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大乘義章 3.52

English (machine translation) 3.52

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3.52

In the second section, its essence and characteristics are analyzed. Herein, broad and concise expansions and consolidations are not fixed. Sometimes it is explained as one: as in the three groups of dharmas—matter, mind, and neither-matter-nor-mind—all consciousnesses are collectively named mind. Sometimes they are divided into two, and there are three approaches to the two: first, dividing into general and particular; second, dividing into true and deluded; third, dividing into essence and characteristics. Regarding the general and particular, there are specifically two approaches. The first meaning is that the former six phenomenal consciousnesses are explained as particular, while the seventh and eighth are general. The former six grasp objects distinctly according to phenomena and arise intermittently, successively, and are therefore named particular; the seventh and eighth are constantly present and are therefore explained as general. Question: Why do the former six arise intermittently? The distinct essences of the mind and objects of the former six are difficult to comprehend; they are known only when a thought is generated, and generated thoughts are each different; thus the six arise distinctly and cannot occur simultaneously. Furthermore, the generation of the former six consciousnesses relies on four conditions: cause-condition, immediately preceding condition, object-condition, and dominant condition. The six sense-faculties relied upon serve as dominant conditions; the six sense-objects that are objective conditions are explained as object-conditions; the previously arisen mental dharma opening the way and inducing the subsequent one is named the immediately preceding condition; own-category, associated, and co-existent dharmas and the like serve as cause-conditions. There is no instance of the six kinds of immediately preceding condition functioning concurrently in a single moment; for this reason the six consciousnesses cannot arise together. Question: If you say that because the immediately preceding conditions are distinct, the six consciousnesses are made to arise successively, then according to the Abhidharma, alongside an indeterminate mind there are twelve mental associates: the ten omnipresent universally within mental states as well as investigation and analysis. When a wholesome mind arises, there are twenty-two mental associates: the twelve the same as before, plus the ten wholesome universal states. Coming from an indeterminate mind, the twelve are the same in number, and there being similar categories before acting as immediately preceding conditions can allow them to arise suddenly; but as for the ten wholesome universal states, with no prior equal number acting as immediately preceding conditions, how can they arise together? Posed against the unwholesome category, the difficulty is also like this: how could the five defilement grounds, torpor, shamelessness, unconscionableness, and one of the ten fetters arise together? Answer: The previously arisen mind and mental dharmas serve as conditions through their general characteristics; opening the way and generating the subsequent, they are not in a one-to-one correspondence; therefore, whether many or few, all the various minds and mental dharmas subsequently arisen arise together alike. Question: If mental dharmas are not in a one-to-one correspondence but universally rely on prior conditions, so that many subsequent mental dharmas arise at a single time, why is it not so for the minds of the six consciousnesses? Relying on a single prior consciousness as an immediately preceding condition to cause many subsequent consciousnesses to arise together at a single time—why should this not be allowed? Answer: They are not analogous. The mind and its mental associates have always supported each other, cooperating on a single object-condition and accomplishing a single affair together; hence they can arise together. Viewing the six consciousnesses in relation to each other, each grasps distinct objects and their accomplishments differ; hence they do not arise together. Just as individual mental associates such as conception and feeling cannot arise concurrently [with other instances of the same], how could the mind-kings of the six consciousnesses possibly arise concurrently? Question: The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra proclaims that the six sense-objects appear simultaneously and the six consciousnesses function concurrently; how could they arise intermittently? Answer: What that text speaks of is the collective functioning of the six consciousnesses within the deluded consciousness, not something subsumed under phenomenal consciousness; that phenomenal consciousnesses do not arise concurrently is largely agreed upon in sūtras and treatises. Question: Why do the six consciousnesses within delusion arise all at once simultaneously, while phenomenal consciousness does not? Answer: Within delusion, objects manifest from the mind and there are no dharmas outside the mind; because they are manifested by the mind, they arise together simultaneously. Within phenomenal consciousness, mind and objects have distinct essences, and distinct essences are difficult to comprehend, so the consciousnesses do not arise concurrently. Since the concurrent functioning of the six consciousnesses within delusion is like this, the concurrent functioning of the six consciousnesses within the true is also like this. Question: In phenomenal [consciousness], ignorance that grasps at intrinsic nature is constantly present from beginning to end and extends universally through the six consciousnesses; by what meaning is it not named general? Answer: Within distinct phenomenal dharmas, it establishes a fixed nature for each and does not apprehend them as one; therefore it is not named general. Question: The six consciousnesses arisen within the two kinds of consciousness—true and deluded—rely on different faculties and grasp distinct objects; by what meaning are they not explained as particular? Answer: Those six are seemingly distinct, but when their essence is investigated, they are produced solely by one mind. There is no distinction outside the mind, and functioning is subsumed into essence; therefore they are explained as general. One meaning is thus. As for the second meaning: among the three levels of consciousness—phenomenal, deluded, and true—all six consciousnesses are named particular, and all general meanings within the three levels of consciousness are named general. The general in phenomenal [consciousness] is ignorance that grasps at intrinsic nature. The general in deluded [consciousness] is the deluded clinging to the characteristic of self and the ground of ignorance; its meaning is as explained below. The general in the true is the mental essence of tathatā, also as explained below. General and particular are thus (this one section ends).

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