大乘義章 6
English (machine translation) 6
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6.1
Compiled by Dharma Master Yuan
6.2
Within the Meaning of Afflictions in the Aggregation of Defiled Dharmas, this fascicle contains seven sections: (The Meaning of the Ten Proclivities, The Meaning of the Ten Entanglements, The Meaning of the Ten Obstacles, The Meaning of the Fourteen Difficult Questions, The Meaning of the Sixteen Selves, The Meaning of the Sixty-Two Views, and The Meaning of the Eighty-Four Thousand Afflictions).
6.3
The Meaning of the Ten Proclivities is differentiated across ten sections: (1. Explaining the names and discerning the characteristics; 2. Differentiating according to the three natures; 3. Differentiating according to sharp and dull, seeing and cultivating; 4. Differences in association; 5. Differentiating in relation to objects and according with realms; 6. Differentiating according to the ninety-eight proclivities and so forth; 7. Differences in object-binding; 8. Distinctions in fulfilled meanings; 9. Initiating karma and moistening rebirth; 10. The sequence of causal arising).
6.4
In the first section, we first generally explain the names, and afterwards distinguish their characteristics. As for the term "underlying afflictions" (anuśaya; 使), the *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* states: "The meaning of following and binding is called anuśaya." This is simply naming the afflictions (kleśa) by way of a metaphor: just as in worldly affairs a public bailiff follows a criminal and, seizing the opportunity, binds him, so it is with afflictions: they follow the practitioner for a long time, binding him within the three realms of existence so that he cannot escape; hence they are named anuśaya. The Abhidharma and the *Tattvasiddhi* also share this explanation. Thus the *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "The following of an anuśaya is like a shadow moving in the sky, or water moving along." The *Tattvasiddhi* states: "The following of an anuśaya is like a mother following her child; it is also like a malarial disease or rat poison that has not yet erupted; like the black mark on hot iron; like a sprout in a seed; or like an unpaid debt." These are all the meaning of "following." Some explain it by saying: "To drive and enslave is called anuśaya." While there is nothing wrong with the meaning, it is simply not found in the sūtras and treatises. Such is the meaning of the name. Next we distinguish their characteristics. The opening and combining of the meaning of anuśaya is extensive or brief and not fixed; here, in this one section, we will provisionally discuss ten kinds: namely, view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), adherence to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa), adherence to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), greed (rāga), anger (pratigha), ignorance (avidyā), pride (māna), and doubt (vicikitsā). As for the view of individuality, it is also named the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi). The five aggregates (skandha) are called the "body" (kāya); within the body, one sees a self and grasps it clearly; because of that about which one is deluded, it is called the "view of individuality." Thus the *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "To definitively conceptualize and adhere within the five aggregates is called the view of individuality. Because one sees a self, based on what is established, it is also named the view of self." What are its characteristics? The view of individuality is twofold: first, attachment to a self in sentient beings; second, attachment to a self in dharmas. Establishing a self or person within the five aggregates is called attachment to a self in sentient beings; grasping at intrinsic nature and clinging to characteristics within the aggregates, elements (dhātu), and sense bases (āyatana) is called attachment to a self in dharmas. These two are broadly distinguished in detail as in the previous chapter on non-self. As for the extreme view, because annihilation and permanence violate the middle, it is named the extreme view. What are its characteristics? If one relies on the Abhidharma, it is only conceptualizing annihilation or grasping permanence with respect to suffering that is called the extreme view. If one relies on the *Tattvasiddhi*, grasping annihilation or conceptualizing permanence with respect to all dharmas is in every case called the extreme view. Thus the chapter on extreme views in that *Tattvasiddhi* states: "That all dharmas are permanent is called the view of permanence. That all dharmas are annihilated is called the view of annihilation. That all dharmas exist is called the view of permanence. That all dharmas do not exist is called the view of annihilation. That the body and the soul are distinct, and that when the body perishes the soul remains, is called the view of permanence. That the body and the soul are one, and that when the body perishes the soul is destroyed, is called the view of annihilation. That the seven factors of earth, water, fire, wind, suffering, pleasure, and lifespan are permanent is called the view of permanence. That the seven factors are annihilated is called the view of annihilation. That one acts again after death is called the view of permanence. That one does not act after death is called the view of annihilation. All such things are called extreme views." Question: Arbitrarily conceptualizing the impermanent as permanent is said to be an extreme view; why is conceptualizing the permanent as impermanent not an extreme view? This meaning is distinguished in detail as in the previous chapter on the eight inversions. As for wrong view, because erroneous grasping contradicts what is correct, it is named wrong view. What are its characteristics? As stated in the sūtras: "Slandering all dharmas by denying cause and effect is its characteristic." Question: All five views are wrong; why is slandering [cause and effect] by asserting nonexistence specifically named wrong view? The *Tattvasiddhi* explains: "Because this view is grave, it is specifically named wrong." As for adherence to rules and observances, grasping at sāsrava dharmas as being able to purify is why it is called adherence to rules and observances. What are its characteristics? Adherence to rules and observances is twofold: first, isolated; second, based on the feet [of other views]. Not relying on various views, directly taking austerities or the rules of crows and chickens as the