大乘玄論 1.13

1.13

明同異第十。有兩師：一者空假名、二者不空假名。不空假名者，但無性實，有假世諦，不可全無，如鼠嘍栗。第二空假名，謂此世諦舉體不可得，若作假有觀舉體世諦，作無觀之舉體是真諦，如水中案爪。手舉爪令體出，是世諦；手案爪令體沒，是真諦。今明義，就此兩義為三階：一往俱非。前二解不同，食栗者，假有法恒不空，假壁內空無性，豈非即有是空耶？所以亦不同。第二解者，若沒舉體空，即無復世諦；若出時舉體俗有，無復真諦。亦不得並有時便空、空時便有。第二階會時亦並得會，雖復有而空、即空而有。但言空時亦不失有，言有時亦不傷空，還同第一不空世諦義，而未始有一有而不空、無有一空而不有。空時舉體空、有時一切有，亦得還同第二空世諦義。第三階一取一捨，碩乖食栗，取用案爪。從來二諦不成案爪義，從來有二理各別，豈得稱為案爪二諦？今始得用此義，以唯是一爪，本非出沒。譬如唯是一道，非有非無。而爪用中有時而出、有時而沒，譬二諦用，或時說俗、或時說真，所以始是案爪義。此譬亦小分之說。爪沒時不出、出時不沒。今無有有時不空、空時不有，此處不齊，不得舉出沒為譬。今出無別出，還是沒者出；沒無別沒，還是出者沒。故空無別空，說有者為空；有無別有，說空為有故也。次周顒明三宗二諦：一不空假、二空假、三假空。空假者，開善等用。假空者，四重二諦中初重二諦，雖空而宛然假、雖假而宛然空，空有無礙。問：若假空者，假生不生時，為當不於實生？不假生耶？答：不生有三種。若假生不生，此無性實生義。二者自有假生不生，不於假生為世諦中道，用真諦之假為世諦中。三者明假生即不生，安不生置真諦。若不生不滅合論，有三種不生不滅：一者不性生滅，明於俗諦。二者不假生滅，明真諦。三者俗諦為有故明不生，真諦無故明不滅。二諦合論，故言不生不滅。

Clarifying Identity and Difference, the tenth. There are two masters: the first is [the proponent of] the empty provisional designation; the second is [the proponent of] the non-empty provisional designation. The non-empty provisional designation means that there is only the absence of an intrinsic substantiality, but provisional conventional truth exists and cannot be entirely non-existent, like a mouse gnawing a chestnut. The second, the empty provisional designation, maintains that this conventional truth is entirely ungraspable; if viewed as provisional existence, it is entirely the conventional truth, and if viewed as non-existence, it is entirely the ultimate truth, like pressing a floating gourd into water. The hand lifting the gourd to make its body emerge is the conventional truth; the hand pressing the gourd to make its body submerge is the ultimate truth. We now clarify the doctrine by establishing three stages with regard to these two meanings. First, tentatively, both are incorrect. The preceding two explanations differ: for the chestnut eater, the provisional existent dharma is constantly not empty, and the emptiness within the provisional wall lacks intrinsic nature; is this not then existence being identical to emptiness? Therefore they also differ. As for the second explanation, if submerged, it is entirely empty, and there is no longer conventional truth; if emerging, it is entirely conventionally existent, and there is no longer ultimate truth. Nor can it be that when existing, it is empty, and when empty, it exists. In the second stage, when reconciling them, both can be reconciled: although existent, it is empty, and being empty, it exists. However, when speaking of emptiness, one does not lose existence, and when speaking of existence, one does not harm emptiness; this still accords with the first meaning of the non-empty conventional truth, yet there has never been an existence that is not empty, nor an emptiness that is not existent. When empty, it is entirely empty; when existing, all exists; this also accords with the second meaning of the empty conventional truth. In the third stage, one accepts one and rejects the other, greatly diverging from the chestnut eater and adopting the pressing of the gourd. Hitherto, the two truths did not establish the meaning of pressing the gourd; hitherto, there were two separate principles, so how could they be called the two truths of pressing the gourd? Only now can this meaning be used, because there is only a single gourd, which originally neither emerges nor submerges. For example, there is only a single Way, which is neither existent nor non-existent. Yet in the functioning of the gourd, sometimes it emerges and sometimes it submerges, which exemplifies the function of the two truths, sometimes speaking of the conventional and sometimes speaking of the ultimate; this is why it only now constitutes the meaning of pressing the gourd. This metaphor is also a partial explanation: when the gourd is submerged, it does not emerge, and when it emerges, it does not submerge. In our present doctrine, there is no existence that is not empty, nor emptiness that is not existent; here they are not parallel, so emergence and submergence cannot serve as a complete metaphor. Now emergence has no separate emergence, but is the emergence of what was submerged; submergence has no separate submergence, but is the submergence of what emerged. Thus emptiness has no separate emptiness, for what is spoken of as existence is empty; existence has no separate existence, for what is spoken of as emptiness is existent. Next, Zhou Yong clarified the two truths of the three traditions: first, non-empty provisionality; second, empty provisionality; third, provisional emptiness. Empty provisionality is that used by Kaishan and others. Provisional emptiness is the first tier of the two truths among the fourfold two truths: although empty, it is vividly provisional; although provisional, it is vividly empty; emptiness and existence are unobscured. Question: If it is provisional emptiness, when provisional arising does not arise, does it not arise from real arising? Or does it not arise from provisional arising? Answer: There are three kinds of non-arising. If provisional arising does not arise, this is the meaning of the non-existence of real arising of intrinsic nature. Second, naturally there is provisional arising not arising; not arising from provisional arising is the Middle Way of the conventional truth, using the provisional of the ultimate truth as the Middle of the conventional truth. Third, it clarifies that provisional arising is itself non-arising, placing non-arising in the ultimate truth. If non-arising and non-ceasing are discussed together, there are three kinds of non-arising and non-ceasing: first, non-arising and non-ceasing of intrinsic nature, clarified regarding conventional truth; second, non-arising and non-ceasing of provisionality, clarified regarding ultimate truth; third, because conventional truth is existence, it clarifies non-arising, and because ultimate truth is non-existence, it clarifies non-ceasing. The two truths are discussed together, and hence it is called non-arising and non-ceasing.