大乘義章 7.51

7.51

八種語者，所謂見聞覺知而說不見不聞不覺知說。相狀如何？今先明其見聞覺知四種心異，後明見等發語差別。見聞覺知，分別有三：一隨根分別。如《毘曇》說，眼識隨生見。耳識隨生聞。鼻舌及身，塵到方知，合名為覺。意識名知。二約境分別。如《成實》說，六識之心得現境界名之為見。故論說言「見名現信。」不現境界，藉教而知，說之為聞。故論說言「聞名信於賢聖之語。」於彼不見不聞境界，依前見聞，譬度知者，說以為知。故論說言「知者比知。」前三心後重分別心，名之為覺。云何分別？先因見已，後重思惟，起於見想；或忘前見，起不見想。此則是其見後覺也，聞知後覺，類亦可知。然此覺心，非直從於見聞及知三心後起，蓋亦從於不見不聞不知後生。如先不見，後忘不見生於見想，此則是其不見後覺。不聞不知，生覺例然。此是第二約境分別。三就四心隨義分別。識心名見，得現境故。想心名聞，境不現故。又復想心知於假名，故說為聞。受心名覺，覺違順故。行心名知，強分別故。四心如是。次明見等發語不同，要略唯八，廣則眾多。廣相如何？若依《毘曇》，所說見等發語不同，有三十二：十六正語、十六邪語，是故通合有三十二。十六正語者，心境俱實有其八語，境虛心實復有八語，故有十六。心境實者，有人實見亦生見想，他問見不，答言實見。聞覺知等，亦復如是，即以為四。有實不見，不見生不見想，他問見不，答言不見。聞覺知等亦復如是，復以為四。通前即為八種實也。境虛心實八種語者，有實不見，後忘不見便生見想，他問見不，答言實見。其境雖虛，以心實故，亦名實語。聞覺知等，類亦同然，即以為四。有人實見，後忘此見生不見想，他問見不，答言不見。雖不稱事，以心實故，亦名實語。聞覺知等，類亦同然，復以為四。通前為八。此前十六，是其正語。就邪語中，心境並虛有其八語，境實心虛復有八語，是故通合有十六語。境心並虛八種語者，有人實見，還生見想，他問見不，答言不見。聞覺知等，類亦同然，即以為四。有實不見，生不見想，他問見不，答言實見。聞覺知等，亦復如是，復以為四。通前為八。境實心虛八種語者，有人實見，後忘此見生不見想，他問見不，答言實見。雖當前事，以心虛故，亦名妄語。聞覺知等，類亦同然，即以為四。有實不見，後忘不見便生見想，他問見不，答言不見。雖當前事，以心虛故，亦名妄語。聞覺知等，亦復如是，復以為四。通前為八。并上八種，合為十六。彼《成實論》所明見等發語差別，人釋不同。有人釋言：見聞及知，此三是本，各別發語。覺者是前三種之後重分別心，無別所知，不別發語。若存此義，所發但有二十四語：見中有八，四正四邪，聞知亦然，是故通合有二十四。於中具辨，與前不異，驗求《成實》，覺亦發語。云何得知？如彼《成實．八語品》中，明見發語差別已竟，聞覺知等亦復如是。論中既以聞覺知等類同見心，明知覺心亦別發語。若存此義，所發亦有三十二語，與上相似。問曰：覺心云何發語？有人先來曾起覺心，亦生覺想，他問覺不，答言實覺。此是初句。有人先來不起覺心，生不覺想，他問覺不，答言不覺。此是兩句。有人先來曾起覺心，後忘覺心，生不覺想，他問覺不，答言不覺。雖違前覺，不違已想，猶名實語。此是三句。有人先來不起覺心，後忘不覺，便生覺相，他問覺不，答言實覺。以稱想故，亦名實語。此四正語。後四邪語，翻上可知。八種語義，略辨如是。