noble path, and explaining them as able to purify, is called isolated; arising in reliance on various views is called based on the feet. The various views are the root of this adherence to rules and observances, and the adherence to rules and observances constitutes the legs and feet; taking these various views as able to purify is called based on the feet. Question: That which is grasped by adherence to rules and observances is not one: one may grasp at austerities as being able to purify, or grasp at observing precepts, or grasp at giving, or grasp at paying homage or wearing refuse rag robes, or grasp at various views as being able to purify. Being manifold like this, why do the sūtras only say adherence to rules, and do not speak of adherence to giving, adherence to austerities, and so forth? The *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "It is an abbreviation here, and so it provisionally says adherence to rules. If given fully, it should be adherence to rules and so forth." Question: Since it is abbreviated with "and so forth," for what reason is the name applied specifically to rules, and not to the others? The explanation is: Those who grasp at the practice of rules are numerous; hence it is spoken of specifically. Why are those who grasp numerous? Most within the Buddhist path grasp at keeping precepts as being the path, and most outside the Buddhist path grasp at the rules of crows, chickens, deer, dogs, and so on as being the path; therefore they are called numerous. All other matters such as austerities are only grasped by non-Buddhists and not by disciples of the Buddha; therefore they are called few. Establishing the designation from the majority, it is therefore called adherence to rules. As for adherence to views, grasping at various views and so forth as supreme is why it is called adherence to views. What are its characteristics? Adherence to views is twofold: first, isolated; second, based on the feet. As for isolated, not relying on various views, directly grasping at inferior sāsrava dharmas as supreme is called isolated—such as falsely conceptualizing the impure as pure, conceptualizing suffering as pleasure, or considering the retributive state of the Heaven of Non-conception to be nirvāṇa. As for based on the feet, arising in reliance on various views is why it is called based on the feet. The various views are the root of this adherence to views, and the adherence to views constitutes the legs and feet; relying upon these feet and grasping them as supreme is called based on the feet. Question: That which is grasped by adherence to views is not one; why do the sūtras only say adherence to views, and do not speak of the others? The *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "Because it is an abbreviation here, it is merely named adherence to views. If given fully, it should be called adherence to views and so forth." Further question: Since it is abbreviated with "and so forth," why is the name of adherence made manifest with respect to views and not with respect to the others? Because it is based on the majority. Most people in the world grasp at their own views as supreme; hence it is spoken of specifically. Furthermore, in those who grasp at views, the mind is hard, rigid, and obstinately clinging, difficult to relinquish; hence views are spoken of specifically. As for greed, tainted craving toward sense-objects is called greed. What are the characteristics of greed? Among them, broad and brief, opening and combining, are not one. It may be divided into two: first, craving for one's own body; second, craving for what is needed. It may be divided into three: the former two as above, with the addition of craving for the beauty of a wife. It may be divided into four: the former three as above, with the addition of craving for relatives. It may be divided into five: the former four as above, with the addition of craving for reputation. It may be divided into six: the former five as above, with the addition of craving for nobility, power, and mastery. It may be divided into seven: the former six as above, with the addition of craving for extinction at death, as when the treatises speak of craving for non-existence (vibhavatṛṣṇā) and so on. It may be divided into eight: the former seven as above, with the addition of craving for one's own views. It may be divided into nine: the former eight as above, with the addition of craving for wholesome dharmas, as when speaking of craving for the Buddha, craving for bodhi, and so on. If broadly distinguished, greed is limitless. If relying on the Mahāyāna, all of these are the anuśaya of greed; if relying on the Hīnayāna, wholesome greed is not an anuśaya. Furthermore, within the Hīnayāna, relying on the Abhidharma, only greed is an anuśaya, while stinginess and so forth are not anuśayas. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, excessive desire, evil desire, stingy attachment, arrogance, and heedlessness—all such things are anuśayas of greed. As for anger, wrath toward contrary objects is called anger. Relying on the Abhidharma, only anger is an anuśaya, and all other things such as indignation, resentment, vexation, malice, jealousy, and cruelty are not named anuśayas. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, indignation, resentment, vexation, malice, jealousy, killing, cruelty, obstinacy, stubborn clinging, intolerance, displeasure, untamedness, and so forth are all the anuśaya of anger. The Mahāyāna is also like this. As for ignorance, relying on the Abhidharma, a dark and deluded mind whose nature lacks the light of wisdom is therefore called ignorance. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, discriminating with a wrong mind, lacking the light of correct wisdom, is called ignorance. Why is it like this? The Abhidharma considers darkness and delusion to be the fault, whereas the *Tattvasiddhi* only considers grasping and clinging to be the defect; hence their explanations differ. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, both delusion-darkness and grasping-clinging are defects, and both meanings are adopted. Such is the meaning of the name. What are its nature and characteristics? The traditions differ, and what they teach is also distinct. There is a treatise master who proclaimed that a nonexistent dharma (abhāva) is the anuśaya of ignorance; what he said was that the place where wisdom is absent is itself ignorance, and there is no separate dharma. Just as when a person does not speak, it is properly called "no speech," and within this there is no separate dharma of non-speech that arises. