大乘玄論 3.16

3.16

出體第二。一乘體者，正法中道為體。《攝論》云「性乘、行乘、果乘。」《中邊分別論》云「乘具五義：一乘本，謂真如佛性。二乘行，即福慧等。三乘攝，謂慈悲等。四乘障，謂智障無明。五乘果，即佛乘也。」《唯識論》云「乘三體六義。三體者：一自性、二乘隨、三主得。六義者：一體如空，出離四謗。二者因，謂福慧。三者攝一切眾生。四者境界真俗。五者障，即皮肉心。六者果，謂無上菩提。」《十二門論》云「乘具四事：一者乘本，謂諸法實相。二者乘主，由波若導萬行得成。三者乘行，餘一切行。四者果，謂薩婆若。」《法華論》云「亦明三種：一者乘體，謂如來平等法身，即是佛性。二者乘果，謂如來大般涅槃。三乘緣，即是六度了因。」此猶三種佛性。不說果果性者，果果性屬果門，境界性者屬因門故。廣說有五，略說唯三也。問：乘以何為體？答：經論雖種種說，不過三種，謂理、行、果，今以正法為體。問：理是不動，云何名運出耶？答：以其不動故，能令眾生運出。別而論之，順忽為運，得無生忍為出。通論一一皆運出：因乘，自運運他；果乘與理乘，自不運而能運他。問：此經明乘，正以何為體？答：若就因果用，以果為宗。若就正法體，即以正法為宗。今明若因若果皆正法故運，故以正法為宗。有人言：此經萬善為乘體。有人言：以果萬德為宗。有人言：境智為宗。今明就用非無此義，而不得乘深體，故以正法中道為經宗、為一乘正體。問：三論學者恒彈有所得義，云何稱用異說耶？答：若言破相為宗，是有所得義。今申無所得，諸師義皆得皆非，得用不得體。異執永消、同歸一極，無執不破、無義不攝，巧用如甘露，拙服成毒藥也。問：《大品》明理教行果四乘，與今何異耶？答：彼經不明開權，與此為異。問：《勝鬘》、《法華》何異？答：《法華》會三乘，為漸悟菩薩說，正對三乘。《勝鬘》為頓悟菩薩說，不對聲聞緣覺但對人說，與此為異。問：若爾，《法華》究竟說，何故須涅槃教？答：失心子須《涅槃》，不失心子不須《涅槃》，但為鈍根眾生故說。是以大通智勝佛、燃燈佛不說涅槃，利根眾生故。又此經明三事：一車、二牛、三儐從。車，因果萬行萬德。牛，亦通因果。中道正觀離斷常垢，為白牛。由正觀故，引萬行出生死，此即婆若導成萬行。問：婆若是乘，云何喻牛耶？答：一法兩義。引導如牛，運義如車。餘不爾，運出故有車義，無引導之能故無牛義。界內為儐從。果地牛者，真慧為牛，六通無垢為白牛，駕遊五道運出眾生。儐從者，即界外因為儐從。問：此經未明正因佛性，此義何耶？答：此人不得經味。《法華論》云「七處明正因性。」今略出四處：「諸法從本來，常自寂滅相。」此明自性住佛性，又云同入法性，此是佛性之異名。又云「開示悟入佛之知見。」論釋知見明佛性。普賢菩薩及授惡人記，有正因性故。問：有人言此經未明常住。此義云何？答：此是小乘氣分。此經「諸法從本來，常自寂滅相」，此是法常住義。「常在靈鷲山」，明人常義。「我淨土不毀」，此名依報常義。依報正報、人法皆常，云何是無常耶？依論釋〈壽量品〉文，三身壽量、法報二身是常。問：有人言遣三而一存。此義為得？答，此是有所得義。《大品》云「非三非一，故名大乘。」「此經不可示，言辭相寂滅。」此以超四句、百非洞遣，強說明乘。三一為二，非三非一為不二，二不二為麁，非二不二為妙。二不二非二非不二為麁，言忘慮絕為妙。三一開會，凡有十門：一者開三顯一、二者會三歸一、三者廢三立一、四者破三明一、五者覆三明一、六者三前明一、七者三中明一、八者三後辨一、九者絕三明一、十者無三辨一也。開三顯一者，開昔三乘是方便，示今一乘是真實，故云開三顯一也。會三歸一者，會彼三行，歸一佛乘，故云「汝等所行是菩薩道」也。廢三立一者，廢昔三教，立今一乘教，故云「於諸菩薩中，正直捨方便，但說無上道」也。破三明一者，破其執三異之情，以明一乘之道也。覆三明一者，如來趣三一兩緣，當有三一之教；昔則以三覆一，今則以一覆三。三前明一者，未趣鹿苑說三之前，寂滅道場已明一實之教，謂三前明一也。三中明一者，從趣鹿苑說於三乘，佛乘第一、緣覺第二、聲聞第三，謂三中明一也。三後辨一者，三乘之後法華教門，以會彼三乘同歸一道，謂三後一也。絕待一者，如無言世界，外則無言無示、內則無慮無識，故不論一三而已；即此為佛事故，則復是一，故云絕待一也。無三辨一者，如香積佛土，彼土無有二乘名字，謂無三辨一也；但有清淨大菩薩眾，謂有一也。前之五種就義論一，後之五種約時處。諸文不同，教門差別，故開五也。問：云何名會三歸一？答：若識會三歸一，先須知開一為三。開一為三者，昔指大乘之因，說為小乘究竟之果也。今還指小乘究竟之果，即是大乘之因，故名會也。問：小乘人謂是究竟，為是迷因？為是迷果乎？答：實是大因，謂是小果，故是迷因也。問：以何義故明一乘是三乘中佛乘？復以何義明一乘非是三乘中佛乘耶？答：若明三乘，攝出世乘盡。故對二乘之方便，明佛乘是真實，故文云「唯此一事實，餘二即非真。」所以明一乘是三乘中之一也。就佛乘中復開真應，昔為二乘人說佛方便身，故佛乘是方便身，則以今教明佛身是真實故。真實之乘異方便佛，如師子坐長者異著弊垢衣長者，是以約今昔兩教明佛有權實不同，是故一乘非三乘中之一也。問：此經中始末，或言「佛以方便力，示以三乘教」，則三乘並是方便。又云「唯此一事實，餘二則非真」，則二是方便。兩文相違，何以會通耶？答：此二文猶是一義，無相違也。於一佛乘方便說三，次云一乘是實、二是方便，如人手內實有一果，方便言三果。次第論者，一果是實、二是方便，故方便說三及二是方便猶是一義，不相違也。問：為會三歸一？為會二歸一？答：此亦是一義。《智度論》云「於一佛乘開為三分。」如人分一斗米為三聚，亦得合三聚為一聚，亦得言會二聚歸一聚。會三會二猶是一義，不相違也。若究竟為言，中道為宗，論云性乘。若就用為談，萬善為乘體，萬善之中以般若為體。報習兩善，取習因為乘體，報因住生死不取。問：若爾，不應會人天五乘為一乘。答曰：人天是報果，而此乘體有習因義故會，乃是增上緣義。別而為論，有漏善非乘體，無漏善為乘體。乘有二種：有漏善為遠乘、無漏善為近乘。乘有二種：一者動乘、二者不動乘，萬行為動乘、如來藏佛性中道為不動乘。問：乘以運出為義。中道佛性不運出，云何名為乘體？答：以其不動故，能令萬善動出，亦令行者動出生死住彼涅槃，故名為乘。小乘初教以果為乘，故言三車在門外，此是盡無生智果。大乘因與果為乘。問曰：若大乘因果為乘者，何故經言「於佛果上更無說一乘法事」？答曰：此約自不運義，不言不運他。

