大乘義章 2.40

2.40

第二門中辨其體相。虛空無為，論釋不同。依如《毘曇》，虛空有二：一者有為、二者無為。除去色像方為虛空，是其有為；本來常空，是其無為。有為虛空，彼此不通，為眼所行；無為虛空，體是法入，無礙周遍，為意所行。二中但取無為虛空，以為三中虛空無為。有為空者，是六大中空大所攝。何者六大？所謂地、水、火、風、空、識。《成實》、大乘並皆破彼有為虛空，但說一種無為虛空。但此虛空有體有相，體則周遍、相則隨色，彼此別異。故《地論》言「因彼色故種種差別。」雖約色像彼此別異，而不可見，故經說為不可見相。問曰：世人皆見虛空，云何說為不可見乎？釋言：世人但見空中光明之色，想心於中知無異物，作虛空解，便謂見空而實不見。若空可見，即是色法，色則無常，《涅槃》廣破明空叵見（虛空如是）。次辨數滅。於中曲有五門分別：一約對分別、二約有漏無漏分別、三約治分別、四約時分別、五約位分別。言約對者，對有三種：煩惱、業、苦。煩惱有二：一是染污，五住性結；二不染污，事中無知。染污盡虛，有是有非，永滅則是、伏滅則非。不染盡處，有是有非，為其無礙解脫滅者是其數滅，如障通壅；不為無礙解脫滅者則非數滅，如習五明所滅闇等。問曰：五明所滅之闇，為當一向定非數滅，亦有是者？大小不同，小乘法中定非數滅；大乘法中義有兩兼，直爾習學五明滅者非是數滅，斷無明地令彼滅者是其數滅。何故如是？大乘宣說事中無知，依無明地，以無漏慧斷無明地，令彼無知永更不起，故是數滅；小乘不爾，故非數滅。又大乘中隨無明地，無礙解脫二道滅故，是其數滅；小乘不爾，故非數滅。煩惱盡處，辨之麁爾。次論其業。依如《毘曇》，唯有煩惱相應業思，與彼煩惱相應斷者，是其數滅；自餘一切不善身口及善無記，有是有非。斷其緣縛，名為數滅；不絕其體，故非數滅。問曰：有人斷煩惱故，令彼身口惡業不起，應是數滅，何故言非？釋言：《毘曇》性相中求，彼非親斷，故非數滅。問曰，若此，非親斷故非數滅者，入見道時斷絕諸見，隨見所起貪瞋癡等一切皆斷，應非數滅。釋言：不類。解有三義：一見與貪等同是心法、同是煩惱，相生義親，故從根本判為數滅；身口二業望彼不爾，故非數滅。二見與貪等同是煩惱，互相緣縛，相縛義親，故從根本判為數滅；身口不爾，故非數滅。三見與貪等同是煩惱，互相增長，相助義強，故從根本判為數滅；身口不爾，故非數滅。云何相助？由見起於貪瞋等結，由貪瞋等令見牢強，故曰相助。是義云何？見所起貪，貪著諸見，愛樂不捨。見所起瞋，防護諸見，聞毀則忿。見所起癡，不覺見過，堅住不捨。見所起慢，持見自高，不肯捨離。以如是義，令見牢強，違返聖諦。以違諦故，見諦滅之，故為數滅；身口不爾，故非數滅。問曰：若言染污思外一切業盡非數滅者，何故論言十七學思斷黑白業？釋言：彼云學思斷者，正斷煩惱相應業思，故是數滅；自餘一切，但斷業上所有緣縛、不斷業體，故非數滅。何者是其十七學思？如四業章具廣分別。問曰：論說身口二業皆修道斷，云何今言非數滅乎？此如前釋，但斷業上所有緣縛、不斷業體。《毘曇》如是。《成實》、大乘，伏結止業皆非數滅，滅盡結業悉是數滅，彼宗辨義務在通故。諸業如是。次辨苦報。依《毘婆沙》，一切報盡，有是數滅、有非數滅。斷潤生惑并斷報上緣縛之義，名為數滅。由斷因故，令報不起并餘一切緣差不受，悉非數滅。有人宣說：羅漢現報盡滅之處，是其數滅無餘涅槃。是義不然。云何不然？羅漢現報，酬因勢極，所以滅盡，不由道滅。云何說此以為數滅無餘涅槃？又彼現報起已滅者，是四相中無常之滅，種類不續，是非數滅。是中用何以為涅槃？問曰：若此非涅槃者，更復用何以為究竟無餘涅槃？釋言：彼宗二種涅槃，體性是一，隨其體時別得二名字。言體一者，煩惱業思，數滅無處，是其涅槃。言隨時別得二名者，彼向涅槃，身智未盡，望後猶有餘身智在，約後別前名為有餘；身智盡竟，望後更無餘身智在，彼前涅槃轉名無餘，非謂報盡更得涅槃。有人復言：報盡之處非是涅槃。無學聖人斷彼報上緣縛之義，是其報盡無餘涅槃。此義不然。斷緣縛者乃是斷除煩惱，所攝何開報盡？是義云何？斷煩惱時具斷二縛：一斷相應縛，斷煩惱故，不後同時縛諸心法；二斷緣縛，斷煩惱故，不復緣中縛外境界。緣縛有二：一者緣縛苦集諦理，見道中斷；二者緣縛陰界入事，修道中斷。羅漢報身是陰界入事相所攝，修道之中但斷報上緣縛之義，不斷報體。云何將此以為報盡無餘涅槃？又復聖人斷緣縛時，身報未盡。是人後時，或經十年或經百歲，酬因極竟，報身方盡。云何將前緣縛無處，以為後時身盡涅槃？是大難解。又復煩惱，非直緣縛自己報身，亦縛他身及外境界山河地等。若斷緣縛自己報身是其無餘涅槃攝者，斷他身縛，應是他人無餘涅槃。而彼非他無餘涅槃，此亦同彼，何得偏將緣縛自報盡滅之處獨為無餘？以如是義，定知《毘曇》斷因報盡，皆非數滅。問曰：報盡非數滅者，何故論言一切果報皆修道斷？此斷報上緣縛之義及潤生惑，不斷報體，《毘曇》如是。成實法中，一切果報但使無漏斷因報盡，皆是數滅。云何得知？如《成實》說，見道斷者，謂示相慢及彼所起諸餘法也。修斷法者，不示相慢及彼所起諸餘法也。示相我慢是見諦惑，取立我相而自高舉名示相慢，三塗業果是彼所起諸餘法也。不示相慢是修道惑，不能推求名不示相，闇昧心中恃我陵物名為我慢，人天業果是彼所起諸餘法也。此等皆為見修所斷，故彼斷處是其數滅，是數滅故。於彼宗中，因盡名為有餘涅槃，果亡名為無餘涅槃。此義如後涅槃章中具廣辨釋。問曰：羅漢現報盡處，是數滅不？釋言：不定。以邊際智促報盡者，是其數滅；餘死則非。《成實》如是。大乘法中，義同《成實》，除因報盡，悉是數滅。又大乘說，煩惱業苦皆是妄想、可斷滅故。約對如是（此一門竟）。

The second section distinguishes their nature and characteristics. Concerning space as an unconditioned dharma, the treatises differ in their explanations. According to the Abhidharma, space is twofold: first, conditioned; second, unconditioned. That which becomes space only upon the removal of material forms is conditioned; that which is originally and constantly empty is unconditioned. Conditioned space is mutually impenetrable and is the domain of the eye; unconditioned space has the dharma-entrance (dharmāyatana) as its essence, is unobstructed and all-pervading, and is the domain of the mind. Between the two, only unconditioned space is taken as the unconditioned space among the three [unconditioned dharmas]. Conditioned space is subsumed under the space element among the six elements. What are the six elements? They are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. The Tattvasiddhi and the Mahāyāna both refute conditioned space, speaking only of a single unconditioned space. However, this space has both an essence and characteristics: its essence is all-pervading, whereas its characteristics follow material form and are distinct from one another. Therefore, the Daśabhūmika-śāstra states: "Due to that material form, there are various distinctions." Although it is distinct from one [thing] to another in relation to material forms, it cannot be seen; hence the sūtra describes it as having an invisible