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* refutes this meaning: the sūtras state that ignorance is the cause of saṃsāra; if it were a nonexistent dharma, how could it be a cause? If relying on the Abhidharma, there are two distinctions: First, distinguishing ignorance in contrast with the various anuśayas. Ignorance is twofold: first, unshared (āveṇika); second, associated (samprayukta). As for unshared, taking as objects the truth of the truths as well as forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and so forth, yet not understanding them, and not combining with any of the other anuśayas, is called unshared. As for associated, excluding the aforementioned unshared, the unknowing mind within all other afflictions that combines with the various anuśayas is called associated. Second, distinguishing according to the object: ignorance is twofold. First, delusion regarding principle: being dark, deluded, and uncomprehending regarding the four noble truths. Second, delusion regarding phenomena: being unable to correctly understand the aggregates, elements, sense bases, forms, smells, tastes, and so forth, thereby giving rise to karmic actions. All these are the anuśaya of ignorance. Relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, ignorance is also twofold: first, grasping at intrinsic nature; second, manifesting in the present. As for grasping at intrinsic nature, it is the mind of all ordinary persons that clings to an intrinsic nature. This grasping at intrinsic nature pervades the minds of all three natures: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Therefore, the chapter on ignorance in that *Tattvasiddhi* states: "All ordinary persons who have not entered emptiness constantly have wrong views, which is called ignorance." That text further says: "Within greed there is no anger, and within anger there is no greed. Ignorance is not like this; it exists everywhere." One clearly knows that it is pervasive. This grasping at intrinsic nature is the fundamental, primary anuśaya among ignorance. Someone explains: "This grasping at intrinsic nature is the ground of the ten anuśayas, not the anuśaya of ignorance." Why does that person speak like this? He says that this is subtle and cannot drive and enslave one back and forth through birth and death, and therefore it is not named an anuśaya. These words are incorrect. Based on what textual evidence is it known not to be an anuśaya? When the *Tattvasiddhi* explains the anuśaya of ignorance, it speaks precisely of this; how can one say it is not? If one says that because this is the ground of the ten anuśayas it is not the anuśaya of ignorance, since it serves as the ground for the ten, what prevents it from being the anuśaya of ignorance? Furthermore, if grasping at intrinsic nature were the ground of the ten anuśayas and could not be said to be the anuśaya of ignorance, then among the three sufferings, since conditioning itself is suffering and is the substance of the three sufferings, it also ought not to be subsumed under the suffering of conditioning (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) among the three sufferings. Yet, although it is the substance of the three sufferings, it can still be subsumed within the suffering of conditioning; this should be likewise. If one says that because grasping at intrinsic nature cannot drive and enslave, it is not an anuśaya: rebirth in the three realms of existence is entirely due to grasping at intrinsic nature; if separated from grasping at intrinsic nature, although there are karmas, they cannot draw forth the fruition. Thus grasping at intrinsic nature drives and enslaves most strongly; why would it not be an anuśaya? Furthermore, in the treatises, anuśaya is explained through "following," not by using "driving and enslaving" to explain the meaning of anuśaya. The words "driving and enslaving" originated from people's mouths and do not pertain to the sūtras and treatises; why use this to evaluate right and wrong? Moreover, the treatises explain anuśaya through following, and among things that follow, nothing exceeds grasping at intrinsic nature; why would it not be an anuśaya? Investigating thoroughly by this, grasping at intrinsic nature is an anuśaya, and it cannot be said not to be. As for manifesting in the present, it is produced by deliberate attention, is restricted to the unwholesome, and does not extend to other minds. What is it? The treatise text is not fixed, and people's explanations are various. Someone explains: "Greed, anger, ignorance, pride, and the various views each have nine grades; dividing them, the first eight grades are the anuśaya of ignorance, and the ninth single grade is the other nine anuśayas." These words are certainly wrong. Among the ten anuśayas, each has nine grades; how could one say that within greed, anger, and so forth there are not the first eight grades, and that within the anuśaya of ignorance there is no ninth grade? This is very difficult to understand. Furthermore, as the treatises say: "In the desire realm, greed, anger, ignorance, and pride each have nine grades; severing the first six grades makes one a sakṛdāgāmin, and severing the last three subtle ones makes one an anāgāmin." If greed and so forth lacked the first six grades, what would ultimately be severed? And if the anuśaya of ignorance lacked the last three, what would be eliminated? Inferring and examining by this, these words cannot be relied upon. Another person further says: "Setting aside the dull anuśayas and taking only the five views to divide them according to meaning: among the five views, in the first eight grades, the mind of view is not yet clear and cannot be named view; it can only be spoken of as the anuśaya of ignorance." This is refuted as before. Furthermore, the *Tattvasiddhi* does not take dark obstruction as the anuśaya of ignorance; why would it need to separately take an uncomprehending mind as the anuśaya of ignorance? Moreover, the *Tattvasiddhi* says: "Within wrong illumination, the absence of the illumination of correct wisdom is called ignorance." If in the first eight grades of the five views, because the view is not yet accomplished, they are not the anuśaya of view, then because the wrong illumination of the first eight grades is not yet accomplished, they also ought not to be spoken of as ignorance. Furthermore, the *Tattvasiddhi* says: "When wrong view is not yet accomplished, it is spoken of as doubt." How could one now say that