大乘義章 6.42

6.42

十四難義，出《涅槃經》。彼《大品經．佛母品》中亦具分別。所言難者，執邪徵正，目之為難。亦可邪執礙於聖道，能與出世為留難故，名之為難。難別不同，宣說十四。就十四中，常無常見有其四種，邊無邊見亦有四種，如去不如去復有四種，身神一異有其二種，是故合有十四難也。常無常中四種見者，一神及世間二俱是常、二神及世間二俱無常、三神及世間亦常無常、四神及世間非常非無常。今先就神分別其相，後就世間。所言神者，謂諸凡夫顛倒憶想，橫計我人名之為神。言神常者，有諸外道說神是常。於中有二：一鈍、二利。鈍根之者，為是神故，修持所行，未來受報。又為苦行，令神得脫。利根之者，說神定常，苦樂不變，則無罪福，多起邪見。言無常者，有諸外道說神無常，計無常故，為今世樂，多起放逸。所言亦常無常者，有諸外道說神有二：一細、二麁。細者是常，身死神在；麁者無常，身死神滅，如仙尼說。所言非常非無常者，有人見彼常與無常二俱有過。云何有過？若神是常，則無罪福苦樂等報，猶如虛空，風雨不變；若神無常，便為苦樂之所變改，猶如牛皮，風雨在中則便瀾壞。以是過故，說神非常亦非無常。雖復宣說非常無常，以我心故，必說有神。就神如是。次就世間明常無常。言世間者，論說有三：一眾生世間、二五陰世間、三國土世間。於此三中，隨人取別，亦有常等四種異見。言世常者，有人說彼三種世間自然而有，不從因起，名之為常。言無常者，有人宣說：一切世間終歸斷滅，更無後續，故曰無常。所言亦常亦無常者，有人說言：世間之中，麁者無常、微塵是常，是故名為亦常亦無常。所言非常非無常者，有人見彼常與無常二俱有過，是故宣說非常無常。此等四種，執定不捨，故名為邪。問曰：神者本來無法，於中妄取，可名為邪。世間是有，設令取之，云何名邪？論自釋言「但破世間定執常等，不破世間。如人見蛇妄謂瓔珞，有明眼者語言是蛇，非是瓔珞。佛亦如是，破彼常等，不破世間。」現見世間無常生滅，云何定常？業報不失，云何說言定是無常？前二既非，寧有第三亦常無常？有為生滅業果不失，寧得定說非常無常？以是義故，常等四種，皆悉是邪（此一門竟）。

The doctrine of the fourteen difficult questions comes from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. It is also fully distinguished in the "Chapter on the Mother of Buddhas" of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. Regarding what is termed a "difficult question" (nan): grasping at erroneous views to cross-examine what is correct is designated a "difficult question." Alternatively, because erroneous attachments obstruct the noble path and can serve as hindrances (liunan) to world-transcendence, they are named "difficult questions." The difficult questions differ, and fourteen are spoken of. Among these fourteen, the views on permanence and impermanence are of four kinds; the views on the finite and infinite are also of four kinds; [the views on] whether [the Tathāgata] goes or does not go likewise are of four kinds; and [the views on whether] the body and the soul are identical or different are of two kinds. Therefore, in total, there are fourteen difficult questions. Among the views on permanence and impermanence, the four kinds are: first, that both the soul and the world are permanent; second, that both the soul and the world are impermanent; third, that both the soul and the world are both permanent and impermanent; and fourth, that both the soul and the world are neither permanent nor impermanent. Now we first distinguish their characteristics with respect to the soul, and subsequently with respect to the world. What is termed the "soul" (shen) refers to ordinary people's inverted conceptualizations, falsely imputing a self or person, which they designate as the soul. Regarding the claim that the soul is permanent, there are non-Buddhists who say that the soul is permanent. Among them, there are two types: first, the dull-rooted; second, the sharp-rooted. Those of dull faculties, for the sake of this soul, cultivate practices and receive future retributions; moreover, they engage in asceticism so that the soul may attain liberation. Those of sharp faculties say that the soul is definitely permanent, that suffering and pleasure do not alter it, and consequently there is neither demerit nor merit; they mostly give rise to wrong views. Regarding the claim that [the soul] is impermanent, there are non-Buddhists who say that the soul is impermanent; because they impute impermanence, they mostly give rise to heedlessness for the sake of pleasures in the present life. Regarding the claim that it is both permanent and impermanent, there are non-Buddhists who say that the soul is of two kinds: first, subtle; second, coarse. The subtle is permanent—the body dies but the soul endures; the coarse is impermanent—the body dies and the soul perishes, as Śreṇika taught. Regarding the claim that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, there are those who see that permanence and impermanence both entail faults. How do they entail faults? If the soul were permanent, there would be no retribution such as demerit, merit, suffering, or pleasure, just like space, which wind and rain cannot alter. If the soul were impermanent, it would be altered by suffering and pleasure, just like an ox hide, which decomposes when subjected to wind and rain. Because of these faults, they say that the soul is neither permanent nor impermanent. Although they state that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, because of their self-grasping mind, they definitely assert the existence of a soul. Such is the discussion regarding the soul. Next, permanence and impermanence are explained with respect to the world. Regarding what is termed the "world" (loka), the treatises say there are three kinds: first, the world of sentient beings; second, the world of the five aggregates; and third, the world of the physical realm. Among these three, according to the distinctions grasped by different persons, there are also four kinds of divergent views, such as permanence and so on. Regarding the claim that the world is permanent, some say that those three kinds of worlds exist spontaneously and do not arise from causes; they designate this as permanent. Regarding the claim that it is impermanent, some state: all worlds ultimately return to annihilation with no further continuation; hence it is called impermanent. Regarding the claim that it is both permanent and impermanent, some say: within the world, that which is coarse is impermanent, while subtle atoms are permanent; therefore it is called both permanent and impermanent. Regarding the claim that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, some see that permanence and impermanence both entail faults; therefore they state that it is neither permanent nor impermanent. Rigidly clinging to these four kinds without abandoning them is why they are called erroneous. Question: Since the soul originally has no real existence, grasping at it falsely may well be called erroneous. But the world exists; even if one grasps at it, how can that be called erroneous? The treatise itself explains: "It is only the rigid grasping of permanence and the like in the world that is refuted; it does not refute the world itself. It is like someone seeing a snake and falsely taking it to be a necklace; a person with clear eyes tells them, 'This is a snake, not a necklace.' The Buddha is also like this: he refutes their permanence and so on, but does not refute the world." Visibly observing the world to be impermanently arising and ceasing, how could it be definitely permanent? Karma and retribution are never lost; how could one say it is definitely impermanent? Since the former two are both false, how could there be a third, both permanent and impermanent? Conditioned arising and ceasing do occur, yet karmic fruits are not lost; how could one definitely state that it is neither permanent nor impermanent? For this reason, the four kinds—permanence and the rest—are all erroneous. (This concludes the first section.)