Second, revealing the essence [of the Vehicle]. The essence of the Ekayāna has the correct Dharma of the Middle Way as its essence. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "The vehicle of nature, the vehicle of practice, and the vehicle of fruition." The Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra says: "The vehicle possesses five meanings: first, the root of the vehicle, which is the tathatā buddha-nature; second, the practice of the vehicle, namely merit, wisdom, and so forth; third, the comprehension of the vehicle, namely kindness, compassion, and so forth; fourth, the obstacles to the vehicle, namely the cognitive obstacle of ignorance; fifth, the fruition of the vehicle, which is the Buddha Vehicle." The Vijñaptimātratāśāstra says: "The vehicle has three essences and six meanings. As for the three essences: first, intrinsic nature; second, following the vehicle; third, master-attainment. As for the six meanings: first, its essence is like empty space, completely transcending the four slanders; second, the cause, namely merit and wisdom; third, gathering in all sentient beings; fourth, its cognitive object is the real and the conventional; fifth, the obstacles, namely the skin, flesh, and heart; sixth, the fruition, namely unexcelled bodhi." The Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra says: "The vehicle possesses four matters: first, the root of the vehicle, which is the real mark of all dharmas; second, the master of the vehicle, which is the perfection of the myriad practices guided by prajñā; third, the practice of the vehicle, all remaining practices; fourth, the fruition, which is sarvajñā." The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa says: "It also explains three kinds: first, the essence of the vehicle, which is the Tathāgata's impartial dharmakāya, that is, buddha-nature; second, the fruition of the vehicle, which is the Tathāgata's mahāparinirvāṇa; third, the conditions of the vehicle, which are the six pāramitās as the revealing cause." These are like the three kinds of buddha-nature. If the fruition-of-fruition nature is not mentioned, it is because the fruition-of-fruition nature belongs to the gate of fruition, and the cognitive-object nature belongs to the gate of cause. Extensively explained there are five; briefly explained there are only three.