characteristic. Question: Worldly people all see space; why is it said to be invisible? Explanation: Worldly people only see the color of light in the midst of emptiness, and their discursive mind, knowing there is no other object therein, conceives of it as space, whereupon they claim to see space; yet in reality they do not see it. If space could be seen, it would be a material dharma, and material form is impermanent; the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra extensively refutes this, clarifying that space cannot be seen. (Space is thus explained.) Next is to distinguish analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). Within this, there are five subordinate sections of distinction: first, distinction in terms of the objects [it counteracts]; second, distinction in terms of tainted (sāsrava) and untainted (anāsrava); third, distinction in terms of the antidotes; fourth, distinction in terms of time; fifth, distinction in terms of stages. Regarding "in terms of the objects [it counteracts]," there are three kinds of objects: defilements, karma, and suffering. Defilements are twofold: first, defiled [defilements], which are the intrinsic fetters of the five entrenchments; second, undefiled [defilements], which are ignorance regarding phenomena. Where defiled [defilements] are exhausted and empty, some are [analytical cessation] and some are not: perpetual cessation is, whereas cessation through suppression is not. Where undefiled [defilements] are exhausted, some are and some are not: that which is extinguished through the unobstructed [path] and the [path of] liberation is analytical cessation, like obstructions that block the superknowledges; that which is not extinguished through the unobstructed [path] and the [path of] liberation is not analytical cessation, like the darkness extinguished by practicing the five sciences. Question: Is the darkness extinguished by the five sciences invariably not analytical cessation, or can some of it be so? The Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna differ: in the Hīnayāna teachings, it is definitely not analytical cessation; in the Mahāyāna teachings, the meaning encompasses both: that which is extinguished simply by practicing and studying the five sciences is not analytical cessation, but that which is extinguished by severing the ground of fundamental ignorance is analytical cessation. Why is this so? The Mahāyāna teaches that ignorance regarding phenomena relies upon the ground of fundamental ignorance; when untainted wisdom severs the ground of fundamental ignorance, causing that ignorance never to arise again, it is therefore analytical cessation. The Hīnayāna is not like this, so it is not analytical cessation. Furthermore, in the Mahāyāna, because it is extinguished following the two paths of the unobstructed and liberation with respect to the ground of fundamental ignorance, it is analytical cessation; the Hīnayāna is not like this, so it is not analytical cessation. This is a rough distinction of where defilements are exhausted. Next, we discuss karma. According to the Abhidharma, only the volitional action (cetanā) associated with defilements that is severed together with those defilements constitutes analytical cessation; all other unwholesome bodily and vocal [actions], as well as wholesome and neutral [actions], have [instances that] are and [instances that] are not [analytical cessation]. Severing the bondage of their objective conditions is called analytical cessation; because their substantive nature is not severed, they are not analytical cessation. Question: If someone, by severing defilements, causes unwholesome bodily and vocal karma not to arise, this ought to be analytical cessation; why