大乘義章 3.71

3.71

次就真妄共相三識料簡有無。言共三者，真與無明共為本識，依本共起阿陀那識，依本共起六種生識。此三識中，六種起識有根有塵。根有二種：一者實依，依本識生。二者似依，以依自心所作六根，如人夢中眼等六識，實依睡心。似依眼等，而實不依。所有塵者，唯是似塵，都無實事，如人夢中所見色等非有似有。阿陀那識亦有根塵。根有二種：一者實依，依本識生。二者似依，同類相望，似前生後，如人夢中執我之心實依睡心，同類相望似後依前。所有塵者唯是似塵，都無實事，如人睡時取夢中身以之為我，無身可取。本識一種，無所依生，得說無根；而體生滅，藉前起後，亦得說根。本識無緣，不說有塵，因迷真法亦得說塵。根塵有無，辨之麁爾。

Next is to analyze presence and absence with respect to the three consciousnesses characterized by the combination of the true and the deluded. By 'three combined' is meant: the true and ignorance combine to form the fundamental consciousness; based on the fundamental, they combine to produce the ādāna consciousness; based on the fundamental, they combine to produce the six active consciousnesses. Among these three consciousnesses, the six active consciousnesses have faculties and objects. There are two kinds of faculties: first, the real support, arising in reliance on the fundamental consciousness; second, the apparent support, relying on the six faculties produced by one's own mind, just as in a dream a person's six consciousnesses such as the eye really rely on the sleeping mind, while apparently relying on the eye and the like without really relying on them. The objects that exist are only apparent objects, entirely lacking real phenomena, just as the forms and so forth seen by a person in a dream are non-existent yet appear to exist. The ādāna consciousness also has faculties and objects. There are two kinds of faculties: first, the real support, arising in reliance on the fundamental consciousness; second, the apparent support, viewed within the same class, where the preceding apparently produces the succeeding, just as in a dream a person's mind grasping at a self really relies on the sleeping mind, while viewed within the same class the succeeding apparently relies on the preceding. The objects that exist are only apparent objects, entirely lacking real phenomena, just as when a person is asleep they grasp the body in the dream as a self, though there is no body to grasp. The one fundamental consciousness, having no reliance from which it arises, can be said to lack a faculty; yet its substance arises and ceases, relying on the preceding to produce the succeeding, so it can also be said to have a faculty. The fundamental consciousness has no objective support, so it is not said to have objects; yet because it obscures true reality, it can also be said to have objects. The presence and absence of faculties and objects is thus roughly discerned.