when wrong view is not yet accomplished, it is spoken of as ignorance? Investigating thoroughly by this, one definitely knows that the first eight grades of views are not taken as the anuśaya of ignorance. If so, what is taken to be ignorance? One should know that ignorance is divided according to meaning upon the various anuśayas, and has no separate mental substance. How is it divided by meaning? There are three explanations: First, it is divided according to meaning with respect to the other nine anuśayas. The other nine anuśayas contain the meaning of dark obstruction, and this is ignorance; therefore, as for the link of ignorance in dependent origination, past afflictions are all named ignorance. Moreover, a treatise says: "All afflictions bewilder and veil the human mind, making it entirely blind and dark." Blind and dark is still the meaning of ignorance. Second, distinguishing by the three poisons: excluding greed and anger, all the remaining ones are ignorance. Therefore a treatise says: "Excluding greed and anger, because the remaining eight anuśayas arise from neutral equanimity, they are called delusion." Third, in terms of wrong views lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, it is spoken of as ignorance. This is divided according to meaning with respect to the five views: within the five views, inferring with a wrong mind is called wrong view. These very five views, lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, are entirely ignorance. Therefore a treatise says: "A mind of wrong view, lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, is called ignorance." If it has no separate substance, there should not be ten anuśayas. The explanation is: because the meanings are distinct, they can exist. Although there are three explanations, conforming to the treatise text, the latter explanation should be the substance of the anuśaya of ignorance. Such is the *Tattvasiddhi*. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, ignorance is twofold: first, unknowing regarding phenomena, not understanding worldly dharmas; second, the ignorance of essential fetters, being deluded regarding principle and reality, within which there are three: coarse, middling, and subtle. The coarse is that associated with the four entrenchments, as taught in the Hīnayāna; the middling is the so-called ignorance [numerous as the] sands of the Ganges; the subtle is the so-called entrenchment ground of ignorance. All these are anuśayas of ignorance. Question: Why is it that in the Hīnayāna Dharma, non-defiled unknowing is not an anuśaya of ignorance, while in the Mahāyāna it is an anuśaya? In the Hīnayāna Dharma, one merely seeks to sever defiled afflictions to attain cessation and is then done; one does not seek the Tathāgata's sarvākārajñatā (all-aspect knowledge), and so it is not spoken of as an anuśaya. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, one seeks the Buddha's all-aspect knowledge, and non-defiled unknowing obstructs the Buddha's all-aspect knowledge; therefore it is spoken of as an anuśaya. As for the anuśaya of pride, disparaging others is called pride. What are the characteristics of pride? As stated in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, pride is of eight kinds. What are the eight names? First is simply called pride (māna); second is called great pride (atimāna); third is called excessive pride (mānātimāna); fourth is inferiority pride (ūnamāna); fifth is called arrogant pride (asmimāna / darpa), also called haughty pride; sixth is called self-pride (asmimāna); seventh is pride of superiority (adhimāna); eighth is called wrong pride (mithyāmāna). This meaning is broadly explained as in the chapter on the eight prides. As for doubt, lack of certainty regarding objects and wavering hesitation is called doubt. Doubt is twofold: first, doubt regarding phenomena, such as seeing a tree at night and doubting whether it is a human or a non-human, etc.; second, doubt regarding principle, doubting the truths and so forth. In the Hīnayāna Dharma, one only takes doubt regarding principle as the anuśaya of doubt; the Mahāyāna encompasses both, because both must be severed. The names and characteristics of the ten anuśayas have thus been roughly distinguished.
6.5
In the second section, distinction is made according to the three natures. As for the 'three natures,' they are the dharmas of good, bad, and indeterminate. If based on the Abhidharma, within the plane of the desire realm, the two views of identity and extremes are exclusively indeterminate, because [they are] not recorded as causing one to fall into the miserable destinies on account of these views. The *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* also holds this view. The remaining eight proclivities are exclusively bad. In the upper two realms, all proclivities are entirely indeterminate. If based on the *Tattvasiddhi*, all ten proclivities throughout the three realms, both higher and lower, are entirely bad. Therefore, its 'Chapter on Miscellaneous Questions' says: 'The two views of identity and extremes are the roots of all views; how could they be indeterminate?' Question: If the ten proclivities are all bad, is the grasping-at-nature ignorance within good and indeterminate [states] bad or not? Someone explains: Grasping-at-nature ignorance within good and indeterminate [states] is good or indeterminate; it is not bad. This formulation is not correct. Wherever 'bad' is spoken of, its meaning is contrary to principle. Since this is contrary to principle, why could it not be called bad? If it is bad, how can it exist within the good and the indeterminate? Explanation: What fault is there after all in an essential badness existing within phenomenal goodness and indeterminacy? If essential badness could not exist within the good and the indeterminate, the suffering of conditioning of arising and cessation also should not exist within pleasant and neutral feelings. Comparing this to that, the meanings are similar. Question: If grasping-at-nature within the good is bad, are the good and the grasping-at-nature identical or different? If they were identical, then since grasping-at-nature is bad, the good would also be bad; and because the good is good, grasping-at-nature would also be good, and when grasping-at-nature is severed, the good should also be severed. If they were different, grasping-at-nature would then not be the substance of phenomenal goodness; grasping-at-nature being sāsrava, the good should be anāsrava. Explanation: It is not fixed. 