大乘義章 5.98

5.98

言九結者，煩惱闇惑結縛行人，故名為結。又能縛心，亦名為結。亦能結集一切生死，故稱為結。結義如是。然此結義，隨別異論，難以限算。今據一門，且論九種。九名是何？一名愛結、二名嗔結、三名癡結、四名慢結、五名疑結、六名見結、七名取結、八名慳結、九名嫉結。名字如是。九中前七，猶是十使五見之，合之為二，餘五各故，有七種，加以慳嫉故合為九。相狀如何？言愛結者，於順境界，貪染名愛，此猶貪使。言嗔結者，於違境界，忿怒名嗔，此猶嗔使。言癡結者，於中境界，緣而不了，故名為癡，此猶癡使。總相雖同，寬狹有異，癡使則寬，癡結則狹。癡使之中有二無明：一者不共、二者相應。言不共者，於理於事緣而不了，不與一切煩惱俱起，故名不共。言相應者，除前不共，自餘一切諸煩惱中闍彰之心，名為相應。爾此唯取不共無明以收癡結。何故如是？九結之中，要取作意獨立之者以之為結，以獨立者力堅強故。故《雜心》云「獨立煩惱入九結中。」言慢結者，方他自高，名之為慢，此猶慢使。言疑結者，於正道中猶預不決，故名為疑，此猶疑使。言見結者，身邊邪見，此之三種顛倒推求，故名為見，此即是其身見、邊見、邪見使也。言取結者，戒見二取，取執境界，故名取結，此猶戒取、見取使也。問曰：何故身邊邪見合為見結，戒見二取合為取結？《雜心》釋言「以名等故，及事等故。」言名等者，《雜心》釋言「身邊邪見，是其女名。戒見二取，是其男名。男女相對，故云名等。」何故三見說之為女？女是內人，身邊邪見親迷於理，義在於內，故從所迷就喻名女。何故二取說之為男？男是外人，戒見二取隨他從起，不親迷理，義在於外，故就喻目說之為男。名義如是。言事等者，彼此名是十八使性，故云事等。何者十八？見結之中三界各六，故有十八。欲界六者，欲界邪見通迷四諦即以為四，身邊二見屬迷苦諦即以為二，通前說六。欲界既六，色無色界類亦同然，故有十八。取結之中，三界各六，亦有十八。欲界六者，欲界見取通迷四諦即以為四，戒取迷於苦道二諦即以為二，通前說六。欲界既然，色無色界類亦同爾，故有十八。事等如是，具斯兩義，三見為一，二見為一。若依《成實》則不如是，彼說十使俱迷四諦，不可說為名等事等，但以二取過患重故，別為取結。云何過重？如彼《成實．九結品》說「戒取之過，難可捨離。世間之人多取為道，不見其過。如內道人取糞掃衣以為道等，諸外道人取彼行以為道等。又此戒取乖違八正，以有此故，雖有所行，空無所得。又能令人得二世苦，如持牛戒為鷄戒等種種苦行，受現世苦，當墮惡道受後世苦。」戒取如是。見取過者，執著一切虛妄之法，不得真實，當知皆是見取之力。過狀如是。以有此過，說為取結，不由名等。言慳結者，於己身財慳惜不捨，故名為慳。言嫉結者，忌他勝己，故名為嫉。此二猶是十纏之中慳嫉纏也。何故纏中唯說此二以為結乎？論自釋言「慳嫉獨立，離於二故。」八九結中自力孤起，不與他合，故云獨立。問曰：一切諸煩惱中皆有無明及睡掉等，云何言獨？釋言：有以。無明睡掉一切處有，彼此昏通，言廢不論。除此已外，不與一切諸使共起，故云獨立。此慳與嫉唯言不善，非善無記，故云離二。何故唯取獨立為結？此如上釋，獨立煩惱，其力堅強、結縛牢固，故說為結。又前七結並是獨立，今為同彼，唯取獨立。何故唯取離二煩惱以之為結？不善煩惱，其力強盛、結縛牢固，所以偏取。若如是者，前七結中身邊二見唯是無記，上二界中一切煩惱亦是無記，非不善性，何故名結？釋言：前七是其使性，使性堅強，假令無記亦能結縛，故說為結；餘非使性，勢力輕微，要不善者方能結縛，不類前七。既在於此。間曰：睡掉何故非結？論自釋言「睡掉二纏，諸結俱起，不名獨立。又通不善穢污無記，不名離二。為是不取。」又問：眠纏何故非結？論自釋言「眠與一切諸使相應，故非獨立。眠通三性，故非離二。是以不取。」無慚無愧何故非結？論自釋言「無慚無愧雖復離二，而不獨立，是故非結。」此無慚愧，唯與欲界不善俱故，名為離二。何故悔纏不說為結？論自釋言「悔雖獨立，而不離二，所以非結，善不善中皆有悔故。」忿覆二纏，何故非結？論自釋言「忿覆雖獨立，而復離二。有人欲令是使性故，所以不說。忿是嗔性，覆是貪性，如是說者但立八纏。」《地持論》中亦同此說。問曰：六垢何故非結？論自釋言「急縛煩惱說之為纏，輕繫煩惱說以為垢。急縛之中稍微之者猶尚不取，何況輕繫，是故不說。」若依《成實》則不如是。彼說云何？慳嫉二纏是弊煩惱，故說為結，更無異義。云何是弊？彼論釋云「以有慳故，慳著身財，雖見貧苦無心濟拔。以有嫉故，忌他得利。又復沒貪嗔最多罪過，嗔墮惡道多由貪嗔，以是過故貪中出慳，瞋中分嫉。又慳與嫉，多慳天人，故偏說之。餘不如是，廢而不說。」九結如是。問曰：頗有見相應法為愛結繫非見結繫，而得名為見使使不？《雜心》言「有，謂見道中集智已生、滅智未生，爾時於彼滅道諦下，戒見二取相應心法及非心法生住滅等，為滅道下愛結所繫，以愛緣於有漏生故，而非見結。」滅道諦下所有邪見親緣理生，不緣有漏，是故不能結縛此法。苦集諦下十一遍使已斷除故，復不繫此，是故不名見結所繫。而為同時戒見二取所使縛故，名見使也。良以二取，九結之中非見結故不名見結，十使之中是見使名見使。九結辨之麁爾。

