Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

大乘義章 2.33

大乘義章 2.33

Language
Classical Chinese

2.33

次辨非色非心之法。依如《毘曇》,宣說十四不相應行,以為非色非心法也。於中略以五門分別:一釋名辨相、二三性分別、三就有漏無漏分別、四就界分別、五明捨不同。就初門中,先釋其名。名字是何?一無想定、二無想報、三滅盡定、四眾生種類、五命根、六凡夫性、七味、八名、九句、十生、十一住、十二異、十三滅、十四得。此之十四,體非質礙,故名非色;又非情慮,稱曰非心;不同想等諸心數法與心相應,名不相應;有為集起,稱之為行。名字如是。次辨其相。無想定者,諸外道等謂無想報以為涅槃,為求彼報修無想定,學滅心想,依第四禪滅諸心法。心想滅已,得一有為非色心法領補心處,名無想定。成實法中不存此義,故彼論言「凡夫不能滅心心法,但心寂靜微細難覺,故云無想,非謂全無。」今依《毘曇》宣說無想。無想報者,依前定因生四禪中廣果天處,初生有心,中間無心逕五百劫,是心滅時得一有為非色心法領補心處,名無想報。命欲終時,心想還生。以彼因時前後有心、中間無心,是故得報還與因同,前後有心、中間無心,報欲盡時心想還生。心想生故,見未來世受生中陰,便謗涅槃。作如是念:「我本謂呼寶有涅槃,懃苦求之。今見未來還有生處,定知一切無有涅槃。」以是謗故死入地獄。以是過故,佛諸弟子都無求者。此無想報,《成實論》中說為心法,但無麁想。滅盡定者,謂諸聖人患心勞慮,暫滅心識,得一有為非色心法領補心處,名滅盡定。若依《成實》,是無為法,非不相應。此義廣釋,如滅盡章。眾生種類者,有一有為非色心法,能使眾生類類相似,是故名為眾生種類。成實法中不存此義。言命根者,眾生身中有一非色非心命法,能持色心令不斷絕,名為命根。若依《成實》,說過去業以為命根,不立非色非心命法。凡夫性者,有為法中有一非色非心之法,未斷已來,凡諸眾生悉令使凡。此之凡性,《成實》不立。所言味者,是字法也。有為法中有一非色非心字法,與聲相應方成語言,說之為字。以此字法攝聲成語,令人愛味,故名為味。若依《雜心》子注中釋,外國噵字有其味音,故說為味。所言名者,有為法中有一非色非心名法,能攝彼字表詮諸法,說之為名。所言句者,有為法中有一非色非心句法,拘攣名味共相屬著以成文誦,謂之為句。此名味等,成實法中唯是聲性,色法所收、法入所攝,不同《毘曇》。相狀如何?即彼音聲相續之中,屈曲高下長短之義,能成語言詮表之義,說為味等。雖是聲性,聲恒是實,味等是假。聲是聲入,味等法入。此云何別?當體為味,對法成詮,說之為名。若當一字詮表義成,字即是名。若一不成名字方成,是即一字,唯是其味而非是名,多字和合方是其名。若彼多字共名一法,名即是句。若當一字即成名者,多名聚集方乃成句。《成實》如是。所言生住異滅法者,非是諸法始起之生、經停之住、衰變之異、盡壞之滅,蓋乃一切有為法邊,別有非色非心相法,能生諸法乃至能滅。此之四相,體雖同時,用在先後。生相用時能生諸法,乃至第四滅相用時能滅諸法。所相之法,初生次住終異後滅,是毘曇家。苦集之理能相生等,是事非理,何故如是?有為之法無常為理,前後四相遷流運變是無常義,故說為理。同時四相,體非先後無常之義,故名為事。若依《成實》,但說諸法初生次住終異後滅,不說法外別有非色非心四相。《地持》亦爾。所言得者,有為法邊有一非色非心得法,能得諸法,故名為得。此是十四不相應行。《毘婆沙》中更有二種:一聖人性,有一非色非心聖法,能令一切出世之人皆得為聖。二者不得,有一非色非心之法,令所斷法不屬行人,故名不得。若通此二,便有十六不相應行(此一門竟)。

