大乘玄論 3.10

3.10

辨內外有無第七。今辨佛性內外有無義，此重最難解。或可理外有佛性、理內無佛性，或可理內有佛性、理外無佛性。今先辨理內外、次說有無。然由來亦言有理內外，凡夫及內道外道，故信等五根未立者，理外行心，名外凡夫。五根立者，理內行心，名內凡夫。故言理內行心、理外行心。既有此語，亦即是理內外義。但舊師等不甚分明，作此名教耳。經言「復次道有二種：一外、二內。外道道者，無常無樂。內道道者，有常有樂。菩提解脫亦復如是。聲聞菩提，無常無樂。諸佛菩薩所有菩提，常樂我淨。解脫亦然也。」問：菩提只是道，何故兩出耶？解云：菩提者是所行之道。先明道者，是能行之道。能所為異也。又若「言一切諸法有生滅者，皆是理外，悉屬外道。若一切諸法無生滅者，皆是理內，則屬內道。」故今明發心悟不生不滅，如《般若》中所辨，名為內道也。分理內外竟。今次明佛性之有無。問：為理外眾生有佛性？為理內眾生有佛性耶？答曰：問理外眾生有佛性不？此不成問。何？者理外本自無有眾生，那得問言理外眾生有佛性不？故如問炎中之水，本自不曾有，何得更問炎中之水從何處來？是故理外既無眾生，亦無佛性，五眼之所不見。故經云「若菩薩有我相、人相、眾生相，即非菩薩。」是故我與人，乃至今人，無有佛性。不但凡夫無佛性，乃至阿羅漢亦無佛性。以是義故，不但草木無佛性，眾生亦無佛性也。若欲明有佛性者，不但眾生有佛性，草木亦有佛性。此是對理外無佛性以辨理內有佛性也。問：眾生無佛性、草木有佛性，昔來未曾聞。為有經文？為當自作？若眾生無佛性，眾生不成佛；若草木有佛性，草木乃成佛。此是大事，不可輕言令人驚怪也。答：少聞多怪。昔來有事，是故經言「有諸比丘聞說大乘，皆悉驚怪，從坐起去。」是其事也。今更略舉愚見以詶來問。《大涅槃．哀歎品》中有失珠得珠喻，以喻眾生迷故失無佛性、悟故得有佛性，故云「一闡提無佛性，殺亦無罪」也。又呵二乘人如燋種，永絕其根，如根敗之士。豈非是明凡聖無佛性耶？眾生尚無佛性，何況草木。以此證知，不但草木無佛性，眾生亦無佛性也。又《華嚴》明善財童子。見彌勒樓觀，即得無量法門。豈非是觀物見性即得無量三昧？又《大集經》云「諸佛菩薩觀一切諸法無非是菩提。」此明迷佛性故為生死萬法，悟即是菩提。故肇法師云：「道遠乎哉？即物而真。聖遠乎哉？悟即是神」也。若一切諸法無非是菩提，何容不得無非是佛性？又《涅槃》云「一切諸法中，悉有安樂性。」亦是經文。《唯識論》云「唯識無境界」，明山河草木皆是心想，心外無別法。此明理內一切諸法依正不二，以依正不二故，眾生有佛性則草木有佛性。以此義故，不但眾生有佛性，草木亦有佛性也。若悟諸法平等，不見依正二相故，理實無有成不成相。無不成故，假言成佛。以此義故，若眾生成佛時，一切草木亦得成佛。故經云「一切諸法皆如也，至於彌勒亦如也。若彌勒得菩提，一切眾生皆亦應得。」此明以眾生彌勒一如無二故，若彌勒得菩提，一切眾生皆亦應得。眾生既爾，草木亦然，故知理通，故欲作無往不得，是故得名大乘無礙。此是通門明義也。若論別門者，則不得然。何以故？明眾生有心迷故，得有覺悟之理。草木無心故不迷，寧得有覺悟之義？喻如夢覺，不夢則不覺。以是義故，云眾生有佛性故成佛，草木無佛性故不成佛也。成與不成，皆是佛語，有何驚怪也。上來至此，明理外無佛性、理內有佛性也。第二明理外有佛性理內無佛性。如《般若經》云「如是滅度無量眾生，實無眾生得滅度者。」《華嚴》亦云「平等真法界，一切眾生入，真實無所入。」既言一切眾生入，當知是理外眾生入。而實無所入者，此入理內無復眾生，故言實無所入。是知理外有眾生，故得入也。如是滅度實無度者，亦作此釋，此至理內，實無眾生得滅度者。當知理內既無眾生，亦無佛性。理外有眾生可度，故言理外眾生有佛性也。然本有理內，故說理外；理內既無，理外豈復有耶？先則為成交互辨義，故理外若無，理內則有；理內若無，理外則有；或時言內外俱有；或時說內外俱無。故經云「闡提人有，善根人無。善根人有，闡提人無。二人俱有，二人俱無」也。問：那得作此不定說耶？答：此豈得有定？故《涅槃經》云「若有人說一闡提人定有佛性、定無佛性，皆名謗佛法僧。」今既不欲謗佛法僧，豈敢定判？義中自有四句，故內外有無不定。所以作此不定說者，欲明佛性非是有無，故或時說有、或時說無也。問：若言定為非者，不定為是耶？答：若言不定為是者，還復成定。定既非是，不定亦非，具如論破。但破定故言不定，有四句如前。若洗淨已，復不定而為定，亦何得而無定耶？今只就不定為定者，有理外眾生、理外草木，有理內眾生、理內草木，定何者有佛性？何者無佛性耶？若不定為定說者，經中但明化於眾生，不云化於草木。是則內外眾生有佛性，草木無佛性。雖然至於觀心望之，草木眾生豈復有異？有則俱有、無則俱無、亦有亦無、非有非無，此之四句皆悉並聽觀心也。至於佛性非有非無，非理內、非理外，是故若得悟有無內外平等無二，始可名為正因佛性也。故《涅槃論》云「眾生有佛性非密，眾生無佛性亦非密。眾生即是佛乃名為密也。」所以得言眾生無佛性者，不見佛性故。佛性無眾生者，不見眾生故。亦得言眾生有佛性，依如來藏故。亦得言佛性有眾生，如來藏為生死作依持建立故。

Seventh, distinguishing inside and outside, existence and non-existence. Now we distinguish the meaning of inside and outside, existence and non-existence, regarding buddha-nature; this layer is the most difficult to understand. It may be that outside principle there is buddha-nature and inside principle there is no buddha-nature, or it may be that inside principle there is buddha-nature and outside principle there is no buddha-nature. Now we first distinguish inside and outside principle, and next discuss existence and non-existence. However, from of old it has also been said that there are inside and outside principle: [distinguishing] ordinary persons and inside the Path or outside the Path. Thus, for those in whom the five faculties such as faith are not yet established, the mind that acts outside principle is called the outer ordinary person. For those in whom the five faculties are established, the mind that acts inside principle is called the inner ordinary person. Therefore it is said: 'the mind acting inside principle' and 'the mind acting outside principle.' Since there is this phrasing, it is indeed the meaning of inside and outside principle. It is only that former masters were not very clear when they framed this terminology and teaching. A sūtra says: 'Furthermore, the Path is of two kinds: first, external; second, internal. The path of the outer paths is impermanent and without bliss; the path of the inner Path has permanence and has bliss. Bodhi and liberation are also like this: the bodhi of the śrāvaka is impermanent and without bliss; the bodhi possessed by all buddhas and bodhisattvas is permanent, blissful, self, and pure. Liberation is also like this.' Question: Bodhi is simply the Path; why is it mentioned twice? Explanation: Bodhi is the path that is traversed. The path explained previously is the path that is able to traverse. The difference is between subject and object. Furthermore: 'If one says that all phenomena have arising