大乘義章 3.14

3.14

第七門中，明其四諦體之同異。於中四諦義，差別有二：一者諦相、二者諦實。今先就相辨其同異。於中滅道有其二種：一者緣修對治滅道，謂三乘人除結無為緣修之治；二者體證真實滅道，謂佛菩薩體證無為圓通實德。今先以彼對治滅道，望於苦集辨其同異。於中滅諦是無為法，望餘三諦一向別體，苦集道諦同異不定。若依《毘曇》，苦集有二：一麁、二細。過業煩惱得今苦果，現業煩惱得當來報，是其麁也，此乃是其事苦事集。有為之法念念生滅，就此者為義分苦集說之為細，以為理苦集也。就麁以論。若就事論，苦集及道一向別體。若據細辨，苦集同體，道諦不同。相狀如何？一念有為從前集起，義說為苦。即此有為，能生於後，義說為集。其猶世人望父為子、望子為父，是故苦集一向同體。道是無漏，不同前二。若依《成實》，唯說結業以之為集，所受生死名為苦諦，微細生滅悉是苦攝。一種事相苦集。然彼所說集道別體，苦望集道，義別有三：一者苦諦與集同體，謂依報心造作集因，集體是苦，故云同體，以彼宗中宣說報心體是苦故。二者苦諦與道同體，謂依報心修起聖道，道諦是苦，故云同體。問曰：《毘曇》何不如是？釋言：《毘曇》明其報心不常續故，集道起時無其報心，是故苦諦不與集道二諦同體。彼《成實》中說報常續，集道起時恒有此報，是故苦諦得與集道二諦同體。三者不同，謂餘一切無記心中，苦報之心不與集道二諦同也。大乘之中所說不定。先就分段辨其同異，於中苦集略有二種：一就三世因果不同以分苦集。若據斯義，苦集望道所辨同異，與《成實》同；第二就彼微細生滅義分苦集，若據斯義，苦集二諦一向同體，與《毘曇》同；即此苦集望於道諦，不同《毘曇》。云何不因？分別有二：一者苦集與道同體，謂依報心起於聖道，報心即是苦集所攝，是以苦集與道同體，良以大乘亦說報心常相續故。二者苦集諦與道別體，謂餘一切有漏法中苦集諦也。分段如是。次就變易辨其同異。於中不定，若就凡時，隨相麁分，單有集諦；隨義通論，得有苦集同體之理。無明住地是其集諦，即此無明生滅之義即說為苦，是故苦集同一體也。若據聖時，三諦同體。一念無漏當分治結即是道諦，即此道者從前無漏變易業生即名為苦，復能生後即名為集，是故三諦同一體性。對治滅道望於苦集，同異如是。次就真實滅道二諦辨其同異。此二相望一向同體，萬德圓寂即說為滅，虛通之義即說為道，更無別體，是故宣說滅道同體。望彼苦集對治滅道，一向別體，真妄異故。諦相如是。次就諦實辨其同異。據實以論，四諦同體，苦集二諦無別體故，用滅道性以之為體。故《涅槃》中說彼「苦集二諦之實，即是佛性、即是涅槃、即是如來、常樂我淨、一切佛法。」《寶性論》中亦說「法身、如來、聖諦及與涅槃，四法無別。」滅道二諦無別體故，還即說彼苦集實性以之為體。是以經中說十二緣以為佛性，「見十二緣名為見佛見法見僧。」又說「五陰以為佛性，一苦滅等。」良以染淨無別體故，經中說言「凡夫未成佛，菩提為煩惱；眾生成佛時，煩惱為菩提。」義在於此。其猶迷人所取之南，與彼悟時所解之北無有二性。同異之義，其相像此。

