大乘義章 9.45

9.45

次辨體性。於中別以三門分別：一就行分別、二體德分別、三體用分別。言就行者，行謂六度，攝此六種以為福智。相狀如何？經論不同，乃有四別。一依《優婆塞經》，施、戒、精進以為福分，忍、禪、波若以為智分。何故如是？施之與戒，隨事修行，資助行人，福利義顯，故說為福；不能照見，故不名智。精進雖能遍策諸行，而彼精進性是發動，隨事修行精進相顯，故從戒施攝之為福。餘三種中，波若正是照見之性，故說為智。即彼波若安法名忍，忍體是慧，故攝智中，如五忍等。然就忍中，義別有三：一他不饒益忍，加損能受；二安苦忍，逢苦堪耐；三法思惟忍，於法能安。此三種中，前二非慧，後一是慧。彼經偏說法思惟忍，為忍度故，攝入智中。即彼波若住緣名定，定體是慧，故攝智中。然就定中，義別有二：一者事定，繫意住緣；二者理定，慧心不動。彼經偏說理定為禪，是故禪度攝入智中。二依《相續解脫》及《地持論》，施戒及忍同為福分，波若智分，精進與禪亦福亦智。施戒及忍但能資潤，故說為福；體非慧性，不能照見，故不名智。波若慧性，故說為智。簡別前門，故不名福。精進與禪那體性是福，從其所生，故分二種福之與智。故《地持》說，依精進故，修行施戒四無量等，是其福分。起聞思修，是其智分。依禪修習四無量等，是其福分。修陰界入巧便觀等，是其智分。問曰：向說依精進故修行施戒四無量等以為福分，何故依禪唯修無量以為福分？釋言：精進遍策諸行，是故通起施戒等善以為福分。施戒散善，不依禪生，是故唯起四無量等以為福分。又問：精進起聞思修，通為智分。何故依禪唯起修慧巧便之觀，以為智分？正以精進遍策諸行，是故通起聞思修等以為智分。聞思二慧乃是禪因，非是禪果，是故依禪唯起修慧以為智分。三依《大品》等經，前之五度是其福分，體非慧性照明法故，故彼經中說之為盲。波若是智，體是慧性照明法故，是故論中說之為眼。四依《涅槃經》，前之五度及事中波若同為福分，以其不能見實義故；照理波若說之為智，見實義故。故彼經言「福莊嚴者，從檀波羅蜜乃至波若，非般若波羅蜜。慧莊嚴者，是波羅蜜。」何者波若非波若波羅蜜？何者波若是波羅蜜？彼說六度各有二種：一者布施乃至波若，非波羅蜜。二者布施乃至波若，是波羅蜜。隨事修行，不到實義，非是自性清淨度故，非波羅蜜。合理成者，是其自性清淨度故，是波羅蜜。於中前五體非慧性，一向為福。就波若中分取波若非波羅蜜，助成前五，亦判為福；分取波若是波羅蜜，為智慧也。上來第一就行分別。次就體德以分福智。真心為體，從緣修生諸行為德，心體本淨，從緣說染，後息妄染，真心始淨。真心始淨，內照法界，說之為智。從緣修生，方便行德，資順義強，通說為福。體德如是。行體雖眾，無出證教。無始法性顯成今德，是證行也。方便修生，是教行也。教行修起，資順義強，通說為福。證行體明，照窮法界，說之為智。體德如是。次就體用開分二種。體謂證如涅槃之行，用謂隨緣世間之行。用隨世間，同世福善，說之為福。體則合如，照第一義，說之為智。隨世行中非無有智，隱而不彰；合如行中非無有福，隱而不說。故《涅槃》云「福莊嚴者，有為有漏，以有果報，有礙非常，是凡夫法。慧莊嚴者，無為無漏，無有果報，無礙常住，是賢聖法。是凡法者，諸佛菩薩常在世間同凡行也，以同凡故，有為有漏有礙非常。是聖法者，諸佛菩薩捨離世間合如行也，以合如故，無為無漏無礙常住。」此二即是《地經》之中常與無常二種愛果，福德是彼無常愛果，智是常果。然此二種性不相離，故經中說「無常共常，常共無常。」二種莊嚴，體性如是（此二門竟）。

Next is the clarification of their intrinsic nature (svabhāva). Within this, there are three separate divisions for differentiation: first, differentiation according to practices; second, differentiation according to essence and virtues; third, differentiation according to essence and function. Regarding 'according to practices', 'practices' refers to the six pāramitās, which subsume these six kinds [of practices] into merit and wisdom. What are their characteristics? The sūtras and treatises differ, presenting four distinct [explanations].