'Good' is based on its phenomenal appearance, while 'grasping-at-nature' is based on its substance; because substance and appearance are distinct, they cannot be definitely identical. Because they are not definitely identical, the good induces pleasant feeling while [grasping-at-]nature invites the suffering of conditioning; the good assists the supramundane, while grasping-at-nature obstructs the path. When the supramundane is attained, grasping-at-nature is severed and eliminated, while the assistance of the good is not destroyed. Because they are not definitely different, when good karma receives fruition, it must rely on grasping-at-nature; grasping-at-nature is tainted (sāsrava), so the good is called sāsrava. The identity and difference of grasping-at-nature within the good are like this, and the same is true for the indeterminate. Question: If all ten proclivities in the higher realms are bad, is this badness bound to the higher realms, or is it bound to the lower plane? This meaning is not fixed. In the good and indeterminate of the higher realms, although the grasping-at-nature ignorance is by nature bad, it is not an actively arisen badness, so it is bound to the higher realms. If discussing active manifestation, the ten bad proclivities are bound to the desire realm, because in the *Tattvasiddhi*, the badness of the desire realm can arise parasitically [in the higher realms]. Question: If so, and the arising of proclivities in the higher realms is bound to the desire realm, then the higher realms should have no afflictions. If there are no afflictions, they should be anāsrava, and should be supramundane. Explanation: The active badness that manifests in the higher realms belongs solely to the desire realm, yet it conjoins with the higher realms; therefore, it is not anāsrava. Furthermore, because there is grasping-at-nature within that goodness, it is not called anāsrava; not being anāsrava, it is not called supramundane. In the Mahāyāna teaching, the meaning partakes of both. If viewed in terms of fruition and retribution, it agrees with the Abhidharma; hence the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* says: 'The ten proclivities of the higher realms are indeterminate.' When analyzed with respect to principle, its meaning agrees with the *Tattvasiddhi*: all ten proclivities are bad.
6.6
Third, distinction between sharp and dull, and between [severed by] vision and cultivation. First, distinguishing sharp and dull: According to the Abhidharma, the first five are sharp, because their nature is to investigate; the latter five are dull, because they do not investigate. According to the *Tattvasiddhi*, their general classification is the same as the Abhidharma; but if analyzed precisely according to reality, the first five are exclusively sharp, while among the latter five, greed, anger, pride, and doubt are exclusively dull, and ignorance is not fixed. If speaking of ignorance in connection with the five views, ignorance is sharp, because they describe perverse understanding as ignorance. If speaking in connection with the others, ignorance is dull. Both characteristics exist in the Mahāyāna teaching. If discussed comprehensively, both sharp and dull exist among all ten proclivities: those arising frequently are called sharp, and those not arising frequently are called dull (this concludes the single section).
6.7
Next, distinguishing [what is severed by] vision and cultivation: As in the Abhidharma, from the forbearance of suffering onward through the fifteen moments of mind is called the path of vision; from the srotāpanna upward through the stage of non-learning (aśaikṣa) is called the path of cultivation. If based on the *Tattvasiddhi*, which contemplates the truths in their general characteristics, one cannot say 'from the forbearance of suffering onward,' but can only say that within the state of non-conceptualization is called the path of vision, while the path of cultivation is as above. In the Mahāyāna teaching, the first bhūmi is the path of vision, and the second bhūmi and above is called the path of cultivation. Vision and cultivation are like this. Concerning the ten proclivities, the five views and doubt obstruct only the vision of the truths, and are called afflictions of vision; greed, anger, pride, and delusion obstruct both vision and cultivation: those obstructing the vision of the truths are categorized as afflictions of vision, and those obstructing the path of cultivation are categorized as afflictions of cultivation. In the Abhidharma system, the greed, anger, delusion, and pride that arise relying on views can obstruct the vision of the truths; those that arise by conditioning on concrete matters can obstruct the path of cultivation. In the *Tattvasiddhi* system, greed, anger, delusion, and pride all carry grasping-at-nature; where grasping-at-nature is heavy, it can obstruct the vision of the truths, and where grasping-at-nature is slight, it can obstruct the path of cultivation. What is taught in the Mahāyāna is that no affliction fails to be confused about principle; among them, the coarse are categorized as afflictions of vision, and the subtle as afflictions of cultivation. Question: Where do these two arise? If based on the Abhidharma, before the path of vision both wheels arise together; from the srotāpanna upward, only afflictions of cultivation arise singly. In the *Tattvasiddhi* system, there is no definitive statement in the text, but inferring according to principle: before the path of vision, afflictions of vision arise singly, while afflictions of cultivation are possessed (samanvāgata) but do not manifest; from the srotāpanna upward, only afflictions of cultivation arise singly. Question: Why is it that in the Abhidharma both wheels arise together before the vision of the truths, whereas in the *Tattvasiddhi* only afflictions of vision arise singly before vision? Explanation: The Abhidharma divides afflictions according to their cognitive objects: those arising from confusion regarding principle are categorized as afflictions of vision, and those arising by conditioning on concrete matters are categorized as afflictions of cultivation. Ordinary beings originally always possess both, and therefore they arise together. In the *Tattvasiddhi* system, all ten proclivities carry grasping-at-nature and their causes are all confusion regarding principle; the two afflictions are divided solely according to lightness and heaviness. All afflictions arisen in ordinary beings have a heavy mind of grasping-at-nature, and when entering