Regarding the nine fetters (saṃyojana): afflictions (kleśa), dark and deluding, tie down and bind practitioners; hence they are named "fetters". Furthermore, they are able to bind the mind; thus they are also named "fetters". Moreover, they can bind together and amass (saṃjñā-) all births and deaths (saṃsāra); hence they are called "fetters". Such is the meaning of "fetter".

However, this meaning of fetter, following different treatises, is difficult to limit by count. Now, relying on one approach, we provisionally discuss nine kinds. What are their nine names? The first is called the fetter of attachment (rāga-saṃyojana); the second is called the fetter of hostility (pratigha-saṃyojana); the third is called the fetter of ignorance (māna-? / avidyā-saṃyojana); the fourth is called the fetter of conceit (māna-saṃyojana); the fifth is called the fetter of doubt (vicikitsā-saṃyojana); the sixth is called the fetter of views (dṛṣṭi-saṃyojana); the seventh is called the fetter of grasping (parāmarśa-saṃyojana); the eighth is called the fetter of avarice (mātsarya-saṃyojana); the ninth is called the fetter of envy (īrṣyā-saṃyojana). Such are their names.

Among these nine, the first seven are just the ten proclivities (anuśaya). The five views among them are combined into two; the remaining five [proclivities] each stand separately; hence there are seven kinds. Adding avarice and envy to them, they combine to make nine. What are their characteristics?

As for the fetter of attachment: covetous clinging toward agreeable objects is called attachment; this is just the proclivity of greed (rāga-anuśaya).
As for the fetter of hostility: anger and rage toward disagreeable objects is called hostility; this is just the proclivity of hostility (pratigha-anuśaya).
As for the fetter of ignorance: cognising intermediate objects without understanding is therefore called ignorance; this is just the proclivity of ignorance (avidyā-anuśaya). Although their general characteristics are identical, their breadth differs: the proclivity of ignorance is broader, while the fetter of ignorance is narrower. Within the proclivity of ignorance, there are two kinds of ignorance: the first is unshared (āveṇika), and the second is associated (samprayukta). "Unshared" means cognising principle and phenomena without understanding, not arising together with any other afflictions; hence it is called "unshared". "Associated" means: excluding the aforementioned unshared [ignorance], the dark and obscuring mind within all the other afflictions is called "associated". Here, only unshared ignorance is taken to subsume the fetter of ignorance. Why is this? Among the nine fetters, only those that operate with attention independently are taken to constitute fetters, because what stands independently has strong power. Hence the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: "afflictions that stand independently enter into the nine fetters."