Question: What does the vehicle take as its essence?

Answer: Although sūtras and treatises explain it in diverse ways, they do not go beyond three kinds: namely, principle, practice, and fruition. Here we take the correct Dharma as the essence.

Question: Principle is unmoving; how can it be called "conveying out"?

Answer: Because it is unmoving, it can cause sentient beings to be conveyed out. Distinguishing them: following and progressing is "conveying"; attaining the receptivity to the unborn Dharma is "out." Generally speaking, each and every one conveys out: the causal vehicle conveys oneself and conveys others; the vehicle of fruition and the vehicle of principle do not convey themselves, but are able to convey others.

Question: In this sūtra's explanation of the vehicle, precisely what does it take as its essence?

Answer: If in terms of the function of cause and fruition, it takes fruition as the central tenet. If in terms of the essence of the correct Dharma, it takes the correct Dharma as the central tenet. Now we explain that whether cause or fruition, both convey because of the correct Dharma; therefore, it takes the correct Dharma as the central tenet. Some say: this sūtra takes the myriad goods as the essence of the vehicle. Some say: it takes the myriad virtues of fruition as the central tenet. Some say: it takes cognitive object and gnosis as the central tenet. Now we explain that in terms of function these meanings are not absent, yet they fail to capture the profound essence of the vehicle; therefore, the correct Dharma of the Middle Way is taken as the central tenet of the sūtra and as the correct essence of the Ekayāna.

Question: Sanlun scholars constantly critique views of attainment; why do they now speak of varying views regarding function?

Answer: If one asserts that refuting characteristics is the central tenet, that is a view of attainment. Now we expound non-attainment: the doctrines of the various masters are all acceptable and all unacceptable; they attain function but do not attain essence. When disparate attachments are perpetually dispelled, all return together to the single ultimate; there is no attachment that is not broken, and no doctrine that is not comprehended. Skillfully applied, it is like ambrosia; clumsily taken, it becomes poison.

Question: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra explains four vehicles—principle, teaching, practice, and fruition; how does it differ from the present text?

Answer: That sūtra does not explain opening the provisional, which constitutes the difference with this text.

Question: What is the difference between the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra and the Lotus Sūtra?

Answer: The Lotus Sūtra converges the three vehicles, being spoken for bodhisattvas of gradual awakening; it directly addresses the three vehicles. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra is spoken for bodhisattvas of sudden awakening; it does not address śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, but only addresses humans; this is how it differs.

Question: If so, since the Lotus Sūtra is the ultimate teaching, why was the teaching of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra needed?