the path of vision, heavy grasping is forever destroyed; hence all that arise in ordinary beings are called afflictions of vision. The afflictions of noble ones have slight and thin grasping-at-nature, but ordinary beings when giving rise to afflictions cannot be like this; therefore ordinary beings do not give rise to afflictions of cultivation, but can only possess them. Question: If afflictions of cultivation have never yet arisen, how are they possessed? Explanation: Afflictions of vision are the cause of afflictions of cultivation; because there is the cause of vision, the fruit of cultivation will definitely arise, hence they are called possessed. Question: The *Tattvasiddhi* refutes the Abhidharma school regarding being free from desire of the desire realm and possessing the first dhyāna before it has manifested; that text refutes it, saying: 'How could one possess it before having entered it? Like a person who does not know a single character but claims to understand writing, this is inadmissible.' Following that analogy for afflictions, they should not be possessed before having arisen. Explanation: The afflicted mind and the good mind are different, and cannot be compared to each other. Afflictions have long been practiced, being firm and difficult to sever; although they have not yet arisen, they will definitely be produced in the end, so they are said to be possessed. Good dharmas are difficult to produce; though there is a prior cause, they may not necessarily arise, so those not yet arisen are not called possessed. The dissimilarity lies here. In the Mahāyāna teaching, the two afflictions of vision and cultivation arise together in the stage of ordinary beings, because the ground of ignorance always operates beforehand; from the vision of the truths upward, only afflictions of cultivation arise. Vision and cultivation are like this.
6.8
Fourth, explaining the differences in the association of proclivities. Herein there are two: First, explaining the differences in the association of the various proclivities in terms of the six consciousnesses. According to the Abhidharma, the two proclivities of greed and anger and their associated ignorance all extend through the six consciousnesses; unshared ignorance and the remaining seven proclivities exist solely in the mental plane (manobhūmi). According to the *Tattvasiddhi*, grasping-at-nature ignorance extends universally throughout the six consciousnesses, while all the rest exist solely in the mental plane. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* agrees with what is taught in the Abhidharma. Second, explaining the differences in the association of the various proclivities with respect to the five feelings. As for the 'five feelings,' they are suffering, pleasure, grief, joy, and equanimity. Oppressive affliction in the plane of the five consciousnesses is called suffering; pleasant satisfaction is called pleasure. Sorrowful affliction in the plane of the mental consciousness is called grief; celebratory satisfaction is called joy. Equanimity extends through all six consciousnesses. The five feelings are like this. How are they associated? According to the Abhidharma, proclivities associate simultaneously with the five feelings. It states that the desire realm fully possesses the five feelings. Within this plane, unshared ignorance associates only with equanimity; the proclivity of doubt associates with grief and equanimity: because of the distress of doubt it associates with grief, and when resting it is in equanimity, so it associates with equanimity. The treatise says: 'In the desire realm, joy is coarse and doubt is subtle, therefore it does not associate with the feeling of joy; and because it is in the mental plane, it does not associate with the two feelings of suffering and pleasure.' The two views of identity and extremes, the two attachments to precepts and views, and the proclivity of pride associate with joy and equanimity: unorthodox views satisfy the mind and lofty pride pleases the intention, so they associate with joy; when resting they accompany equanimity, so they associate with equanimity; they are not distressing activities, and therefore do not associate with grief and suffering; because they are in the mental plane, they do not associate with pleasure. The single proclivity of wrong view associates with the three feelings of grief, joy, and equanimity: when that person of wrong views hears that cause and effect exist, grief and distress arise, so it associates with grief; when hearing that they do not exist, joy arises, so it associates with joy; when resting it unites with equanimity, so it associates with equanimity; because it is in the mental plane, it does not associate with the two feelings of suffering and pleasure. Greed associates with the feelings of joy, pleasure, and equanimity, because it is an activity of defiled attachment that extends through the six consciousnesses: it associates with joy and pleasure, and when resting it is in equanimity, so it associates with the feeling of equanimity; it is not an adverse or distressing activity, and therefore does not associate with grief and suffering. Anger associates with the feelings of grief, suffering, and equanimity; by contrast with greed, this can be understood. Associated ignorance associates with all five feelings, because it is constant and pervasive. It states: 'In the first dhyāna there is neither grief nor suffering, but there are the remaining three feelings. In its eye, ear, and body consciousnesses, there is still the feeling of pleasure within the bodily aggregation; inside samādhi there is joy, and outside samādhi there is equanimity. Within this plane, unshared ignorance associates only with equanimity.' The five views, doubt, and pride associate with joy and equanimity, because they are in the mental plane. Question: In the desire realm doubt and joy do not coexist; why in the first dhyāna do doubt and joy associate? The treatise says: 'Therein there are no other faculties (indriya-prakṛti), therefore it associates with it.' It states that inside samādhi there are no other faculties, not discussing outside samādhi. Question: An undecided mind of doubt should be distressing; how can it associate with the feeling of joy? Explanation: This joy is not the joy of understanding principle, therefore they can associate. Although they associate, there is only the substance of joy without the function of joy; the remaining dhyānas are also like this. The proclivity of greed and associated ignorance associate