大乘義章 2.69

2.69

次就畢竟辨三無為。宗別不同，若依《毘曇》，龜無毛等，就事說無，即彼事攝，彼宗緣無不生心故。三無為中，畢竟無其生住異滅色心等法，還即是彼三無為攝。問曰：就彼三無為中無生住等，應是互無，今云何言是畢竟無？釋言：有義若望其餘有為法中生住滅等以說其無，是互無攝。若說虛空數非數滅體無生等，是畢竟無。如兔無於牛羊等角，是其互無。兔自無角，是畢竟無。若就諦理，宣說畢竟無我人等，諦理所攝。《成實》所說龜無毛等，事上無事，是虛空攝。三無為法自體畢竟無生住等，還即是彼三無為攝。一切法中畢竟無性，第一義攝。第一義中畢竟無於一切諸相，當知亦是第一義攝。大乘法中，若就世事虛空非數說畢竟無，與《成實》同。若就數滅說畢竟無，亦數滅攝。於中分別，麁同小乘，細則不同。不同云何？小乘未能見一切法畢竟寂滅以成涅槃，故涅槃中但無自體生住滅等，不能畢竟無一切相。大乘法中，見一切法畢竟寂滅以成涅槃，故涅槃中畢竟無於一切世相。故《涅槃》云「世法涅槃，終不相對。得涅槃時，涅槃之外無有世法對涅槃故。」數滅如是。一切法中畢竟無性、畢竟無相，第一義攝。上來至此，歷就四無辨三無為（此一門竟）。

Next, distinguishing the three unconditioned [dharmas] with reference to absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva). The tenets of the traditions differ. If according to the Abhidharma, the hairlessness of a turtle and the like are spoken of as non-existent with reference to phenomena, and are subsumed under those very phenomena, because in that school consciousness is not produced by taking non-existence as an object. Within the three unconditioned [dharmas], the absolute non-existence of dharmas such as arising, abiding, changing, ceasing, form, and mind is in turn subsumed under those very three unconditioned [dharmas]. Question: The absence of arising, abiding, and so forth with respect to those three unconditioned [dharmas] should be mutual non-existence; why do you now say it is absolute non-existence? Explanation: There is a meaning: if one speaks of their absence with reference to arising, abiding, ceasing, and so forth within other conditioned dharmas, it is subsumed under mutual non-existence. If one speaks of the nature of space, cessation through deliberation, and cessation independent of deliberation as lacking arising and so forth in their substance, it is absolute non-existence. Just as a rabbit's lacking the horns of cattle, sheep, and so forth is mutual non-existence, while the rabbit itself lacking horns is absolute non-existence. If, with reference to the principle of truth, one proclaims the absolute non-existence of a self, a person, and so forth, it is subsumed under the principle of truth. In what the Tattvasiddhi teaches, the hairlessness of a turtle and the like—the absence of a phenomenon upon a phenomenon—is subsumed under space. The absolute absence of arising, abiding, and so forth in the intrinsic substance of the three unconditioned dharmas is in turn subsumed under those very three unconditioned dharmas. The absolute absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas is subsumed under the ultimate [truth]. That all marks are absolutely non-existent within the ultimate [truth] should be known also to be subsumed under the ultimate [truth]. In the Mahāyāna teaching, if one speaks of absolute non-existence with reference to worldly phenomena, space, and cessation independent of deliberation, it is the same as the Tattvasiddhi. If one speaks of absolute non-existence with reference to cessation through deliberation, it is also subsumed under cessation through deliberation. In distinguishing among them, it is roughly the same as the Hīnayāna, but in detail it is not the same. How are they not the same? The Hīnayāna is not yet able to see that all dharmas are absolutely tranquil and extinguished so as to constitute nirvāṇa; therefore within its nirvāṇa there is only the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing in its own substance, and it cannot be that all marks are absolutely non-existent. In the Mahāyāna teaching, one sees that all dharmas are absolutely tranquil and extinguished so as to constitute nirvāṇa; therefore within nirvāṇa all worldly marks are absolutely non-existent. Therefore the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'Worldly dharmas and nirvāṇa are never set in opposition. When nirvāṇa is attained, outside of nirvāṇa there are no worldly dharmas in opposition to nirvāṇa.' Cessation through deliberation is like this. The absolute absence of an intrinsic nature and the absolute absence of marks in all dharmas are subsumed under the ultimate [truth]. From above to this point, we have traversed the four non-existences to distinguish the three unconditioned [dharmas]. (This completes one section.)