and ceasing, these are all outside principle and entirely belong to the outer paths. If all phenomena are without arising and ceasing, these are all inside principle and then belong to the inner Path.' Therefore, now we clarify that generating the mind [for bodhi] and awakening to non-arising and non-ceasing, as distinguished in the Prajñā[pāramitā], is called the inner Path. Dividing inside and outside principle is finished. Now, next we clarify the existence and non-existence of buddha-nature. Question: Is it that sentient beings outside principle have buddha-nature, or is it that sentient beings inside principle have buddha-nature? Answer: Asking whether sentient beings outside principle have buddha-nature or not—this does not constitute a valid question. Why? Outside principle there are originally no sentient beings at all; how could one ask whether sentient beings outside principle have buddha-nature or not? Therefore, it is like asking about water in a mirage: since it originally never existed, how could one further ask where the water in the mirage comes from? Therefore, since outside principle there are no sentient beings, there is also no buddha-nature, which is unseen by the five eyes. Hence a sūtra says: 'If a bodhisattva has the notion of a self, the notion of a person, or the notion of a sentient being, they are then not a bodhisattva.' Therefore, from self and person down to contemporary persons, there is no buddha-nature. Not only do ordinary persons lack buddha-nature, but even arhats also lack buddha-nature. For this reason, not only do grasses and trees lack buddha-nature, sentient beings also lack buddha-nature. If one wishes to clarify that there is buddha-nature: not only do sentient beings have buddha-nature, grasses and trees also have buddha-nature. This distinguishes the existence of buddha-nature inside principle in contrast to the non-existence of buddha-nature outside principle. Question: That sentient beings lack buddha-nature and grasses and trees have buddha-nature has never been heard from of old! Is there a sūtra passage for this, or have you made it up yourself? If sentient beings lack buddha-nature, sentient beings would not become buddhas; if grasses and trees have buddha-nature, grasses and trees would then become buddhas. This is a momentous matter; one must not speak lightly so as to astonish and alarm people. Answer: Those who have heard little are astonished by much. There have been such incidents from of old; hence a sūtra says: 'There were monks who, upon hearing the Mahāyāna taught, were all astonished and alarmed, and arose from their seats and departed.' This is just such a case. Now I will further briefly present my humble view in response to the question posed. In the 'Chapter on Grieving and Lamenting' of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, there is the parable of losing the jewel and finding the jewel, which uses a metaphor to show that because sentient beings are deluded, they lose it and lack buddha-nature, and because they awaken, they gain it and have buddha-nature; hence it says: 'An icchantika lacks buddha-nature; killing them also incurs no sin.' Furthermore, it reproaches the practitioners of the two vehicles as being like scorched seeds whose roots are forever severed, like men whose faculties are ruined. Is this not clarifying that both the ordinary and the sage lack buddha-nature? Sentient beings do not even have buddha-nature, how much less grasses and trees! By this evidence one knows that not only do grasses and trees lack buddha-nature, sentient beings also lack buddha-nature. Furthermore, the Gaṇḍavyūha / Avataṃsaka clarifies that when the youth Sudhana saw Maitreya's tower, he immediately attained immeasurable Dharma gates. Is this not that by contemplating external objects and seeing nature one immediately attains immeasurable samādhis? Furthermore, the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra says: 'All buddhas and bodhisattvas contemplate all phenomena as being none other than bodhi.' This clarifies that because one is deluded about buddha-nature, it becomes the myriad phenomena of saṃsāra, while awakening is just bodhi. Hence Master Zhao said: 'Is the Way far off? It is realized right in things as true. Is the sage far off? Awakening is itself spirit.' If all phenomena are none other than bodhi, how could it be inadmissible that they are none other than buddha-nature? