大乘玄論 1.8

1.8

二諦體第五。常解不同，有五家：初家明：有為體，空為用。何故爾？明世諦是有，行者折有入空。無有因空入有，故有是其本，空為其末。第二家云：以空為體，有是其用。何以故明？空為理本，古今常定。有是世間法，皆從空而生。故空為其本，有是其用。第三云：二諦各自有體。以世諦假有是世諦體，假有即空無相是真諦體，故言二諦各有體。第四云：二諦雖是一體，以義約之為異，若以有來約之即名俗諦，以空約之名為真諦。而今此二諦唯一，約用有二。第五云：二諦以中道為體。故云不二而二，二諦理明；二而不二，中道義立。彼家有時亦作體用相即。今皆不然。問第一解：若言以有為體、空為用者，可以有為理、空為用不？體是理之異名，既言有為體，是即有為理，然皆見理得道。今若以有為理，即見有得道；今聖人皆見空斷結，明知空是理。問第二解：空為體、有為用者，是即成一諦，何謂二諦？汝今指空當體，是即但空是諦、有非諦。若空有俱諦，何得偏用一空為體？故不然。問第三解：假有是世諦體，假有即空為真諦體。若二諦各有體，即應成兩理，有自有為理、空自空為理。碩反，何得辨其相即？問第四解：二諦唯一體以義約之為異者，今何以二諦唯是一體？是何物體？為當一有體？為當一空體？何處離此空有別有一體，而言以空有約之故二諦之別？問第五解：二諦同中道為體者，今問汝言若用中道為體，為是二諦攝？為是二諦外物？彼解云：終是一無名無相，還是二諦攝。此是開善所用。攝山高麗朗大師，本是遼東城人，從北土遠習羅什師義，來入南土，住鍾山草堂寺。值隱士周顒，周顒因就師學。次梁武帝，敬信三寶，聞大師來，遣僧正智寂十師往山受學。梁武天子得師意，捨本《成論》，依大乘作章疏。開善亦聞此義，得語不得意。今意有第三諦，彼無第三諦。彼以理為諦，今以教為諦。彼以二諦為天然之理，今明唯一實諦方便說二。如唯一乘，方便說三，故言異。雖復有五解，不出四句之計：初一有句、第二無句、第三第四亦有亦無句、第五解非有非無。既束為四句，是橫計，何得扶道？問：何處經文中道為二諦體也？答：《中論》云「因緣所生法，我說即是空，亦為是假名，亦是中道義。」因緣生法是俗諦，即是空是真諦，亦是中道義是體。《華嚴》云「一切有無法，了達非有非無。」故有無為二諦，非有非無為體。經云「非有非無，假說有無。」《涅槃經》云「隨順眾生說有二諦。」故以教門為諦。《仁王經》云「有諦、無諦、中道第一義諦。」故知有第三諦。問：教諦為是一體？為是異體？答：如前言，中道為體，故是一體。若約用為論，亦得假為二體，但非正義。問：若言一體者，與他家一體何異？答：他家定一、定異、定亦一亦異。今明約第一重，故作此語。至第二第三第四重，不可言一、不可言異。問：於諦為是一體？為是異體？答：約二妄情為二體爾，終無有兩物，如眼病，空華異；空無華故，以一中道為體。問：假有假無為二諦，非有非無為中道也。答：一往開中假義，故假非中、中非假也。究竟而言，假亦是中。故《涅槃經》文「有無即是非有非無。」亦得中為假，一切言說皆是假故。問：何物是體假用假？何為體中用中耶？答：假有假無是用假，非有非無是體假。有無是用中，非有非無是體中。復言有無非有非無皆是用中用假，非二非不二方是體假體中，合有四假四中，方是圓假圓中耳。