First, according to the Upāsaka-[śīla]-sūtra, giving, morality, and vigor constitute the share of merit; forbearance, meditation, and prajñā constitute the share of wisdom. Why is this so? Giving and morality are cultivated according to phenomenal matters, providing support to the practitioner; since their meaning of welfare and benefit is obvious, they are explained as merit. Because they cannot illuminate and see, they are not called wisdom. Although vigor can comprehensively stimulate all practices, the nature of that vigor is arousal, and its characteristics of vigor are obvious as it is cultivated according to phenomenal matters; thus, following morality and giving, it is subsumed under merit. Among the remaining three kinds, prajñā is precisely the nature of illuminating and seeing, and is therefore explained as wisdom. That very prajñā settling in dharma is called forbearance (kṣānti); since the essence of forbearance is prajñā, it is subsumed within wisdom, as in the five forbearances, and so forth. However, with respect to forbearance, there are three distinct meanings: first, forbearance of others' harmful actions, being able to endure when injury is inflicted; second, forbearance of enduring suffering, being able to withstand it when meeting with suffering; third, forbearance of examining dharmas, being able to settle in the Dharma. Among these three kinds, the first two are not wisdom, while the latter one is wisdom. That sūtra specifically speaks of the forbearance of examining dharmas as the forbearance pāramitā, and therefore subsumes it into wisdom. That very prajñā abiding on an object is called concentration; since the essence of concentration is prajñā, it is subsumed within wisdom. However, with respect to concentration, there are two distinct meanings: first, phenomenal concentration, tying the mind to abide on an object; second, principle concentration, the mind of wisdom remaining unmoving. That sūtra specifically speaks of principle concentration as dhyāna, and for this reason the dhyāna pāramitā is subsumed into wisdom.

Second, according to the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and the Bodhisattvabhūmi (*Di chi lun*), giving, morality, and forbearance together constitute the share of merit; prajñā is the share of wisdom; vigor and dhyāna are both merit and wisdom. Giving, morality, and forbearance can merely provide nourishment, and are therefore explained as merit; their essences are not of the nature of wisdom and cannot illuminate and see, so they are not called wisdom. Prajñā is of the nature of wisdom, and is therefore explained as wisdom; to distinguish it from the previous category, it is not called merit. The intrinsic natures of vigor and dhyāna are merit, but in terms of what they produce, they are divided into the two kinds of merit and wisdom. Thus the Bodhisattvabhūmi states that, relying on vigor, the cultivation of giving, morality, the four immeasurables, and so forth is its share of merit; giving rise to [the wisdoms of] hearing, reflection, and cultivation is its share of wisdom. Relying on dhyāna, cultivating the four immeasurables and so forth is its share of merit; cultivating the contemplation of skillful means regarding the aggregates, realms, and sense fields is its share of wisdom.

Question: It was just said that relying on vigor, cultivating giving, morality, the four immeasurables, and so forth constitutes the share of merit; why is it that relying on dhyāna, one only cultivates the immeasurables to constitute the share of merit?
Explanation: Vigor comprehensively stimulates all practices, and therefore universally gives rise to wholesome [dharmas] such as giving and morality to constitute the share of merit. Giving and morality are diffused wholesome [dharmas] and are not produced relying on dhyāna; therefore, [relying on dhyāna] one only gives rise to the four immeasurables and so forth to constitute the share of merit.

It is asked again: Vigor gives rise to [the wisdoms of] hearing, reflection, and cultivation, which universally constitute the share of wisdom; why is it that relying on dhyāna, one only gives rise to the contemplation of skillful means of cultivated wisdom to constitute the share of wisdom?
[Explanation:] Precisely because vigor comprehensively stimulates all practices, it therefore universally gives rise to hearing, reflection, cultivation, and so forth to constitute the share of wisdom. The two wisdoms of hearing and reflection are causes of dhyāna, not the fruits of dhyāna; therefore, relying on dhyāna, one only gives rise to cultivated wisdom to constitute the share of wisdom.