Next is to explain the dharmas that are neither matter nor mind. According to the Abhidharma, fourteen conditioned factors not associated [with mind] (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) are taught, which constitute the dharmas that are neither matter nor mind. Within this, they are briefly differentiated through five sections: first, explaining the names and distinguishing their characteristics; second, differentiation according to the three natures; third, differentiation according to sāsrava and anāsrava; fourth, differentiation according to the [three] realms; fifth, clarifying the differences in relinquishment. In the first section, their names are first explained. What are their names? (1) absorption without ideation (asaṃjñi-samāpatti), (2) retribution without ideation (āsaṃjñika), (3) absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti), (4) category of sentient beings (sabhāgatā), (5) life-faculty (jīvitendriya), (6) state of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva), (7) syllable (vyañjana), (8) name (nāman), (9) sentence (pada), (10) origination (jāti), (11) abiding (sthiti), (12) decay (jarā/anyathātva), (13) cessation (anitya/nirodha), and (14) acquisition (prāpti). These fourteen are non-obstructive in substance, hence called 'neither matter'; nor are they cognitive thinking, hence called 'neither mind'; unlike mental concomitants such as ideation (saṃjñā) that associate with the mind, they are termed 'not associated'; being conditioned aggregations and risings, they are termed 'conditioned factors' (saṃskāra). Such are their names. Next is to distinguish their characteristics. As for the absorption without ideation, various non-Buddhists and others regard the retribution without ideation as nirvāṇa; in order to seek that retribution, they cultivate the absorption without ideation, practicing the cessation of mental ideations and relying on the fourth dhyāna to extinguish all mental dharmas. When mental ideations have ceased, they obtain a conditioned dharma that is neither matter nor mind, which replaces and occupies the locus of the mind; this is called the absorption without ideation. This meaning is not maintained in the Tattvasiddhi system; hence that treatise says: 'Ordinary persons cannot extinguish the mind and mental concomitants; it is merely that the mind is quiet, subtle, and difficult to perceive, hence it is said to be "without ideation," not that it is entirely absent.' Here, based on the Abhidharma, [we] explain non-ideation. As for the retribution without ideation: relying on the cause of the preceding absorption, one is born in the heaven of Great Fruit (Bṛhatphala) within the fourth dhyāna. At the initial birth there is mind; in the interval there is no mind for the span of five hundred kalpas; when this mind ceases, one obtains a conditioned dharma that is neither matter nor mind, which replaces and occupies the locus of the mind; this is called the retribution without ideation. When one's life is about to end, mental ideation arises again. Because at the time of the cause there is mind before and after while there is no mind in the interval, the obtained retribution is also identical to the cause: there is mind before and after, and no mind in the interval; when the retribution is about to exhaust, mental ideation arises again. Because mental ideation arises, one sees the intermediate existence (antarābhava) of taking birth in a future life, and then slanders nirvāṇa, having such a thought: 'I originally thought there really was nirvāṇa and sought it with diligent toil. Now I see that in the future there is still a place of rebirth; I certainly know that none has nirvāṇa.' Due to this slander, upon dying one enters hell. Due to this fault, none of the Buddha's disciples ever seeks it. This retribution without ideation is taught in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra as a mental dharma, simply lacking coarse ideations. As for the absorption of cessation: the noble ones are troubled by the fatigue of mental deliberation, and temporarily extinguish the mind and consciousness, obtaining a conditioned dharma that is neither matter nor mind, which replaces and occupies the locus of the mind; this is called the absorption of cessation. If according to the Tattvasiddhi, it is an unconditioned dharma, not an unassociated [factor]. This meaning is explained in detail as in the chapter on cessation. As for the category of sentient beings: there is a conditioned dharma that is neither matter nor mind that can cause sentient beings to be mutually similar within their respective kinds; therefore it is called the category of sentient beings. The Tattvasiddhi system does not maintain this meaning. As for the life-faculty: within the body of a sentient being there is a life-dharma that is neither matter nor mind, which can sustain matter and mind and prevent them from being cut off; it is called the life-faculty. If according to the Tattvasiddhi, past karma is explained as the life-faculty, and it does not posit a life-dharma that is neither matter nor mind. As for the state of an ordinary