大乘義章 2.78

2.78

第三門中，依上四門次第廣辨。先釋無常。無常有三：一分段無常、二念無常亦名少時、三者自性不成無常。於中略以三門分別：一釋其名、二辨其相、三就大小料簡通局有無之義。言分段者，六道因果，三世分異，名為分段。分段非恒，故曰無常。念無常者，念謂心念，心道峻速。信此念頃，顯法時分，故稱為念。如經中說，一彈指頃、屈申臂頃、瞬息之頃。如是之言，寄其色相，顯法時分。或說一念一剎那等，寄心以顯。良以有為生滅難覺，故寄色心顯其時分。念義如是。有為念念遷流非恒，名念無常。所言自性不成實者，向前二種前後遷變，破其常相；此性無常，破其常性。明前分段及與念法，幻化虛立體性無自實，名性不成。以不成故，無其常性，故曰無常。名義如是。體相云何？分段無常，體相可知。念無常者，有為之法一念之頃具有四相，初生、次住、終異、後滅，前後遷變，故曰無常。然此四相，經論不同。如《毘曇》中，明有為法其性羸劣，不能自生自住自異自滅，要賴同時八相之法共相推變，方得初生乃至終滅。言八相者，如一念色，同時即有生住異滅四大相法及四隨相。此四隨相亦名小相。彼大生邊有一小生，彼大住邊有一小住，彼大異邊有一小異，彼大滅邊有一小滅，故有八也。然此八相，就能為名，以能生他故名為生，乃至滅他故稱為滅，非謂法起名之為生，乃至法謝說名為滅。若論體性，三聚法中非色非心不相應攝。論其行數，一一之中皆有初生次住終異後滅之義。然此八種，體性同時，用即不定，相狀之用，剋必同時；遷法之用，用在先後。大生用時，能生八法，所謂能生所相法體及餘七相，合為八也。此八有為，有可生義，是故大生堪能生之。無為之法，無可生義，是故大生不能生也。即此大生，亦是有為，有可生義，是故為彼小生生之。小生唯能生於大生，不生餘法。如是次第，乃至大滅起用之時，能滅八法，所謂能滅所相法體及餘七相，通有八也。此八有為，有可滅義，大滅能滅，即是大滅，亦是有為。有可滅義，是故還為小滅所滅。如色既然，一切有為類皆如是滅同為相遷，方有初生乃至終滅。《毘曇》如是。《涅槃經》中亦同此說，故彼經言「有為之法有生性，故生能生之。虛空之法無生性，故生不能生。」又彼經言「生能生法，不能自生。不自生故，由生生生。生生不自生，復賴生故生。」如《成實論．不相應品》廣非此義。彼論宣說，法起名生、法停曰住、法遷稱異、法謝名滅，不說法外別有諸相共相推遷。《地持》之中亦同此義，故彼文中廣破法外別立相也。各是聖教，難定是非。念無常義，麁況如是。所言自性不成實者，明法同時同體四相共相破壞，無法自性，故曰無常。是義云何？世法虛幻無一定性，以無性故相有體無，相有名生、體無稱滅，相有名生，不同始起初出之生；體無名滅，不同終謝灰盡之滅。此生與滅，當知即是十二緣中逆順觀也。如經中說，無明生故乃至老死，是此生相；無明滅故乃至老死，是此滅相。此生與滅，幻炎像立，義說為住，不同生後遷停之住。彼生滅等雖復同體，性相乖異，故名為異。又異凡夫所取實有亦名為異，不同住後衰變之異。四相如是，同一體性，隨義互分。以同體故，說住異滅，以之為生；住異滅外無別生性，無生性故生性不成，還即說此生住異滅法以之為住。生等之外無別住性，無住性故住性不成，乃至說彼生住異法以為滅。故生等之外無別滅性，滅無性故滅性不成。進退推求，畢竟無有一性可得，故曰自性不成實也。故《維摩》言「不生不滅是無常義」，良在斯耳。彼經所說「即生即滅、無生無滅，是故名為不生不滅。」非謂就彼一相空中說無生滅。又《地持》云「不知真實無言說事有生有滅，觀無言性一切無常。」此文亦顯性無常義。問曰：無常有麁有細，生滅是麁，不生不滅是其細者。苦中亦應有麁有細，得言逼惱是其麁苦，無逼無惱是細苦不？釋言：亦得逼惱麁苦，義在可知。然此逼惱，守性不壞，非性無常。非無常故，不名性苦。非性苦故，義說為樂。以實觀之，逼無逼性、惱無惱性，自性無安，方名微細自性壞苦，亦名微細虛集行苦。體相如是。通局如何？三中前二大小通論，自性無常，大有小無。何故如是？小乘眾生未解法空，不能破壞諸法自性，故不說之。若使無常義別三門，小乘之中但有前二，無第三者。苦中亦三，小乘之中亦應有二，不具三苦。釋言：法門各別不同，何可一類？如無我中義別有二，小乘眾生但解生空，豈可亦得類同三苦小乘齊得二無我乎？義無斯理。雖知不同，有何所以？若總分別，得言苦者對緣而生。其相麁故，小乘眾生具能解知，故小乘中具明三苦。然無常者，遷滅法體。法體之義微細難識，小乘眾生不能精究，故小乘中不明第三自性無常。若別論之，三苦之義具論有三：一對緣分別、第二約緣就體分別、三約三種無常分別。此義如後一切苦中具廣分別。初之兩門，相麁易知，小乘能解；後之一門，與無常同。小乘眾生但解前二，自體虛集微細行苦小乘不解，故小乘中不明自體虛集行苦。是以經言「所說苦諦，中智所知。分別是苦，有無量種，非諸聲聞緣覺所解。我於彼經，竟不說之。」旨謂在此。無常之義，麁況如是（此一門竟）。

In the third section, based on the four sections above, [the doctrines] are distinguished in detail according to their sequence. First, impermanence is explained. Impermanence has three [types]: first, impermanence of delimited stages; second, moment-to-moment impermanence, also called [impermanence of] a brief time; third, impermanence wherein intrinsic nature does not realiter exist. Within these, they are briefly distinguished through three sections: first, explaining their names; second, discerning their characteristics; third, in terms of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, evaluating the sense of universal or limited [scope], existence or non-existence. Regarding delimited stages, the causes and effects of the six destinies differing across the three times are named delimited stages. Delimited stages are not permanent, and are therefore called impermanence. Regarding moment-to-moment impermanence, "moment" means a mental thought-moment; the path of the mind is swift and rapid. Taking the span of this thought-moment, it manifests the temporal duration of dharmas, and hence is called a moment. Just as it is said in the sūtras, in the span of a finger-snap, in the span of bending or extending an arm, in the span of an instant of breathing—words such as these resort to material characteristics to manifest the temporal duration of dharmas. Or they speak of a single thought-moment, a single kṣaṇa, and so forth, resorting to the mind to manifest it. Indeed, because the arising and ceasing of conditioned phenomena are difficult to perceive, they resort to matter and mind to manifest their temporal duration. Such is the meaning of "moment." Conditioned phenomena shift and flow moment to moment and are not permanent; this is called moment-to-moment impermanence. Regarding the statement that intrinsic nature does not realiter exist, the previous two kinds shift and transform sequentially, breaking down the appearance of permanence; this impermanence of nature breaks down the nature of permanence. It reveals that the previous delimited stages as well as momentary dharmas are like illusions, falsely established, their substance and nature devoid of an intrinsic reality, which is called nature being unrealized. Because