In the seventh section, the identity and difference among the essences of the four truths are explained. Regarding the meaning of the four truths therein, there are two distinctions: first, the phenomenal characteristics of the truths; second, the real nature of the truths. Now, we first distinguish their identity and difference in terms of characteristics. In this regard, cessation and the path are of two kinds: first, cessation and the path of conditioning and cultivation through remedies, which refers to the remedies of conditioning and cultivation by which beings of the three vehicles eradicate defilements [to attain] the unconditioned; second, cessation and the path of ontological realization of reality, which refers to the perfected and unobstructed true virtues of the unconditioned ontologically realized by buddhas and bodhisattvas. Now we first distinguish their identity and difference by looking at those [truths of] cessation and path through remedies in relation to suffering and origination. In this context, the truth of cessation is an unconditioned dharma; in relation to the other three truths, it is definitively a distinct entity, whereas the identity and difference of the truths of suffering, origination, and path are not fixed. If one relies on the Abhidharma, suffering and origination are of two kinds: first, coarse; second, subtle. Past karma and defilements obtaining present suffering fruits, and present karma and defilements obtaining future retributions—this is the coarse, which is phenomenal suffering and phenomenal origination. Conditioned dharmas arise and cease moment to moment; distinguishing suffering and origination conceptually on this basis is said to be subtle, and is taken as principle suffering and origination. If discussing them in terms of the coarse: if discussed in terms of phenomena, suffering, origination, and the path are definitively distinct entities. If distinguished in terms of the subtle, suffering and origination are of the same entity, while the truth of the path is different. What is the nature of this? A single moment of conditioned dharma arising from a prior origination is conceptually called suffering; this very conditioned dharma, being able to generate what follows, is conceptually called origination. It is just as a worldly person in relation to his father is a son, and in relation to his son is a father; therefore, suffering and origination are definitively of the same entity. The path is untainted and is not the same as the former two. If one relies on the Tattvasiddhi, it explains only defilements and karma as origination, and the saṃsāra one receives is called the truth of suffering; subtle arising and ceasing are all subsumed under suffering. This is a single kind of phenomenal suffering and origination. However, what it teaches is that origination and the path are distinct entities; in relation to origination and the path, suffering has three conceptual distinctions: First, the truth of suffering and origination are of the same entity, meaning that relying on the mind of retribution, one produces the causes of origination; the essence of origination is suffering, and hence they are said to be of the same entity, because that school proclaims that the essence of the mind of retribution is suffering. Second, the truth of suffering and the path are of the same entity, meaning that relying on the mind of retribution, one cultivates and generates the noble path; the truth of the path is [sustained on] suffering, and hence they are said to be of the same entity. Question: Why is the Abhidharma not like this? Explanation: The Abhidharma explains that the mind of retribution is not constantly continuous; when origination or the path arises, there is no such mind of retribution, and therefore the truth of suffering is not of the same entity as the two truths of origination and the path. That Tattvasiddhi explains that retribution is constantly continuous, and when origination or the path arises, this retribution is always present; therefore, the truth of suffering can be of the same entity as the two truths of origination and the path. Third, they are different, which refers to the mind of the suffering retribution among all other indeterminate minds, which is not the same as the two truths of origination and the path. In the Mahāyāna, what is explained is not fixed. First, distinguishing their identity and difference in terms of fragmented [saṃsāra]: suffering and origination therein are broadly of two kinds. First, dividing suffering and origination based on the difference between cause and effect across the three time periods; if based on this meaning, the identity and difference distinguished regarding suffering and origination in relation to the path are the same as in the Tattvasiddhi. Second, dividing suffering and origination conceptually based on that subtle arising and ceasing; if based on this meaning, the two truths of suffering and origination are definitively of the same entity, the same as in the Abhidharma. These very [truths of] suffering and origination in relation to the truth of the path, however, are not the same as in the Abhidharma. How are they not the same? There are two distinctions: First, suffering and origination are of the same entity as the path, meaning that relying on the mind of retribution, one generates the noble path; the mind of retribution is precisely subsumed under suffering and origination, and therefore suffering and origination are of the same entity as the path, precisely because the Mahāyāna also teaches that the mind of retribution is constantly continuous. Second, the truths of suffering and origination are of distinct entities from the path, which refers to the truths of suffering and origination among all other tainted dharmas. Fragmented [saṃsāra] is like this. Next, distinguishing their identity and difference in terms of transformed [saṃsāra]: within this it is not fixed. If in the state of an ordinary person, coarsely divided according to characteristics, there is only the truth of origination; broadly discussed according to principle, there can be the principle that suffering and origination are of the same entity. The ground of abiding ignorance is its truth of origination; the very meaning of the arising and ceasing of this ignorance is spoken of as suffering, and therefore suffering and origination are of one and the same entity. If based on the state of a noble one, the three truths are of the same entity: a single moment of the untainted [mind] that, in its own portion, remedies defilement is precisely the truth of the path; this very path, having arisen from prior untainted transformative karma, is called suffering, and being further able to generate what follows is called origination; therefore, the three truths are of one and the same essential nature. The remedies of cessation and the path in relation to suffering and origination, in their identity and difference, are like this. Next, distinguishing the identity and difference between the two truths of real cessation and the path: looking at these two in relation to each other, they are definitively of the same entity. The perfect tranquility of all virtues is precisely spoken of as cessation; the meaning of unobstructed permeability is precisely spoken of as the path; there is no separate entity, and therefore it is proclaimed that cessation and the path are of the same entity. Looking at them in relation to those [truths of] suffering and origination and the remedies of cessation and the path, they are definitively of distinct entities, because the real and the deluded are different. The phenomenal characteristics of the truths are like this. Next, distinguishing their identity and difference based on the real nature of the truths: discussing them in terms of reality, the four truths are of the same entity. Because the two truths of suffering and origination have no separate entity, they take the nature of cessation and the path as their entity. Therefore, it is taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]: 'The reality of those two truths of suffering and origination is precisely Buddha-nature, is precisely nirvāṇa, is precisely the Tathāgata, permanence, bliss, self, purity, and all Buddha-dharmas.' In the Ratnagotravibhāga it is also taught: 'Dharmakāya, Tathāgata, the noble truths, and nirvāṇa—these four dharmas are without distinction.' Because the two truths of cessation and the path have no separate entity, in turn that very real nature of suffering and origination is spoken of as their entity. For this reason, the twelve links of dependent origination are taught in the sūtras to be the Buddha-nature: 'To see the twelve links of dependent origination is called seeing the Buddha, seeing the Dharma, and seeing the Saṅgha.' It is also said that 'the five aggregates are the Buddha-nature, the cessation of suffering, and so forth.' Precisely because defilement and purity have no separate entities, it is said in the sūtra: 'When an ordinary person has not yet achieved buddhahood, bodhi is defilement; when sentient beings achieve buddhahood, defilements are bodhi.' The meaning lies in this. It is just like the south grasped by a confused person, which has no dual nature from the north understood when awakened. The meaning of identity and difference is similar to this.