As for the fetter of conceit: exalting oneself in comparison with others is called conceit; this is just the proclivity of conceit.
As for the fetter of doubt: hesitation and indecision regarding the right path is therefore called doubt; this is just the proclivity of doubt.
As for the fetter of views: view of self-identity (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), extreme view (anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi), and false view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi)—these three kinds investigate invertedly, and are therefore called views; these are precisely the proclivities of the view of self-identity, extreme view, and false view.
As for the fetter of grasping: the two graspings—attachment to views (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) and attachment to precepts and vows (śīlavrata-parāmarśa)—grasp and hold fast to objects; hence they are called the fetter of grasping. These are precisely the proclivities of attachment to precepts and attachment to views.

Question: Why are the view of self-identity, extreme view, and false view combined into the fetter of views, while the two graspings of precepts and views are combined into the fetter of grasping?
The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "Because their names are equal, and because their entities (vastu) are equal." As for "their names are equal", the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "The view of self-identity, extreme view, and false view are feminine names. The two graspings of precepts and views are masculine names. Male and female correspond to each other; hence it says 'their names are equal'." Why are the three views spoken of as female? A woman is an internal person; the view of self-identity, extreme view, and false view directly delude regarding principle, their sense being internal; hence following that which is deluded, by way of metaphor they are named female. Why are the two graspings spoken of as male? A man is an external person; the two graspings of precepts and views arise following others, not directly deluding regarding principle, their sense being external; hence according to metaphor they are referred to and spoken of as male. Such is the meaning of the names. As for "their entities are equal": both [groups] in their names have eighteen proclivities in their nature; hence it says "entities are equal". What are the eighteen? Within the fetter of views, there are six in each of the three realms; hence there are eighteen. As for the six in the desire realm: false view in the desire realm deludes commonly with respect to the four truths, thus counting as four; the two views of self-identity and extremes belong to deluding with respect to the truth of suffering, thus counting as two; combined with the preceding they are spoken of as six. Since there are six in the desire realm, those in the form and formless realms are similarly classified; hence there are eighteen. Within the fetter of grasping, there are six in each of the three realms, likewise making eighteen. As for the six in the desire realm: attachment to views in the desire realm deludes commonly with respect to the four truths, thus counting as four; attachment to precepts deludes with respect to the two truths of suffering and the path, thus counting as two; combined with the preceding they are spoken of as six. Since the desire realm is thus, the form and formless realms are similarly classified; hence there are eighteen. "Entities are equal" is like this. Possessing these two meanings, three views constitute one [fetter], and two views constitute one [fetter].

If one relies on the *Tattvasiddhi*, however, it is not like this. It states that the ten proclivities all delude with respect to the four truths, so one cannot speak of names being equal or entities being equal; it is solely because the faults and perils of the two graspings are grave that they are separately made into the fetter of grasping. How are they gravely faulted? As the "Chapter on the Nine Fetters" in that *Tattvasiddhi* states: "The fault of attachment to precepts is difficult to abandon. Worldly people mostly grasp it as the path and do not see its fault. Just as adherents of the inner teaching grasp wearing rag-robes as the path, and various non-Buddhists grasp such practices as the path. Furthermore, this attachment to precepts runs contrary to the eightfold noble path; because it exists, even if one undertakes practices, they are empty and bring no attainment. Furthermore, it causes people to obtain the suffering of two lifetimes: just as observing the bovine precept or the canine precept and other such various austerities incurs suffering in the present life and will cause one to fall into the evil destinies to suffer in future lives." Such is attachment to precepts. As for the fault of attachment to views: grasping at all false and delusory dharmas without attaining the real—one should know that this is all the power of attachment to views. Such are the characteristics of its fault. Because these faults exist, they are spoken of as the fetter of grasping, not by reason of names being equal and so forth.

As for the fetter of avarice: being miserly and ungiving toward one's own body and wealth is called avarice.
As for the fetter of envy: resenting another's surpassing oneself is called envy. These two are just the entanglements (paryavasthāna) of avarice and envy among the ten entanglements.
Why among the entanglements are only these two spoken of as fetters? The treatise itself explains: "Because avarice and envy stand independently and are separated from two." Among the eight or nine fetters, they arise singly by their own power and do not combine with others; hence it says "stand independently".
Question: Among all afflictions, ignorance, torpor, restlessness, and so forth are all present; how can one say they stand alone?
Answer: There is a reason. Ignorance, torpor, and restlessness exist everywhere; their dimming is common to all, so discussing them is dispensed with and not pursued. Aside from these, they do not arise together with any other proclivities; hence it says "stand independently". These two, avarice and envy, are solely unwholesome, not wholesome or indeterminate; hence it says "separated from two".
Why take only what stands independently to be a fetter? This is as explained above: afflictions that stand independently have firm and strong power, and their binding is solid; hence they are spoken of as fetters. Furthermore, the preceding seven fetters all stand independently; now to be the same as them, only those that stand independently are taken.
Why take only afflictions that are separated from two to be fetters? Unwholesome afflictions have powerful force and their binding is solid; therefore they are specially selected.
If that is so, among the preceding seven fetters, the two views of self-identity and extremes are exclusively indeterminate, and all afflictions in the upper two realms are also indeterminate and not of an unwholesome nature; why are they named fetters?
Answer: The preceding seven are of the nature of proclivities; the nature of proclivities is firm and strong, so even if they are indeterminate, they are still able to bind; hence they are spoken of as fetters. The others are not of the nature of proclivities and their strength is slight; only when they are unwholesome are they able to bind; they are not comparable to the preceding seven. The reason lies here.

