大乘義章 6.18

6.18

次就諸使縛境差別。於中有三：一明諸使縛境總別、二約三世明縛不同、三隨六識明縛有異。言總別者，依如《毘曇》，貪瞋及慢是自相使，餘之七種是共相使。云何自相？論自釋言「貪瞋及慢，別緣事生，不能總緣一切法起，故名自相。如彼貪心，要於所見所聞境界而起貪心，不能於彼不見不聞不思惟處而起貪心。貪心既爾，瞋慢亦然。」云何共相？見、疑、無明，總緣一切境界法起，故云共相。依如《成實．雜問品》中，應非此義。彼說十使皆有總緣別緣之義，總皆名共，別皆名自，不得偏說。如以貪使，或時總緣四天下起，云何定別？又彼論中引《長爪經》，證貪瞋等是總煩惱。如我見人，聞一切有，皆生忍心，忍即是貪。聞一切無，心皆不忍，不忍是瞋。執我自高，則名為慢。又邪見人，聞一切無，心則貪喜。聞一切有，心則瞋惱。恃此自高，即是其慢。云何名別？見、疑、無明，當知亦有別緣之義，云何定總？是故十使皆有總別。《成實》如是。理實十使皆有總別，《毘曇》所說，從多言耳。次約三世明縛不同。如《毘曇》說「貪瞋慢使，若過去者，於彼三世有漏法中，唯縛彼使所緣境界；所不緣者，則無縛義，所緣定故。若現在者，亦於三世有漏法中，唯縛彼使所緣境界；所不緣者，使則不縛，所緣定故。在未來者，有生不生。若不生者，緣縛三世一切有漏，以未起故。三世有漏，一切皆有可縛之義。」若論生者，隨緣別縛。譬如有人遙射體多人，若未放箭，多人皆有可射之義。若已放竟，隨所著者則名被射，餘不著者不名被射。貪等亦然，未起之者通縛一切，當起之者隨緣別縛。自餘七使，隨在過去現在未來，皆縛三世一切有漏，以彼見等共縛使故。此總相言，非是別相。差別之相，如後門說。若依《成實》，三世十使一一皆縛三世有漏。次隨六識相縛有異。如論中說「五識之中貪瞋煩惱，若過去者，唯縛過去五塵境界。若現在者，唯縛現在。若未來者，則有二種：一者生法、二不生法。若生法者，隨緣別縛。若不生者，通縛三世色等五塵。若在意地，十使煩惱於三世中隨何世起，皆縛三世有漏諸法。若無漏法，緣而不縛。」總相如是。於中分別，貪瞋及慢於三世法，別緣別縛；見疑無明，總緣總縛。若依《成實》，十使煩惱唯在意地，一一皆能總縛三世，亦得別緣。縛不同，辨之麁爾。

Next is the distinction among the cognitive objects bound by the underlying afflictions. Herein are three parts: first, explaining the general and specific cognitive objects bound by the underlying afflictions; second, explaining the differences in binding with respect to the three times; third, explaining the variations in binding according to the six consciousnesses. As for general and specific: according to the Abhidharma, greed, anger, and conceit are afflictions of specific characteristics, while the remaining seven are afflictions of general characteristics. Why are they specific characteristics? The treatise itself explains: "Greed, anger, and conceit arise by separately taking phenomena as cognitive objects and cannot arise by generally taking all phenomena as cognitive objects; hence they are named specific characteristics. For example, a mind of greed necessarily gives rise to greed in relation to objects seen and heard, and cannot give rise to greed in what is not seen, heard, or thought. Greed being so, anger and conceit are likewise." Why are they general characteristics? View, doubt, and ignorance arise by generally taking all objects and phenomena as cognitive objects; hence they are called general characteristics. If one relies on the "Chapter on Miscellaneous Inquiries" in the Tattvasiddhi, it should not mean this. That [treatise] states that all ten underlying afflictions have the meanings of both general cognitive objects and specific cognitive objects: all general ones are named "common," and all specific ones are named "particular"; one must not speak one-sidedly. For instance, with the affliction of greed, it sometimes arises by generally taking the four continents as its cognitive object; how could it be definitively specific? Furthermore, that treatise cites the Dīrghanakha-sūtra to prove that greed, anger, and so forth are general afflictions: as when a person with the view of self, hearing that all exists, gives rise to an accepting mind—acceptance is precisely greed; hearing that all is non-existent, the mind does not accept—non-acceptance is anger; grasping oneself as superior is called conceit. Again, a person with wrong view, hearing that all is non-existent, feels greed and joy in his mind; hearing that all exists, his mind feels anger and vexation; relying on this to elevate himself is precisely conceit. How are they specific? View, doubt, and ignorance, one should know, also have the meaning of specific cognitive objects; how could they be definitively general? Therefore, all ten underlying afflictions have both general and specific [modes]. The Tattvasiddhi is thus. In actual principle, all ten underlying afflictions have both general and specific [modes]; what the Abhidharma stated was merely spoken from the predominant aspect. Next is explaining the differences in binding with respect to the three times. As the Abhidharma states: "If the afflictions of greed, anger, and conceit are past, among the sāsrava phenomena of the three times they bind only the cognitive objects that those afflictions took as objects; what was not taken as an object has no meaning of being bound, because the cognitive object is fixed. If they are present, among the sāsrava phenomena of the three times they also bind only the cognitive objects that those afflictions take as objects; what is not taken as an object is not bound by the afflictions, because the cognitive object is fixed. If they are in the future, there are those that will arise and those that will not arise. If they will not arise, they bind by cognitive object all sāsrava [phenomena] of the three times, because they have not yet arisen. The sāsrava [phenomena] of the three times all have the capacity to be bound." If one discusses those that will arise, they specifically bind according to the object. For example, a person from afar shoots at a target with many people: if the arrow has not yet been released, the many people all have the capacity to be shot; if it has already been released, whichever is struck is said to have been shot, while the rest that were not struck are not said to have been shot. Greed and the rest are also like this: those that have not arisen bind all universally, while those that will arise specifically bind according to the object. The remaining seven underlying afflictions, whether in the past, present, or future, all bind all sāsrava [phenomena] of the three times, because those views and the rest are afflictions that bind generally. This is spoken in terms of general characteristics, not specific characteristics. The distinguishing characteristics are as explained in the subsequent section. If one relies on the Tattvasiddhi, each of the ten underlying afflictions of the three times binds the sāsrava [phenomena] of the three times. Next, there are differences in binding according to the six consciousnesses. As stated in the treatise: "If the afflictions of greed and anger in the five consciousnesses are past, they bind only the past objects of the five sense data. If they are present, they bind only the present. If they are future, there are two kinds: first, dharmas that will arise; second, dharmas that will not arise. If they are dharmas that will arise, they specifically bind according to the object. If they are dharmas that will not arise, they universally bind the five sense data—matter and so forth—of the three times. If in the mental ground, whichever time the ten underlying afflictions arise in among the three times, they all bind all sāsrava dharmas of the three times. If they are anāsrava dharmas, they take them as cognitive objects but do not bind them." The general characteristic is like this. To distinguish within this: greed, anger, and conceit take specific cognitive objects and specifically bind with respect to the dharmas of the three times; view, doubt, and ignorance take general cognitive objects and generally bind. If one relies on the Tattvasiddhi, the ten underlying afflictions exist only in the mental ground; each can generally bind the three times and can also take specific cognitive objects. The differences in binding are roughly distinguished thus.