Answer: The sons who lost their minds needed the Nirvāṇa Sūtra; the sons who did not lose their minds did not need the Nirvāṇa Sūtra; it was spoken merely for sentient beings of dull faculties. Therefore, Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū Buddha and Dīpaṅkara Buddha did not teach nirvāṇa, because their audiences were sentient beings of sharp faculties.

Furthermore, this sūtra explains three things: first, the cart; second, the ox; third, the attendants. The cart represents the myriad practices and myriad virtues of cause and fruition. The ox also applies to both cause and fruition: the correct contemplation of the Middle Way, freed from the defilements of annihilation and permanence, is the white ox. Due to correct contemplation, it guides the myriad practices out of saṃsāra; this is prajñā guiding and perfecting the myriad practices.

Question: Prajñā is the vehicle; why is it compared to an ox?

Answer: One dharma has two meanings. Guiding is like the ox; the meaning of conveyance is like the cart. The others are not like this: because they convey out, they have the meaning of the cart, but because they lack the capacity to guide, they do not have the meaning of the ox. What is within the realm [of saṃsāra] are the attendants. As for the ox of the stage of fruition: true wisdom is the ox; the undefiled six superknowledges are the white ox, which yoked travels the five destinies to convey out sentient beings. As for the attendants, the causes outside the realm serve as the attendants.

Question: This sūtra does not yet clarify the direct cause of buddha-nature; what is the meaning of this?

Answer: This person has not grasped the flavor of the sūtra. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa states: "In seven places it explains the nature as direct cause." Now we briefly present four places: "All dharmas from the very beginning / are constantly marked by quiescent extinction." This clarifies the buddha-nature abiding in its own nature. It also says, "jointly entering the Dharma-nature"; this is an alternate name for buddha-nature. It also says, "to open, reveal, awaken to, and enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision." The treatise explains knowledge and vision as elucidating buddha-nature. Bodhisattva Samantabhadra and the conferral of prophecy upon evil people are because of having the nature as direct cause.

Question: Some say that this sūtra does not yet clarify eternal abiding. What is the meaning of this?

Answer: This is of the temperament of the Hīnayāna. In this sūtra, "All dharmas from the very beginning / are constantly marked by quiescent extinction" expresses the meaning of the eternal abiding of Dharma. "Constantly on Gṛdhrakūṭa Mountain" clarifies the eternal abiding of the person. "My pure land is never destroyed" names the eternal abiding of circumstantial retribution. Circumstantial retribution and direct retribution, person and Dharma, are all eternal; how could they be impermanent? Relying on the treatise's explanation of the text of the "Fāshòu liàng" (Lifespan) chapter, regarding the lifespan of the three bodies, the two bodies of Dharma and retribution are eternal.

Question: Some say that the three are discarded while the one is retained. Is this doctrine correct?

Answer: This is a view of attainment. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "It is neither three nor one, therefore it is called the Great Vehicle." "This Dharma cannot be shown; / the characteristics of words and speech are quiescent and extinct." This utterly dispels the four positions and the hundred negations, forcefully and provisionally speaking of the vehicle. Three and one are dual; neither three nor one is non-dual; dual and non-dual are crude; neither dual nor non-dual is subtle. Dual, non-dual, neither dual, nor non-dual is crude; words forgotten and thoughts terminated is subtle.

Regarding the opening and converging of three and one, there are altogether ten approaches: first, opening the three to reveal the one; second, converging the three to return to the one; third, abolishing the three to establish the one; fourth, refuting the three to clarify the one; fifth, concealing the three to clarify the one; sixth, clarifying the one before the three; seventh, clarifying the one within the three; eighth, distinguishing the one after the three; ninth, clarifying the one through transcendence of the three; tenth, distinguishing the one in the absence of the three.

"Opening the three to reveal the one" means opening up the previous three vehicles as provisional and revealing the present Ekayāna as real; hence it is called opening the three to reveal the one.

"Converging the three to return to the one" means converging those three practices to return to the one Buddha Vehicle; hence it says: "What you are practicing is the bodhisattva path."

"Abolishing the three to establish the one" means abolishing the former three teachings to establish the present Ekayāna teaching; hence it says: "Among the bodhisattvas, / honestly discarding provisional means, / I teach only the unexcelled path."

