大乘義章 2.64

2.64

第七門中有無分別。諸論不同，毘曇法中，三無為法一向是有。何故如是？彼宗之中無不生心，三無為法為心所緣，能生心故，明知是有。問曰：若有，何故經中說作無為？此言無者，無他有為，非無無為。以非無故，謗涅槃者名為邪見，得大罪報。《成實》所說，三種無為並是無法。如人無手，是中更復何所可有？又復經中說作無為，明知是無。問曰：若無，云何生心？釋言：彼宗緣於無法得生心故，不妨是無。如人夢中所見境界悉是無法，故知緣無亦得生心。又問：若無，謗涅槃者何故得罪？釋言：煩惱其實盡滅，謗言不盡，違於滅義，是故得罪；非由謗有，所以得罪。有無兩競，備如《成實》、《涅槃》中說。大乘法中，義說不定。就事以論，得言是無。故經說言「虛空無故，不生不滅。」餘二類然。以是無故，經名無為。望理而辨，此三乃是待對之法，無有別體得言是有。故《地持》言「有為無為，名之為有。無我我所，名之為無。」又《地經》說「虛空界集，無為界集，涅槃界集。」若令無法，知何所集？良以大乘非定有故，破有定執，故《涅槃》言「我諸弟子不解我意，唱言：『如來說三無為，一向定有。』」非定無故，破無定執，故《涅槃》言「我諸弟子不解我意，唱言：『如來說三無為，一向定無。』」以斯准驗，有無之義難以偏定。有無如是。

In the seventh section, there is the analysis of existence and non-existence. The treatises differ: in the system of the Abhidharma, the three unconditioned phenomena are unconditionally existent. Why is this so? In that school, no consciousness arises without an object; the three unconditioned phenomena serve as the cognitive objects of consciousness and are able to give rise to consciousness, so it is clearly known that they are existent. Question: If they are existent, why are they called 'unconditioned' in the sūtras? [Answer:] The word 'un-' [or 'non-'] here means that they lack the conditioned phenomena of other things; it does not mean they lack the unconditioned. Because they are not non-existent, slandering nirvāṇa is called wrong view and incurs great karmic retribution. What is taught in the *Tattvasiddhi* is that the three kinds of unconditioned are all non-existent phenomena. Like a person lacking a hand, what more could be existent therein? Furthermore, the sūtras call them 'unconditioned' [wuwei, without action/conditioned existence], so it is clearly known that they are non-existent. Question: If they are non-existent, how do they give rise to consciousness? Explanation: In that school, because consciousness can arise taking non-existent phenomena as cognitive objects, this does not hinder their being non-existent. Just as the perceptual objects seen by a person in a dream are all non-existent phenomena, one therefore knows that taking non-existence as a cognitive object can also give rise to consciousness. Another question: If they are non-existent, why does slandering nirvāṇa incur guilt? Explanation: Afflictions are in fact entirely extinguished; slandering it by saying they are not exhausted contradicts the principle of cessation, and for this reason one incurs guilt; it is not because of slandering existence that one incurs guilt. The debate between existence and non-existence is fully set forth as in the *Tattvasiddhi* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. In the Mahāyāna doctrine, the meaning is stated without fixed determination. Discussing it in terms of phenomena, one can say they are non-existent. Thus the sūtra says: 'Because space is non-existent, it is unborn and unceasing.' The other two are likewise. Because they are non-existent, the sūtra names them unconditioned. Analyzing them in terms of principle, these three are phenomena of relative opposition; having no separate substantial nature, they can be said to be existent. Thus the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says: 'The conditioned and the unconditioned are named existent; the absence of self and what belongs to self is named non-existent.' Furthermore, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* says: 'The accumulation of the realm of space, the accumulation of the unconditioned realm, the accumulation of the nirvāṇa realm.' If they were made to be non-existent phenomena, what would be known to accumulate? Truly, because the Mahāyāna does not fix them as definitively existent, it refutes the grasping to definitive existence; thus the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Tathāgata said that the three unconditioned are unconditionally and definitively existent."' Because it does not fix them as definitively non-existent, it refutes the grasping to definitive non-existence; thus the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: "The Tathāgata said that the three unconditioned are unconditionally and definitively non-existent."' Verified by this, the meaning of existence and non-existence is difficult to determine one-sidedly. Such is existence and non-existence.