is a universal caitta. Regarding contact: the treatise states that the harmonious union of the three is called contact. That treatise holds that when the mind-consciousness relies on the sense-organ to contact sense-objects, it is therefore called contact; it does not state that there is a separate caitta of contact outside the mind. In truth of principle, the meaning of contact universally extends through the four minds; here it is spoken of as contact with respect to the mind of formation. Regarding mindfulness: the treatise states that arousal and activation is called mindfulness; when mental application arouses what follows, it is called arousal and activation. Regarding aspiration: the treatise states that the mind having a need is called aspiration. Regarding joy: the treatise states that mental delight is called joy; an intensification of aspiration is spoken of as joy. The Abhidharma lacks this. Regarding faith: the treatise states that certain determination is called faith. This extends through the three natures; in the Abhidharma it is solely wholesome, and that which is among the unwholesome is directly called lack of faith. Regarding exertion: the treatise states that the activation of mental action is called exertion. This extends through the three natures, and when entering wholesome dharmas it is contrarily called diligence (vīrya); in the Abhidharma it is solely wholesome. Regarding gross investigation and subtle analysis: the treatise's explanation has several kinds: first, explained according to samādhi: coarse thinking is called gross investigation, and fine thinking is called subtle analysis; second, explained according to prajñā: knowing by inference regarding matters not yet known is called gross investigation, and direct knowing is called subtle analysis; third, explained with respect to the distracted mind: the frequent arising of a dispersed mind is called gross investigation, and a dispersed mind being faint and slight is called subtle analysis. Regarding memory: the treatise states that knowing what was previously experienced is called memory. Because these ten kinds universally pervade the three realms and their substance extends through the three natures, they are called universal caittas. There are ten wholesome caittas, which together with the preceding makes twenty: namely, concentration, prajñā, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, shame, embarrassment, serenity, equanimity, and heedfulness. Regarding concentration: its doctrinal explanation has both a universal and a distinct sense. Discussed universally, it pervades the three natures: purified concentration is wholesome, stained concentration is unwholesome, and retributive concentration is indeterminate; in a distinct sense, it exists solely in the wholesome. The treatise master, relying on the distinct sense, speaks of it as a wholesome caitta. Regarding prajñā: its doctrinal explanation also has a universal and a distinct sense. Discussed universally, it also exists in the three natures: correct knowledge is wholesome, incorrect knowledge is unwholesome, and general worldly knowledge is its indeterminate aspect. Discussed in a distinct sense, untainted prajñā is spoken of as the caitta of prajñā, tainted wholesome prajñā is spoken of as the wholesome root of non-delusion, inverted prajñā is spoken of as wrong view, and the remaining unwholesome prajñā and indeterminate prajñā are spoken of as gross investigation and subtle analysis. The treatise master, relying on the distinct sense, speaks of untainted prajñā as the caitta of prajñā. Non-greed, non-hatred, shame, embarrassment, serenity, equanimity, and heedfulness are identical with the Abhidharma. The non-deluded wholesome root in the Abhidharma system is in substance the caitta of prajñā and is not differentiated separately; the Tattvasiddhi selectively divides tainted wholesome prajñā to be non-delusion, and so it is explained separately. For what reason is liberation not mentioned? In that school, prajñā is explained as liberation, and there is no separate dharma; hence it is not discussed. Among the unwholesome, there are fourteen caittas, which together with the preceding makes thirty-four. What are the fourteen? The defilements of the ten fetters are grouped into six: the mind of the five views is combined into wrong view, which makes one; and the fetters of greed, hatred, delusion, pride, and doubt make five more, which together with the preceding makes six. Among the ten entanglements (paryavasthāna), there are distinctly five caittas: namely, shamelessness, lack of embarrassment, restlessness, regret, and concealment, which together with the preceding makes eleven. For what reason is the entanglement of stinginess not mentioned? Because it is a part of greed. For what reason are anger and jealousy not mentioned? Because they are parts of hatred. For what reason is torpor-and-sleep not mentioned? Because it is a part of ignorance. Question: The entanglement of concealment should be a part of greed; why is it discussed separately? Explanation: Concealment does not belong exclusively to greed. There are sentient beings who, out of fear of beatings, bindings, mutilation, and so forth, conceal their own faults; or it may be for wealth and gain. This meaning is variable, and so it is discussed separately. Among the six defilements (mala), there are flattery and deceit, which together with the preceding makes thirteen. Why are affliction, enmity, harmfulness, and so forth not mentioned? Because they are parts of hatred. Why is haughtiness not mentioned? Because it is a part of pride. Question: Flattery and deceit should be parts of greed; why are they discussed separately? The meaning of flattery is variable: one may flatter out of greed, or flatter out of fear. Deceit is also variable: one may deceive out of greed, deceive out of hatred, or deceive out of fear. Because they do not pertain exclusively, they are discussed separately. Adding heedlessness, this together with the preceding makes fourteen; such are the unwholesome [caittas]. There are three indeterminate [dharmas]: namely, consciousness, perception, and feeling. In that school, the three minds prior to mental formation are solely indeterminate. With these combined with the preceding, there are thirty-seven; such is the essential summary. Discussed according to distinct [varieties], the mind-dharmas are immeasurable. Just as in the single mind of greed, its distinct varieties are manifold, namely: evil desire, excessive desire, insatiability, stinginess, attachment, exhibiting signs, aggressive solicitation, seeking gain with gain, *lapanā*, and so forth; thus they are not one. Seeking gain by harming others is called evil desire. Broadly seeking much gain is called excessive desire. Wanting even more gain is called insatiability. Not sharing all that one possesses with others is called stinginess. Entangling love that does not let go is called attachment. Manifesting the appearance of desiring to obtain because of greed for gain is called exhibiting signs. Praising that and disparaging this to obtain gain is called aggressive solicitation. Mentioning what was obtained elsewhere to attract this gain is called seeking gain with gain. Greedily desiring gain in one's mind while pleasing people's intentions with one's mouth is called *lapanā*. Among [the varieties of] hatred, the distinct [types] are also immeasurable, namely: hatred, enmity, malice, jealousy, wrath, anger, affliction, harmfulness, confusion, obstinacy, stubborn clinging, intolerance, violence and urgency, displeasure, and intractability; thus they are not one. Ignorance according to its distinct [varieties] is also manifold, namely: darkness, dullness, rowdiness, foolishness, delusion, false-forgetfulness, stupidity, clumsiness, torpor, sleep, *tandrī*, and so forth. Encountering an object without understanding it is called darkness. Awakening and understanding not being swift is called dullness. Incurring loss without noticing it is called rowdiness. Having no mind to discriminate is called foolishness. Taking this to be that is called delusion. Having attained something and then losing it is called false-forgetfulness. Inability to distinguish right from wrong is called stupidity. What one does not being skillful is called clumsiness. When the mind is heavy and inclined to sleep heavily, it is called torpor. Withdrawing the mind away from awareness is called sleep. The sickness of a disposition to sleep is called *tandrī*. Following these distinctions, they are therefore immeasurable. Although these distinct varieties are not each treated in full in the treatise, in principle they indeed exist.