with the three feelings of joy, pleasure, and equanimity. Because there is no proclivity of anger there, it is not mentioned. In the plane of the second dhyāna, there are only joy and equanimity. Within this plane, unshared ignorance associates only with equanimity, and all the rest associate with joy and equanimity. In the plane of the third dhyāna, there are only pleasure and equanimity. Within this plane, unshared ignorance associates only with equanimity, and all the rest associate with pleasure and equanimity. In the fourth dhyāna and above, there is only the feeling of equanimity; all afflictions associate with equanimity. According to the *Tattvasiddhi*, association is successive and not simultaneous: from a prior feeling-mind, the subsequent ten proclivities arise, associating without abandonment; therefore it is called association. It states that from the desire realm up through the fourth dhyāna, all five feelings are fully present. Therein, the proclivity of greed associates with joy and pleasure; the proclivity of anger associates with grief and suffering; the remaining eight proclivities associate with the feeling of equanimity; grasping-at-nature ignorance associates with all five feelings. In the sphere of empty space and above, there is neither suffering nor pleasure, but the remaining three feelings exist; therein, the proclivity of greed associates only with joy, the proclivity of anger associates only with the feeling of grief, and the remaining eight proclivities associate only with equanimity. Grasping-at-nature extends everywhere. The explanation with respect to consciousness and feeling is roughly like this.
6.9
Fifth, distinguishing them according to objective realm and realm [of existence]. First, discussing them with respect to the objective realm. The objective realm refers to principle and phenomena. Principle refers to the four noble truths; phenomena refer to all the aggregates, realms, sense bases, and so forth. According to the Abhidharma, the two views—personality view and extreme view—are deluded only regarding the truth of suffering, because they arise with respect to the effect. Attachment to rules and vows is next in breadth; it is deluded regarding suffering and the path, but not deluded regarding origination and cessation. Why is this so? People of the world mostly claim that ascetic practices can exhaust past karma; thus it is said to be deluded regarding suffering, as in the case of Subhadra and others. Or again, there are persons who grasp at various views, giving, morality, and other dharmas that are not the true path, taking them to be the true path, claiming they can purify, thereby being deluded about and obscuring the true path; thus it is said to be deluded regarding the path. Therefore the treatise says: "Those who are inwardly deluded are severed upon seeing suffering; those who are outwardly deluded are removed only upon seeing the path." What is internal and external, such that it is spoken of as deluded inwardly and deluded outwardly? Explanation: Attachment to rules and vows arises in objective relation to the tainted. The truth of suffering is the inherent principle within tainted dharmas; therefore it is called internal. The truth of the path is the inherent principle outside tainted dharmas; therefore it is called external. If a person simply claims that directly experiencing the retributive fruit of suffering repays past causes and thereby yields liberation, this is called inward delusion. Truly because experiencing suffering cannot destroy hindrances to obtain liberation, grasping it as capable of destroying and grasping it as capable of liberating is therefore called delusion. If a person grasps those practices of observing precepts and the like as the true path, claiming they can purify, thereby being deluded about and obscuring the true path, this is called outward delusion. For those who are inwardly deluded, when they see suffering and know that suffering cannot destroy hindrances to obtain liberation, that view is only then severed. For those who are outwardly deluded, when they see the true path, only then do they know that precepts and the like are not the true path; thus that view is only then severed. Therefore it is spoken of as purification through the path and non-path. No one in the world grasps origination as capable of purifying; hence they are not deluded regarding origination. Persons with attachment to rules and vows seek the fruit of cessation; they never grasp cessation as a purifying cause, and hence are not deluded regarding cessation. Furthermore, it is said that the truth of cessation is free of fault and pure, not an inverted view; hence they are not deluded regarding cessation. Question: People of the world grasp suffering as capable of purifying, which is called being deluded regarding suffering. Those persons with attachment to rules and vows grasp precepts, giving, and various views as capable of purifying; the substance of those precepts, giving, and so forth is precisely origination. Why can it not be called delusion regarding origination? Explanation: There is a meaning [to this]. Non-Buddhists directly grasp suffering as capable of purifying; therefore it is called delusion regarding suffering. Although the substance of precepts, giving, and various views is origination, non-Buddhists do not deem them to be origination; grasping them as capable of purifying, they convert them into the path and only then say they can purify; therefore it can only be called delusion regarding the path, not delusion regarding origination. Why is this so? The mind of attachment to rules and vows mostly arises alongside teachings. In the sacred teachings, it is proclaimed that diligence and hardship can escape saṃsāra; hence they directly grasp suffering as capable of purifying. In the Buddha's sūtras, it is not taught that the cause of origination is capable of purifying, but only taught that cultivating the path is capable of purifying. Therefore, non-Buddhists do not grasp them as origination and say they can purify; they convert them into the path and only then say they can purify. The disparity lies herein. Question: Although non-Buddhists grasp precepts and the like taking them to be the path, originally they were not directed toward the path; how can it be called delusion regarding the truth of the path? [Answer:] Holding to this contradicts that; therefore it is called delusion. Question: The Abhidharma states that the principles of suffering and origination constitute the truths of suffering