Third, according to sūtras such as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (*Da pin*), the preceding five pāramitās are its share of merit; because their essences are not of the nature of wisdom that illuminates dharmas, that sūtra speaks of them as blind. Prajñā is wisdom; because its essence is of the nature of wisdom that illuminates dharmas, the treatises speak of it as the eye.

Fourth, according to the Nirvāṇa-sūtra, the preceding five pāramitās and the phenomenal prajñā together constitute the share of merit, because they cannot see the real meaning; the prajñā that illuminates the principle is explained as wisdom, because it sees the real meaning. Thus that sūtra states: 'The adornment of merit is from dāna-pāramitā up to prajñā, but not prajñāpāramitā. The adornment of wisdom is the pāramitā.' What is prajñā that is not prajñāpāramitā? What is prajñā that is pāramitā? It explains that the six pāramitās each have two kinds: first, giving up to prajñā that are not pāramitā; second, giving up to prajñā that are pāramitā. When cultivated according to phenomenal matters, not arriving at the real meaning, they are not pāramitās that are inherently pure, and are therefore not pāramitās. Those that accord with the principle and are perfected, being pāramitās that are inherently pure, are pāramitās. Among them, the essences of the first five are not of the nature of wisdom and are exclusively merit. In prajñā, taking the portion of prajñā that is not pāramitā, which assists in completing the first five, it is also judged as merit; taking the portion of prajñā that is pāramitā, it is wisdom. The above is the first, differentiation according to practices.

Next, merit and wisdom are divided according to essence and virtues. The true mind is the essence, and the various practices cultivated and generated in dependence on conditions are the virtues. The essence of the mind is originally pure; defilement is spoken of in dependence on conditions. Later, when deluded defilements cease, the true mind first becomes pure. When the true mind first becomes pure, inwardly illuminating the dharmadhātu, it is explained as wisdom. Cultivated and generated in dependence on conditions, the virtues of expedient practices have a strong sense of supporting and according, and are universally explained as merit. Such are essence and virtues. Although the essences of practice are numerous, they do not exceed realization and teaching. The beginningless dharmatā manifested to complete present virtues is the practice of realization. That which is cultivated and produced through skillful means is the practice of teaching. When the practice of teaching is cultivated and arises, its sense of supporting and according is strong, and it is universally explained as merit. The essence of the practice of realization is luminous, illuminating and exhausting the dharmadhātu, and is explained as wisdom. Such are essence and virtues.

Next, the two kinds are distinguished according to essence and function. Essence refers to the practice of realizing suchness and nirvāṇa; function refers to the practice of according with conditions in the mundane world. When function accords with the mundane world, identical with mundane meritorious wholesome [dharmas], it is explained as merit. When the essence unites with suchness, illuminating the ultimate truth, it is explained as wisdom. In the practices that accord with the mundane world, it is not that there is no wisdom, but it is hidden and not prominent; in the practices that unite with suchness, it is not that there is no merit, but it is concealed and not spoken of. Thus the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] says: 'The adornment of merit is conditioned and tainted; because it has karmic retribution, it has obstruction and is impermanent—this is the dharma of ordinary persons. The adornment of wisdom is unconditioned and untainted; without karmic retribution, it is unobstructed and permanently abiding—this is the dharma of noble sages. That which is the dharma of ordinary persons means that the buddhas and bodhisattvas are constantly in the world, acting identically to ordinary persons; because they act identically to ordinary persons, it is conditioned, tainted, obstructed, and impermanent. That which is the dharma of noble ones means that the buddhas and bodhisattvas abandon the world and practice in union with suchness; because they unite with suchness, it is unconditioned, untainted, unobstructed, and permanently abiding.' These two are precisely the two kinds of cherished fruits, permanent and impermanent, in the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (*Di jing*); merit is that impermanent cherished fruit, and wisdom is the permanent fruit. However, the natures of these two kinds are not separate from each other, so the sūtra states: 'Impermanence is together with permanence; permanence is together with impermanence.' Such is the intrinsic nature of the two kinds of adornment (this concludes the second division).