Question: Why are torpor and restlessness not fetters?
The treatise itself explains: "The two entanglements of torpor and restlessness arise together with all the fetters; they are not called standing independently. Furthermore, they pervade the unwholesome and the defiled indeterminate; they are not called separated from two. For this reason they are not taken."
Question again: Why is the entanglement of sleep not a fetter?
The treatise itself explains: "Sleep is associated with all proclivities; therefore it does not stand independently. Sleep pervades the three natures; therefore it is not separated from two. Hence it is not taken."
Why are shamelessness (āhrīkya) and lack of conscience (anapatrāpya) not fetters?
The treatise itself explains: "Although shamelessness and lack of conscience are separated from two, they do not stand independently; therefore they are not fetters." These, shamelessness and lack of conscience, only occur together with the unwholesome of the desire realm; hence they are called "separated from two".
Why is the entanglement of regret (kaukṛtya) not spoken of as a fetter?
The treatise itself explains: "Although regret stands independently, it is not separated from two; therefore it is not a fetter, because regret exists in both the wholesome and unwholesome."
Why are the two entanglements of anger (krodha) and concealment (mrakṣa) not fetters?
The treatise itself explains: "Although anger and concealment stand independently and are also separated from two, some assert that they are of the nature of proclivities; therefore they are not spoken of. Anger is of the nature of hostility, and concealment is of the nature of greed; for those who explain it thus, only eight entanglements are established." The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Dichi lun*) also shares this explanation.
Question: Why are the six defilements (mala) not fetters?
The treatise itself explains: "Afflictions that bind tightly are spoken of as entanglements; afflictions that tie lightly are spoken of as defilements. Among those that bind tightly, those that are even slightly subtle are still not taken, how much less those that tie lightly; therefore they are not spoken of."

If one relies on the *Tattvasiddhi*, however, it is not like this. How does it explain? The two entanglements of avarice and envy are detrimental afflictions; hence they are spoken of as fetters, with no other meaning. How are they detrimental? That treatise explains: "Because of avarice, one is stingily attached to one's body and wealth, and even when seeing poverty and suffering, one has no intention of rescuing. Because of envy, one resents others obtaining benefit. Furthermore, immersion in greed and hostility holds the most transgressions; falling into the evil destinies mostly stems from greed and hostility; because of these faults, avarice is brought out from greed, and envy is distinguished from hostility. Furthermore, avarice and envy mostly obstruct humans and devas; therefore they are spoken of in particular. The others are not like this, and are set aside without being discussed." The nine fetters are like this.

Question: Can a dharma associated with views be bound by the fetter of attachment yet not bound by the fetter of views, and nonetheless be called bound by the proclivity of views, or not?
The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: "There is such a case. Namely, in the path of seeing, when the cognition of origin has already arisen but the cognition of cessation has not yet arisen, at that time under the truths of cessation and the path, the mental and non-mental dharmas associated with the two graspings of precepts and views—their arising, abiding, and ceasing, and so forth—are bound by the fetter of attachment under cessation and the path, because attachment arises by taking the tainted (sāsrava) as object; yet they are not [bound by] the fetter of views." Any false views under the truths of cessation and the path arise by directly taking principle as object, not taking the tainted as object; therefore they cannot bind these dharmas. Because the eleven omnipresent proclivities under the truths of suffering and origin have already been severed, they further do not bind these; therefore they are not called bound by the fetter of views. Yet because they are driven and bound by the simultaneous two graspings of precepts and views, they are called [bound by] the proclivity of views. Truly, it is because the two graspings are not the fetter of views among the nine fetters that they are not called the fetter of views, while among the ten proclivities they are the proclivity of views and are called the proclivity of views. The explanation of the nine fetters is roughly this.