Fifth, the substance of the two truths. Conventional explanations differ, having five schools: The first school explains: existence is the substance, and emptiness is the function. Why so? It explains that conventional truth is existence; the practitioner breaks down existence to enter emptiness. There is no entering existence by relying on emptiness; therefore existence is its root, and emptiness is its branch. The second school says: taking emptiness as the substance, existence is its function. Why is this explained? Emptiness is the root of principle, constantly fixed from ancient times to the present. Existence belongs to worldly phenomena, all of which are born from emptiness. Therefore emptiness is its root, and existence is its function. The third says: the two truths each have their own substance. Taking the provisional existence of conventional truth as the substance of conventional truth, and provisional existence being identical to emptiness and signlessness as the substance of ultimate truth, it is therefore said that the two truths each have their own substance. The fourth says: although the two truths are a single substance, they differ when delimited by their meanings: if delimited by existence, it is called conventional truth; if delimited by emptiness, it is called ultimate truth. Now these two truths are only one, but with respect to function there are two. The fifth says: the two truths take the Middle Way as their substance. Therefore it is said that being non-dual and yet dual, the principle of the two truths is clear; being dual and yet non-dual, the meaning of the Middle Way is established. That school at times also regards substance and function as mutually identical. Now, none of these are so. We interrogate the first explanation: If you say that existence is the substance and emptiness is the function, can existence be the principle and emptiness the function, or not? Substance is another name for principle; since you say existence is the substance, it follows that existence is the principle, yet all attain the path by seeing principle. Now, if existence is the principle, one would attain the path by seeing existence; but the noble ones all sever fetters by seeing emptiness, so we clearly know that emptiness is the principle. We interrogate the second explanation: If emptiness is the substance and existence is the function, then this becomes a single truth; why call them two truths? You now point to emptiness as the substance itself; that means only emptiness is a truth, and existence is not a truth. If emptiness and existence are both truths, how could you exclusively use the one emptiness as the substance? Therefore it is not so. We interrogate the third explanation: Provisional existence is the substance of conventional truth, and provisional existence being identical to emptiness is the substance of ultimate truth. If the two truths each have their own substance, then there should be two principles: existence has its own existence as principle, and emptiness has its own emptiness as principle. Being diametrically opposed, how can one explain their mutual identity? We interrogate the fourth explanation: That the two truths are only a single substance and differ by delimitation through meaning—now, why are the two truths only a single substance? What kind of substance is it? Is it a single substance of existence? Or is it a single substance of emptiness? Where is there a separate substance apart from this emptiness and existence, such that you say the distinction of the two truths is due to delimitation by emptiness and existence? We interrogate the fifth explanation: That the two truths share the Middle Way as their substance—now we ask you: if you use the Middle Way as the substance, is it subsumed within the two truths, or is it an entity outside the two truths? Their explanation says: ultimately it is a single nameless and signless [reality], still subsumed within the two truths. This is what Kaishan uses. Master Falang of Gaoli on Mount She was originally a native of Liaodong Fortress; he traveled from the northern region to study Master Kumārajīva’s teachings from afar, then came south and resided at the Caotang Monastery on Mount Zhong. He met the hermit Zhou Yong, who thereupon studied under the master. Next, Emperor Wu of the Liang, revering and having faith in the Three Jewels, heard that the great master had arrived and dispatched the Sangha Controller Zhiji and ten masters to go to the mountain to receive instruction. The Liang Emperor Wu grasped the master’s intent, abandoned his original reliance on the *Tattvasiddhi*, and composed treatises and commentaries based on the Mahāyāna. Kaishan also heard this doctrine, but grasped the words without grasping the intent. Our present meaning is that there is a third truth; they have no third truth. They take principle as truth; we now take teaching as truth. They take the two truths to be a natural principle; we now clarify that there is only one real truth, provisionally spoken of as two. Just as there is only one vehicle and provisionally three are spoken of, hence we say they differ. Although there are these five explanations, they do not go beyond the attachments of the catuṣkoṭi: the first is the proposition of existence; the second, the proposition of non-existence; the third and fourth, the proposition of both existence and non-existence; the fifth explains neither existence nor non-existence. Since they are bound into the catuṣkoṭi, these are arbitrary attachments; how could they support the path? Question: Where in the sūtra texts is the Middle Way the substance of the two truths? Answer: The *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: “The phenomena produced by dependent co-arising, I declare to be identical to emptiness; it is also a conventional designation, and is also the meaning of the Middle Way.” The phenomena produced by dependent co-arising are the conventional truth; being identical to emptiness is the ultimate truth; also being the meaning of the Middle Way is the substance. The *Avataṃsaka* says: “Regarding all phenomena of existence and non-existence, one thoroughly understands that they are neither existent nor non-existent.” Therefore existence and non-existence are the two truths, and neither existent nor non-existent is the substance. A sūtra says: “Being neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally spoken of.” The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: “In accordance with sentient beings, two truths are spoken of.” Hence the gate of teaching is taken as truth. The *Humane King Sūtra* says: “The truth of existence, the truth of non-existence, and the ultimate truth of the Middle Way.” Hence we know there is a third truth. Question: Is truth as teaching a single substance or different substances? Answer: As stated before, it takes the Middle Way as substance, hence it is a single substance. If discussed in terms of function, they can also provisionally be two substances, but that is not the orthodox meaning. Question: If you say it is a single substance, how does it differ from other schools’ single substance? Answer: Other schools assert a definite one, a definite difference, or a definite both-one-and-different. We now clarify that this statement is made with respect to the first tier. Reaching the second, third, and fourth tiers, it cannot be said to be one, nor can it be said to be different. Question: Is truth in relation to cognition a single substance or different substances? Answer: It is merely two substances with respect to two deluded consciousnesses; ultimately there are not two things. Like an eye disease and sky-flowers being different: because the sky has no flowers, it takes the single Middle Way as substance. Question: Provisional existence and provisional non-existence are the two truths; neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way? Answer: Broadly opening the meanings of the provisional and the middle, provisional is not middle, and middle is not provisional. Speaking definitively, provisional is also middle. Therefore the text of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: “Existence and non-existence are just neither existence nor non-existence.” One can also consider the middle as provisional, because all verbal explanations are provisional. Question: What are substantial provisionality and functional provisionality? What are substantial middleness and functional middleness? Answer: Provisional existence and provisional non-existence are functional provisionality; neither existent nor non-existent is substantial provisionality. Existence and non-existence are functional middleness; neither existent nor non-existent is substantial middleness. Furthermore, it is said that existence, non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence are all functional middleness and functional provisionality; only being neither dual nor not dual is substantial provisionality and substantial middleness. Combining them, there are four provisionalities and four middles, which alone constitute perfect provisionality and perfect middleness.