and origination, without discussing their phenomenal aspects; cessation and the path are also like this. But what those non-Buddhists grasp—ascetic practices as capable of purifying—is phenomenal suffering; grasping the observance of precepts and the like as the path is delusion regarding the phenomenal path. Since it is not delusion regarding principle, how can it be called delusion regarding the truths of suffering and the path? Explanation: There is a meaning [to this]. Although they are deluded about phenomena, by analogizing phenomena to principle, it can therefore be called delusion regarding the truths of suffering and the path. How does it analogize? Since phenomenal suffering can remedy past karma, the principle should also be so; thus it is said to be deluded regarding principle. It is also like this within the path. Just as the Buddha taught, because the phenomenal path of antidotes is not the true path, the principle must also not be so; thus it is said to be deluded regarding principle. What are phenomenal suffering and the phenomenal path? What are the principle of suffering and the principle of the path, such that one speaks of delusion regarding phenomena analogizing to delusion regarding principle? Receiving retribution in the six destinies from past causes of karma and defilement is called phenomenal suffering. Conditioned dharmas arise and cease from moment to moment; the prior can produce the subsequent, which is conceptually called origination; the subsequent arises from the prior, which is conceptually called suffering: this is the principle of suffering. The differences in retribution of the six destinies are called phenomenal suffering. All conditioned, tainted dharmas merely arise from the prior, regardless of whether distant or near; all these are called effects. Upon these effects, the four meanings of suffering, impermanence, and so forth are universally applicable; this is called the principle of suffering. In regard to the path, the thirty-seven factors of awakening, morality, samādhi, wisdom, and so forth are called the phenomenal path. Within those very phenomena, the four meanings of path, correctness, reaching, and vehicle are universally applicable; this is called the principle of the path. Principle and phenomena are like this; therefore it is said that phenomena analogize to delusion regarding principle. Attachment to rules and vows is like this. Wrong view, attachment to views, and the drive of doubt are universally deluded regarding the four truths. The mind of wrong view denies the existence of the four truths; therefore it is called universally deluded. The mind that grasps wrongly takes the five aggregates as an effect to be foremost; this is called delusion regarding suffering. Taking the five aggregates as a cause to be foremost is called delusion regarding origination. Grasping the Brahmā Heaven, the heaven of non-conception, and the like to be nirvāṇa is called delusion regarding cessation. Grasping the path established by that attachment to rules and vows to be foremost is called delusion regarding the path. Furthermore, grasping those minds of wrong view and the like under the four truths to be foremost, according to what is grasped, is also called delusion regarding the four noble truths. Question: If grasping the views under the four truths as superior is therefore called delusion regarding the four truths according to what is grasped, attachment to rules and vows also grasps the views under the four truths as capable of purifying; why is it not said to be deluded regarding the four truths? Explanation: It is not analogous. Attachment to views directly grasps views to be foremost without converting them into the path before claiming they are foremost; therefore, following what is grasped, it is called delusion regarding the four truths. Attachment to rules and vows is not like this; it converts them into the path and only then claims they can purify; therefore, following what is established, it is called delusion regarding the truth of the path. Question: In the treatises it is proclaimed that three views have three subsequent conformances: personality view has extreme view conforming to it; doubt has wrong view conforming to it; attachment to rules and vows has attachment to views conforming to it. Why is attachment to rules and vows deluded only regarding suffering and the path, whereas attachment to views is universal to the four? [Answer:] When they speak of conforming, it is only a partial statement. Under suffering and the path, one may say that attachment to views arises conforming to attachment to rules and vows; under the truths of origination and cessation, it only conforms to wrong view. As for discussing the drive of doubt, it universally doubts the four truths. All the remaining—greed, anger, ignorance, and pride—are universally deluded regarding the four truths and obstruct the path of cultivation. According to the Tattvasiddhi, the ten drives of defilement are universally deluded regarding the four truths. Thus the Chapter on Miscellaneous Inquiries in that Tattvasiddhi states: "All fetters are severed upon seeing the truth of cessation. Cessation is the principle of the four truths; therefore they are universally deluded regarding the truths." How does it explain this? As with that personality view, arising with respect to the effect is delusion regarding suffering. Viewing the self as permanent and not arisen from causes and conditions is delusion regarding origination. Saying that the self does not cease is delusion regarding cessation. Because it conceives the self as permanent and that no path can eliminate it, this is delusion regarding the path. Extreme view is also like this. Within attachment to rules and vows, claiming that suffering can remedy is delusion regarding suffering. Not knowing that wrong practice is the cause and condition of suffering is delusion regarding origination. Falsely grasping wrong practice as capable of purifying is delusion regarding the path. Because it claims that wrong practice is the correct path, having no intention to sever it and advance toward the truth of cessation is delusion regarding cessation. The remaining drives are as above. Wrong view, attachment to views, and the mind of doubt are deluded only regarding the four truths. Greed, anger, ignorance, and pride are universally deluded regarding seeing and cultivating. The Mahāyāna is also like this. (This completes the one section.)
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- 大乘義章 — Classical Chinese