person: among conditioned dharmas there is a dharma that is neither matter nor mind which, as long as it has not yet been severed, makes all ordinary sentient beings ordinary. This ordinary state is not posited by the Tattvasiddhi. What is called syllable (vyañjana) is the dharma of characters (akṣara). Among conditioned dharmas there is a character-dharma that is neither matter nor mind which, associating with sound, only then forms spoken language; it is spoken of as a character. Because this character-dharma gathers sound to form speech and causes people to relish its meaning, it is called relish (vyañjana). If according to the explanation in the subcommentary to the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra, when foreign countries speak of characters, they have the sound of relish (vyañjana); hence it is spoken of as relish. What is called name (nāman): among conditioned dharmas there is a name-dharma that is neither matter nor mind that can gather those characters to denote and express all dharmas; it is spoken of as name. What is called sentence (pada): among conditioned dharmas there is a sentence-dharma that is neither matter nor mind that binds names and syllables together in mutual dependence to form texts and recitations; it is termed sentence. These names, syllables, and so forth, in the Tattvasiddhi system, are solely of the nature of sound, included under material dharmas and subsumed under the dharma-āyatana, differing from the Abhidharma. What is their characteristic? It is precisely within the continuity of that voice and sound, the sense of modulation, inflection, pitch, length, and shortness that can form spoken language and express meanings, which is spoken of as syllable and so forth. Although it is of the nature of sound, sound is always real, whereas syllables and so forth are provisional. Sound is the sound-āyatana (śabdāyatana), whereas syllables and so forth are the dharma-āyatana (dharmāyatana). How do these differ? Taking its intrinsic entity, it is a syllable; facing phenomena to form an expression, it is spoken of as a name. If a single character expresses a complete meaning, the character is itself a name. If one does not form it and only characters form it, then a single character is only its syllable and not a name, and only the combination of many characters is a name. If those many characters jointly name a single dharma, the name is a sentence. If a single character immediately forms a name, then only the gathering of many names forms a sentence. Such is the Tattvasiddhi. As for what are called the dharmas of origination, abiding, decay, and cessation: they are not the origination of the initial arising of all dharmas, the abiding of their dwelling, the decay of their decline and alteration, and the cessation of their exhaustion and destruction. Rather, alongside all conditioned dharmas, there are separately characteristics-dharmas that are neither matter nor mind, which can originate all dharmas and up to can extinguish them. Although the substance of these four characteristics is simultaneous, their functions operate in succession. When the function of the characteristic of origination operates, it can originate all dharmas, and up to when the function of the fourth characteristic of cessation operates, it can extinguish all dharmas. The dharmas that are characterized are first born, next abide, eventually decay, and subsequently cease—this is the Abhidharma school. The principle of the truth of suffering and origination is capable of characterizing origination and so forth; it is phenomenal fact (vastu) rather than ultimate principle. Why is it so? For conditioned dharmas, impermanence is the principle; the four successive characteristics shifting and transforming is the meaning of impermanence, hence spoken of as principle. The simultaneous four characteristics, whose substance is not the meaning of successive impermanence, are therefore called phenomenal fact. If according to the Tattvasiddhi, it only speaks of all dharmas as first born, next abiding, eventually decaying, and subsequently ceasing, and does not say that apart from dharmas there are separately the four characteristics that are neither matter nor mind. The Bodhisattvabhūmi (*Dī-chí) is also like this. As for what is called acquisition (prāpti): alongside conditioned dharmas there is an acquisition-dharma that is neither matter nor mind, which can acquire all dharmas; hence it is called acquisition. These are the fourteen conditioned factors not associated [with mind]. In the Vibhāṣā there are two more kinds: first, the state of a noble person (āryatva)—there is a noble dharma that is neither matter nor mind that can cause all world-transcending persons to become noble; second, non-acquisition (aprāpti)—there is a dharma that is neither matter nor mind that causes severed dharmas not to belong to the practitioner; hence it is called non-acquisition. If these two are included, there are sixteen conditioned factors not associated [with mind] (this concludes the first section).

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

Translations (1)