it does not realiter exist, it lacks a permanent nature, and is therefore called impermanence. Such are the meanings of the names. What are their essences and characteristics? The essence and characteristics of the impermanence of delimited stages can be understood. Regarding moment-to-moment impermanence, a conditioned dharma within the span of a single thought-moment possesses four characteristics: initially arising, next persisting, then altering, and finally ceasing. Shifting and transforming through before and after, it is therefore called impermanence. However, concerning these four characteristics, the sūtras and treatises differ. For example, in the Abhidharma, it is explained that the nature of conditioned dharmas is weak and inferior; they cannot arise by themselves, persist by themselves, alter by themselves, or cease by themselves. They must rely on eight simultaneous characteristics of dharmas jointly driving and transforming one another, before they can achieve their initial arising down to their final cessation. Regarding the eight characteristics: for instance, with a single thought-moment of matter, simultaneously there are the four primary characteristics of arising, persistence, alteration, and cessation, as well as the four secondary characteristics. These four secondary characteristics are also called the minor characteristics. Beside that primary arising there is a secondary arising; beside that primary persistence there is a secondary persistence; beside that primary alteration there is a secondary alteration; beside that primary cessation there is a secondary cessation. Hence there are eight. However, these eight characteristics are named according to their functions: because they can give rise to another, they are called arising, down to because they can cease another, they are called cessation; it is not that the emerging of the dharma is named arising, down to the passing away of the dharma being called cessation. If discussing their essential nature, within the three categories of dharmas, they are subsumed under the non-material, non-mental formations not associated with mind. Discussing their functioning, within each single one there are the meanings of initial arising, subsequent persistence, intermediate alteration, and final cessation. Yet these eight kinds, though their essential nature is simultaneous, their applications are not fixed: the application of their distinguishing marks must strictly be simultaneous, but their application of shifting dharmas functions sequentially. When primary arising functions, it can give rise to eight dharmas: namely, it can give rise to the substantial entity of the characterized dharma and the remaining seven characteristics, totaling eight. These eight are conditioned, and have the quality of being able to be produced; therefore, primary arising is capable of producing them. Unconditioned dharmas do not have the quality of being able to be produced; therefore, primary arising cannot produce them. This very primary arising is also conditioned and has the quality of being able to be produced; therefore, it is produced by that secondary arising. The secondary arising can only produce the primary arising, and does not produce the remaining dharmas. In this sequence, down to when primary cessation activates its function, it can cease eight dharmas: namely, it can cease the substantial entity of the characterized dharma and the remaining seven characteristics, universally having eight. These eight are conditioned and have the quality of being able to be ceased; primary cessation can cease them. This very primary cessation is also conditioned and has the quality of being able to be ceased; therefore, in turn, it is ceased by secondary cessation. Matter being such, all conditioned phenomena are similarly shifted by cessation alongside these characteristics, before there are the initial arising down to the final cessation. Thus it is in the Abhidharma. In the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, it is also explained in the same way; hence that sūtra says: "Conditioned dharmas have the nature of arising, and therefore arising can produce them. The dharma of space lacks the nature of arising, and therefore arising cannot produce