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] says: 'Within all phenomena, all possess a blissful nature.' This is also a scriptural passage. The Vijñaptimātratāśāstra says: 'Consciousness-only is without cognitive objects,' clarifying that mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees are all mental conceptions, and outside the mind there are no distinct phenomena. This clarifies that inside principle, all phenomena, whether the environment or sentient beings, are non-dual; because the environment and sentient beings are non-dual, if sentient beings have buddha-nature, then grasses and trees have buddha-nature. For this reason, not only do sentient beings have buddha-nature, grasses and trees also have buddha-nature. If one awakens to the equality of all phenomena and does not see the dual marks of environment and sentient beings, then in the truth of principle there are originally no marks of becoming or not becoming [a buddha]. Because there is none who does not become [a buddha], one conventionally speaks of becoming a buddha. For this reason, when sentient beings become buddhas, all grasses and trees also become buddhas. Hence a sūtra says: 'All phenomena are thusness; as for Maitreya, he is also thusness. If Maitreya attains bodhi, all sentient beings should also attain it.' This clarifies that because sentient beings and Maitreya are one thusness without duality, if Maitreya attains bodhi, all sentient beings should also attain it. Since it is so for sentient beings, it is also so for grasses and trees. Therefore we know that principle pervades, and so whatever one wishes to formulate, nowhere is it obstructed; hence it is called 'the unobstructedness of the Mahāyāna.' This is clarifying the meaning through the universal approach. If one discusses it through the particular approach, then this cannot be so. Why? It clarifies that because sentient beings have minds and are deluded, they can possess the principle of awakening. Because grasses and trees lack minds, they are not deluded; how could they have the meaning of awakening? It is like waking from a dream: without dreaming, one does not awaken. For this reason, it is said that because sentient beings have buddha-nature they become buddhas, and because grasses and trees lack buddha-nature they do not become buddhas. Both becoming and not becoming are the words of the Buddha; what is there to be astonished and alarmed about? The preceding up to this point has clarified that outside principle there is no buddha-nature and inside principle there is buddha-nature. Second, clarifying that outside principle there is buddha-nature and inside principle there is no buddha-nature: As the Prajñā[pāramitā]sūtra says: 'Having thus brought immeasurable sentient beings to extinction and crossing over, in reality no sentient beings attain extinction and crossing over.' The Avataṃsakasūtra also says: 'Into the equal and true dharmadhātu, all sentient beings enter, yet in reality there is nowhere entered.' Since it says that all sentient beings enter, one should know that it is sentient beings outside principle who enter. Yet 'in reality there is nowhere entered' means that upon entering inside principle there are no longer sentient beings, and therefore it says that in reality there is nowhere entered. From this we know that outside principle there are sentient beings, and therefore they can enter. 