is it said not to be? Explanation: The Abhidharma investigates within intrinsic nature and characteristics; since those are not directly severed, they are not analytical cessation. Question: If so, and because they are not directly severed they are not analytical cessation, then when one enters the path of seeing and severs all views, all greed, anger, delusion, and so forth that arise in accordance with those views are also severed, and so they ought not to be analytical cessation. Explanation: They are not of the same class. There are three points of explanation: First, views and greed and so forth are alike in being mental dharmas and alike in being defilements, and their reciprocal generation is intimately related; therefore, judged from the root, they are analytical cessation. Bodily and vocal karmas, viewed against them, are not like this, and therefore are not analytical cessation. Second, views and greed and so forth are alike in being defilements, mutually binding each other as conditions, and their reciprocal bondage is intimately related; therefore, judged from the root, they are analytical cessation. Body and speech are not like this, and therefore are not analytical cessation. Third, views and greed and so forth are alike in being defilements, mutually augmenting each other, and their reciprocal assistance is strong; therefore, judged from the root, they are analytical cessation. Body and speech are not like this, and therefore are not analytical cessation. How do they assist each other? Due to views, the fetters of greed, anger, and so forth arise; due to greed and so forth, views are made firm and strong; hence it is called "mutual assistance." What does this mean? Greed arising from views greedily clings to views, delighting in them and not letting them go. Anger arising from views guards and protects views, becoming enraged upon hearing them criticized. Delusion arising from views fails to recognize the faults of the views, remaining firmly fixed in them and not letting them go. Pride arising from views holds to the views to elevate oneself, unwilling to abandon them. Through such meanings, views are made firm and strong, opposing the noble truths. Because they oppose the truths, seeing the truths extinguishes them, and therefore it is analytical cessation; body and speech are not like this, and therefore are not analytical cessation. Question: If all karma other than defiled volition is, upon its exhaustion, not analytical cessation, why does the treatise state that seventeen volitions of the trainee sever black and white karma? Explanation: When that [treatise] speaks of the volitions of the trainee severing, it refers specifically to the severance of the volitional karma associated with defilements, which is why it is analytical cessation; all the rest merely sever the bondage of objective conditions upon the karma, but do not sever the substance of the karma, which is why they are not analytical cessation. What are these seventeen volitions of the trainee? As extensively distinguished in the Chapter on the Four Karmas. Question: The treatises state that bodily and vocal karma are both severed by the path of cultivation; why is it said now that they are not analytical cessation? Explanation: This is as explained before: it merely severs the bondage of objective conditions upon the karma, but does not sever the substance of the karma. The Abhidharma is like this. In the Tattvasiddhi and the Mahāyāna, suppressing fetters and halting karma are both not analytical cessation, whereas the complete exhaustion of fetters and karma is entirely analytical cessation, for the purpose of those schools in distinguishing matters lies in comprehensive application. The various karmas