The eight kinds of speech are: speaking of what is seen, heard, sensed, or known as unseen, unheard, unsensed, or unknown, and speaking [conversely]. What are their characteristics? Now we first explain the differences among the four kinds of mind—seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing—and afterwards explain the differences in speech generated by seeing and so forth. Seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing are distinguished into three: First, distinguishing according to the faculties. As explained in the Abhidharma: eye-consciousness gives rise to seeing; ear-consciousness gives rise to hearing; the nose, tongue, and body know only when sense-objects arrive, and are collectively called sensing; mental consciousness is called knowing. Second, distinguishing according to the objects. As explained in the Tattvasiddhi: the mind of the six consciousnesses grasping present objects is called seeing. Thus that treatise says: 'Seeing is called present conviction.' Non-present objects known by relying on instruction are spoken of as hearing. Thus that treatise says: 'Hearing is called conviction in the words of the noble and wise.' Regarding objects neither seen nor heard, knowing them through inferential reasoning based on prior seeing and hearing is spoken of as knowing. Thus that treatise says: 'Knowing is inferential knowledge.' The subsequent re-conceptualizing mind following the prior three minds is called sensing. How does it re-conceptualize? Having previously seen, one later reflects again and produces the notion of seeing; or, forgetting the previous seeing, produces the notion of not seeing. This is sensing following seeing; sensing following hearing and knowing can be understood by analogy. However, this sensing mind does not only arise following the three minds of seeing, hearing, and knowing; it also arises following not seeing, not hearing, and not knowing. For instance, having previously not seen, one later forgets not seeing and gives rise to the notion of seeing; this is sensing following not seeing. Arising of sensing from not hearing and not knowing is analogous. This is the second: distinguishing according to objects. Third, distinguishing the four minds according to their functions: The consciousness mind is called seeing, because it grasps present objects. The samjñā mind is called hearing, because the objects are not present; furthermore, the samjñā mind knows nominal designations, hence it is spoken of as hearing. The vedanā mind is called sensing, because it senses the agreeable and disagreeable. The saṃskāra mind is called knowing, because it strongly differentiates. Such are the four minds. Next, explaining the differences in speech generated by seeing and so forth: in summary there are only eight, while in detail there are many. What are their detailed characteristics? According to the Abhidharma, the differences in speech generated by seeing and so forth comprise thirty-two: sixteen correct speeches and sixteen erroneous speeches, which together make thirty-two. As for the sixteen correct speeches: when both mind and object are factual, there are eight speeches; when the object is false and the mind is factual, there are again eight speeches; hence there are sixteen. When mind and object are both factual: someone actually sees and also forms the notion of seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he actually saw. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are also like this; these make four. One actually does not see and forms the notion of not seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he did not see. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are also like this; these make another four. Combining these with the previous makes eight kinds of factuality. As for the eight kinds of speech where the object is false and the mind is factual: someone actually does not see, but later forgets not seeing and produces the notion of seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he actually saw. Although the object is false, because the mind is truthful, it is also called truthful speech. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are analogous; these make four. Someone actually sees, but later forgets this seeing and produces the notion of not seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he did not see. Although it does not accord with the fact, because the mind is truthful, it is also called truthful speech. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are analogous; these make another four. Combining them with the previous makes eight. These prior sixteen are correct speech. Among erroneous speech: when both mind and object are false, there are eight speeches; when the object is factual and the mind is false, there are again eight speeches; hence together there are sixteen speeches. As for the eight speeches where both object and mind are false: someone actually sees and still forms the notion of seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he did not see. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are analogous; these make four. One actually does not see and forms the notion of not seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he actually saw. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are also like this; these make another four. Combining them with the previous makes eight. As for the eight speeches where the object is factual and the mind is false: someone actually sees, but later forgets this seeing and produces the notion of not seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he actually saw. Although it corresponds to the actual event, because the mind is false, it is also called false speech. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are analogous; these make four. One actually does not see, but later forgets not seeing and produces the notion of seeing; when asked by another, 'Did you see?', he answers saying he did not see. Although it corresponds to the actual event, because the mind is false, it is also called false speech. Hearing, sensing, and knowing are also like this; these make another four. Combining them with the previous makes eight. Combined with the above eight, they make sixteen. Regarding the differences in speech generated by seeing and so forth explained in the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, commentators explain differently. Some explain: Seeing, hearing, and knowing—these three are primary, each separately generating speech; sensing is a subsequent re-conceptualizing mind following the previous three, having no distinct object of knowledge, and does not separately generate speech. If one holds this interpretation, there are only twenty-four speeches generated: eight within seeing (four correct and four erroneous), and the same for hearing and knowing; hence together there are twenty-four. Explaining them in full is no different from before. Examining the *Tattvasiddhi*, sensing also generates speech. How is this known? In the 'Chapter on the Eight Speeches' of that *Tattvasiddhi*, having finished explaining the differences in speech generated by seeing, it states that hearing, sensing, and knowing are also like this. Since the treatise analogizes hearing, sensing, and knowing to the seeing mind, it is clear that the sensing mind also separately generates speech. If one holds this interpretation, there are also thirty-two speeches generated, similar to the above. Question: How does the sensing mind generate speech? Someone previously aroused a sensing mind and also formed the notion of sensing; when asked by another, 'Did you sense?', he answers saying he actually sensed. This is the first clause. Someone previously did not arouse a sensing mind and formed the notion of not sensing; when asked by another, 'Did you sense?', he answers saying he did not sense. This makes two clauses. Someone previously aroused a sensing mind, but later forgot the sensing mind and formed the notion of not sensing; when asked by another, 'Did you sense?', he answers saying he did not sense. Although it contradicts the prior sensing, it does not contradict his own thought, so it is still called truthful speech. This is the third clause. Someone previously did not arouse a sensing mind, but later forgot not sensing and produced the appearance of sensing; when asked by another, 'Did you sense?', he answers saying he actually sensed. Because it accords with his thought, it is also called truthful speech. These are four correct speeches. The four erroneous speeches can be understood by reversing the above. The meaning of the eight kinds of speech is briefly distinguished as such.