'Having thus brought [them] to extinction and crossing over, in reality none are crossed over' is also explained in this way: this reaches inside principle, where in reality no sentient beings attain extinction and crossing over. One should know that since inside principle there are no sentient beings, there is also no buddha-nature. Outside principle there are sentient beings to be crossed over; hence it is said that sentient beings outside principle have buddha-nature. However, it is originally because there is an inside principle that one speaks of an outside principle; since inside principle does not exist, how could an outside principle exist either? Previously, to establish the alternating differentiation of meanings: if outside principle there is none, then inside principle there is; if inside principle there is none, then outside principle there is; or at times it is said that both inside and outside have it; or at times it is said that neither inside nor outside has it. Hence a sūtra says: 'Icchantikas have it, while those with wholesome roots lack it. Those with wholesome roots have it, while icchantikas lack it. Both persons have it, and neither person has it.' Question: How can such an indeterminate statement be made? Answer: How could this admit of anything determinate? Hence the Nirvāṇasūtra says: 'If someone says that an icchantika determinately has buddha-nature or determinately lacks buddha-nature, these are all called slandering the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha.' Now, since we do not wish to slander the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, how would we dare to make a determinate judgment? Within the meaning there are naturally four positions (catuṣkoṭi); therefore, inside and outside, existence and non-existence, are indeterminate. The reason for making this indeterminate statement is that we wish to clarify that buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent; hence at times it is said to exist, and at times it is said not to exist. Question: If you say that what is determinate is wrong, is what is indeterminate right? Answer: If one says that what is indeterminate is right, it reverts once again to becoming determinate. Since what is determinate is not right, what is indeterminate is also not right, fully as refuted in the treatises. It is only to refute what is determinate that we speak of what is indeterminate, having the four positions as above. Once these have been washed clean, if one again takes the indeterminate as determinate, how could there be no determinacy? Now, if we just rely on taking the indeterminate as determinate: there are sentient beings outside principle and grasses and trees outside principle; there are sentient beings inside principle and grasses and trees inside principle. Determinately, which ones have buddha-nature, and which ones lack buddha-nature? If one speaks by taking the indeterminate as determinate: the sūtras only clarify transforming sentient beings, and do not speak of transforming grasses and trees. This means that inside and outside sentient beings have buddha-nature, while grasses and trees lack buddha-nature. Even so, when viewed from the perspective of the contemplation of mind, how could grasses and trees and sentient beings be different? If they exist, both exist; if they are non-existent, both are non-existent; both existent and non-existent; neither existent nor non-existent—these four positions are all fully open to the contemplation of mind. As for buddha-nature, it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither inside principle nor outside principle; therefore, if one attains awakening to the equality and non-duality of existence and non-existence, inside and outside, only then can it be called the direct cause buddha-nature. Hence the Nirvāṇa Treatise says: 'That sentient beings have buddha-nature is not esoteric; that sentient beings lack buddha-nature is also not esoteric. That sentient beings are themselves buddha is called esoteric.' The reason one can say that sentient beings lack buddha-nature is that they do not see buddha-nature. That buddha-nature lacks sentient beings is because it does not see sentient beings. One can also say that sentient beings have buddha-nature, because they rely on the tathāgatagarbha. One can also say that buddha-nature has sentient beings, because the tathāgatagarbha serves as the support and foundation for saṃsāra.