are thus. Next, we distinguish the retribution of suffering. According to the Vibhāṣā, of the exhaustion of all retributions, some are analytical cessation and some are non-analytical cessation. Severing the delusions that moisten rebirth together with severing the bondage of objective conditions upon retribution is called analytical cessation. That retribution does not arise because its cause has been severed, along with all other instances where conditions fail and [retribution] is not experienced, are entirely non-analytical cessation. Some people declare: The exhaustion and cessation of an arhat's present retribution is analytical cessation, nirvāṇa without remainder. This view is incorrect. Why is it incorrect? An arhat's present retribution reaches its exhaustion because the momentum of recompensing its cause has reached its limit, not because it is extinguished by the path. How can this be called analytical cessation, nirvāṇa without remainder? Furthermore, that the present retribution ceases after having arisen is the cessation of impermanence among the four characteristics; when the continuum of its type does not continue, that is non-analytical cessation. What in this could be taken as nirvāṇa? Question: If this is not nirvāṇa, what else is taken as ultimate nirvāṇa without remainder? Explanation: In that school, the two kinds of nirvāṇa are identical in essence, and receive two different names according to the time of their essence. That their essence is one means: the locus of non-existence where defilements and volitional karma have analytical cessation is nirvāṇa. That they receive two names according to time means: in that previous nirvāṇa, body and wisdom were not yet exhausted, and looking ahead, there was still a remainder of body and wisdom; in contrast to what came after, what came before was called [nirvāṇa] with remainder. Once body and wisdom have completely ended, looking ahead there is no longer any remainder of body and wisdom; that earlier nirvāṇa then shifts its name to [nirvāṇa] without remainder, not that an additional nirvāṇa is attained when retribution is exhausted. Some people further say: The point where retribution is exhausted is not nirvāṇa. The non-trainee sage's severance of the bondage of objective conditions upon that retribution is the nirvāṇa without remainder of the exhaustion of retribution. This view is incorrect. Severing the bondage of objective conditions is subsumed under the elimination of defilements; how could it be set apart as the exhaustion of retribution? What does this mean? When defilements are severed, two bondages are completely severed: first, severing associative bondage (saṃprayoga-bandhana)—because defilements are severed, they no longer simultaneously bind the mental dharmas; second, severing objective bondage (ālambana-bandhana)—because defilements are severed, they no longer bind external sensory objects among cognitive conditions. Objective bondage is twofold: first, the objective bondage to the principles of the truths of suffering and origination, severed in the path of seeing; second, the objective bondage to the phenomena of the aggregates, realms, and entrances, severed in the path of cultivation. The retribution body of an arhat is subsumed under the phenomena of the aggregates, realms, and entrances; in the path of cultivation, one merely severs the bondage of objective conditions upon the retribution, but does not sever the substance of the retribution. How could this be taken as the nirvāṇa without remainder of the exhaustion of retribution? Furthermore, when the sage severs the bondage of objective conditions, the bodily retribution is not yet exhausted. Later on, perhaps after ten years or a hundred