it." Furthermore, that sūtra says: "Arising can produce dharmas, but cannot produce itself. Because it does not produce itself, it is produced by the arising of arising. The arising of arising does not produce itself; it again relies on arising, and is therefore produced." The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, in its chapter on formations not associated with mind, broadly refutes this doctrine. That treatise declares that the emerging of a dharma is called arising, the abiding of a dharma is called persistence, the shifting of a dharma is called alteration, and the passing away of a dharma is called cessation; it does not say that apart from the dharma there are distinct characteristics that jointly drive and shift it. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, it is also of this meaning; therefore, in that text, it broadly refutes establishing distinct characteristics outside of dharmas. Each is a sacred teaching, and it is difficult to determine right from wrong. The meaning of moment-to-moment impermanence, in rough outline, is like this. Regarding the statement that intrinsic nature does not realiter exist, this explains that the four characteristics within the same substance and at the same time mutually undermine each other; dharmas lack intrinsic nature, and are therefore called impermanence. What is the meaning of this? Worldly dharmas are illusory, lacking a fixed nature; because they lack nature, the appearance exists while the entity is absent. That the appearance exists is called arising; that the entity is absent is called cessation. That the appearance exists is called arising, which differs from an arising that initially starts and first emerges; that the entity is absent is called cessation, which differs from a cessation that finally passes away into ashes and extinction. This arising and cessation, one should know, are precisely the direct and reverse contemplations within the twelve links of dependent origination. As the sūtra states, because ignorance arises, down to aging and death [arise]—this is the characteristic of arising; because ignorance ceases, down to aging and death [cease]—this is the characteristic of cessation. This arising and cessation, established like an illusory flame, are conventionally spoken of as persistence, which differs from a persistence that remains halted after arising. Although those arisings, cessations, and so forth are of the same substance, their natures and characteristics are divergent, and are therefore called alteration. Moreover, differing from the real existence grasped by ordinary worldlings is also called alteration, which differs from the alteration of declining and changing after persistence. The four characteristics are like this: they share a single essential nature, and are distinguished from each other according to meaning. Because they share the same substance, persistence, alteration, and cessation are spoken of as arising; outside of persistence, alteration, and cessation, there is no separate nature of arising; because there is no nature of arising, the nature of arising does not realiter exist. In turn, these dharmas of arising, persistence, alteration, and cessation are spoken of as persistence; outside of arising and the rest, there is no separate nature of persistence; because there is no nature of persistence, the nature of persistence does not realiter exist. Down to speaking of those dharmas of arising, persistence, and alteration as cessation; therefore, outside of arising and the rest, there is no separate nature of cessation; because cessation lacks a nature, the nature of cessation does not realiter exist. Examining forward and backward, ultimately not a single nature can be apprehended; hence it is said that intrinsic nature does not realiter exist. Therefore the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa states, "Non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence," and it is truly based on this. What that sūtra explains as "simultaneously arising and simultaneously ceasing, non-arising and non-ceasing, is therefore called non-arising and non-ceasing" does not mean speaking of non-arising and non-ceasing with respect to the emptiness of a single characteristic. Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmi states, "Not knowing that the real, ineffable matter has arising and cessation, one contemplates that the ineffable nature is entirely impermanent." This passage also reveals the meaning of the impermanence of nature. Question: Impermanence has the coarse and the subtle; arising and ceasing are the coarse, and non-arising and non-ceasing are the subtle. Within suffering, should there also be the coarse and the subtle, so that one may say that torment and affliction are coarse suffering, and the absence of torment and affliction is subtle suffering? Answer: One also may. Torment and affliction are coarse suffering, and this meaning is easily understood. However, this torment and affliction preserve their nature without disintegration; they are not the impermanence of nature. Because they are not impermanent, they are not called suffering of nature. Because they are not the suffering of nature, they are conventionally spoken of as pleasure. Looking at it in reality, torment lacks the nature of torment, and affliction lacks the nature of affliction; intrinsic nature is without security, which only then is called the subtle suffering of disintegration in intrinsic nature, and is also called the subtle suffering of conditioned existence through empty aggregation. Its entity and characteristics are like this. How are they universal or limited? Among the three, the first two are universally discussed in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; the impermanence of intrinsic nature exists in Mahāyāna but is absent in Hīnayāna. Why is this so? Hīnayāna sentient beings have not realized the emptiness of dharmas and cannot break down the intrinsic nature of all dharmas; therefore, it is not taught to them. If the meaning of impermanence is distinguished into three sections, and within Hīnayāna there are only the first two without the third, then within suffering there are also three, and within Hīnayāna there should also be only two, lacking the full three sufferings. Answer: The Dharma gates are each distinct; how could they be uniform? Just as within non-self there are two distinctions in meaning, and Hīnayāna sentient beings understand only the emptiness of sentient beings, how could it be that, like the three sufferings, Hīnayāna equally obtains both forms of non-self? There is no such principle. Even knowing they differ, what is the reason? If distinguishing them generally, one may say that suffering arises in response to conditions. Because its characteristics are coarse, Hīnayāna sentient beings are fully capable of understanding and knowing it; therefore, in Hīnayāna, the three sufferings are fully explained. However, impermanence shifts and extinguishes the substantial entity of dharmas. The meaning of the entity of dharmas is subtle and difficult to discern; Hīnayāna sentient beings cannot thoroughly investigate it, so Hīnayāna does not explain the third, the impermanence of intrinsic nature. If discussing them specifically, the meaning of the three sufferings, when fully discussed, has three [approaches]: first, distinguished in response to conditions; second, distinguished by referring to conditions and addressing the entity; third, distinguished according to the three kinds of impermanence. This meaning will be fully and broadly distinguished later under [the section on] all sufferings. The first two sections are coarse in characteristic and easy to understand, so Hīnayāna is capable of understanding them; the last section is identical with impermanence. Hīnayāna sentient beings only understand the first two; the subtle suffering of conditioned existence through the empty aggregation of their own entity is not understood by Hīnayāna, so Hīnayāna does not explain the subtle suffering of conditioned existence through the empty aggregation of one's own entity. Therefore the sūtra states: "The truth of suffering that has been expounded is known by those of middling wisdom. The distinctions of this suffering are of immeasurable kinds, not understood by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. In those sūtras, I did not teach them in the end." The intention lies here. The meaning of impermanence, in rough outline, is like this. (This completes one section.)