years, when the recompense of causes has reached its utmost end, only then is the retribution body exhausted. How could the earlier locus where the bondage of objective conditions was absent be taken as the later nirvāṇa of the body's exhaustion? This is extremely difficult to accept. Furthermore, defilements do not merely bind one's own retribution body as an object, but also bind other persons' bodies and external objects such as mountains, rivers, and the earth. If severing the objective bondage to one's own retribution body were subsumed under nirvāṇa without remainder, then severing the bondage to another's body ought to be that other person's nirvāṇa without remainder. But that is not the other person's nirvāṇa without remainder, and this case is just like that one; how could one exclusively take the exhaustion and cessation of the objective bondage to one's own retribution as uniquely constituting [nirvāṇa] without remainder? By such reasoning, we definitely know that in the Abhidharma, the exhaustion of retribution through the severance of causes is in all cases not analytical cessation. Question: If the exhaustion of retribution is not analytical cessation, why does the treatise state that all fruition-retributions are severed by the path of cultivation? Explanation: This refers to severing the bondage of objective conditions upon the retribution and the delusions that moisten rebirth; it does not sever the substance of the retribution. The Abhidharma is like this. In the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi, as long as untainted [wisdom] severs the causes so that retributions are exhausted, all fruition-retributions are analytical cessation. How is this known? As the Tattvasiddhi states: that which is severed by the path of seeing refers to the conceit that manifests characteristics and all the other dharmas that arise from it. That which is severed by the path of cultivation refers to the conceit that does not manifest characteristics and all the other dharmas that arise from it. The 'I'-conceit that manifests characteristics is a delusion of seeing the truths: grasping and establishing the characteristic of a self and elevating oneself is called the conceit that manifests characteristics; the karmic fruitions of the three wretched paths are the other dharmas arising from it. The 'I'-conceit that does not manifest characteristics is a delusion of the path of cultivation: being unable to scrutinize is called 'not manifesting characteristics'; within a darkened mind, relying on the self to bully others is called 'I'-conceit; the karmic fruitions of humans and devas are the other dharmas arising from it. Because all of these are severed by seeing and cultivation, the locus of their severance is analytical cessation; and because it is analytical cessation, in that school the exhaustion of causes is called nirvāṇa with remainder, and the demise of fruitions is called nirvāṇa without remainder. This meaning will be fully and extensively explained below in the Chapter on Nirvāṇa. Question: Is the exhaustion of an arhat's present retribution analytical cessation or not? Explanation: It is not fixed. If one uses the wisdom of the edge of existence (prāntakoṭika-jñāna) to shorten the retribution to its exhaustion, it is analytical cessation; other deaths are not. The Tattvasiddhi is like this. In the Mahāyāna teachings, the meaning is identical to the Tattvasiddhi: eliminating the causes so that retributions are exhausted is entirely analytical cessation. Furthermore, the Mahāyāna teaches that defilements, karma, and suffering are all false conceptualizations and can be severed and extinguished. 'In terms of the objects [it counteracts]' is thus. (This concludes section one.)