"Refuting the three to clarify the one" means refuting their mental attachments to the differentiation of the three in order to clarify the path of the Ekayāna.

"Concealing the three to clarify the one" means that as the Tathāgata responds to conditions of three and one, there are teachings of three and one; previously he concealed the one with the three, and now he conceals the three with the one.

"Clarifying the one before the three" means that before going to the Deer Park to preach the three, in the bodhimanda of quiescent extinction he had already clarified the teaching of the one and real; this is called clarifying the one before the three.

"Clarifying the one within the three" means that from going to the Deer Park to speak of the three vehicles, the Buddha Vehicle is first, the pratyekabuddha is second, and the śrāvaka is third; this is called clarifying the one within the three.

"Distinguishing the one after the three" means that following the three vehicles, the doctrinal gate of the Lotus converges those three vehicles so that they return together to the single path; this is called the one after the three.

"The one transcendent of duality" means that, as in the World without Words, externally there is no speech and no indication, and internally there is no thought and no cognition, so it does not even discuss one or three; yet this itself functions as the Buddha's work, which is again the one; hence it is called the one transcendent of duality.

"Distinguishing the one in the absence of the three" means that, as in the buddha-land of Gandhaprabhāsa (Xiangji), that land lacks even the names of the two vehicles; this is called distinguishing the one in the absence of the three; having only the assembly of pure great bodhisattvas is called having the one.

The first five discuss the one in terms of doctrine; the latter five are according to time and place. Because texts differ and doctrinal gates have distinctions, five are thus opened.

Question: What is meant by "converging the three to return to the one"?

Answer: If one wishes to understand converging the three to return to the one, one must first understand opening the one into three. Opening the one into three means that formerly, the cause of the Mahāyāna was pointed to and taught as the ultimate fruition of the Hīnayāna. Now, in turn, pointing out that the ultimate fruition of the Hīnayāna is none other than the cause of the Mahāyāna is called converging.

Question: When Hīnayāna practitioners consider it ultimate, are they confused about the cause, or confused about the fruition?

Answer: It is truly a great cause, yet they consider it a small fruition; therefore, they are confused about the cause.

Question: By what meaning is it clarified that the Ekayāna is the Buddha Vehicle among the three vehicles? Furthermore, by what meaning is it clarified that the Ekayāna is not the Buddha Vehicle among the three vehicles?

Answer: When clarifying the three vehicles, they completely encompass all world-transcending vehicles. Therefore, in contrast to the provisional means of the two vehicles, it clarifies that the Buddha Vehicle is the real; hence the text says: "Only this one thing is real; / the other two are not true." Thus it clarifies that the Ekayāna is one among the three vehicles. Within the Buddha Vehicle, the real and the responsive are further opened: formerly, for the people of the two vehicles, he spoke of the Buddha's provisional body, so the Buddha Vehicle was the provisional body; whereas now the teaching clarifies that the Buddha body is real. Because the real vehicle is different from the provisional Buddha—just as the elder upon the lion seat is different from the elder dressed in foul, tattered clothes—in terms of the two teachings of now and formerly, the Buddha has differences between provisional and real. Therefore, the Ekayāna is not one among the three vehicles.

Question: From beginning to end in this sūtra, it sometimes says: "The Buddha, through the power of provisional means, / demonstrated the teaching of the three vehicles," in which case the three vehicles are all provisional means. It also says: "Only this one thing is real; / the other two are not true," in which case two are provisional means. These two passages contradict each other; how are they reconciled?

Answer: These two passages still share one meaning; there is no contradiction. In relation to the one Buddha Vehicle, three are spoken provisionally; next, it says the one vehicle is real and two are provisional. It is like a person who truly holds one fruit in hand, but provisionally says there are three fruits. Progressively considered, one fruit is real and two are provisional; therefore, provisionally speaking of three and the two being provisional are still a single meaning, without contradiction.

Question: Is it converging three to return to one, or converging two to return to one?

Answer: This also is a single meaning. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The one Buddha Vehicle is opened into three portions." Just as a person divides one peck of rice into three heaps, one can combine the three heaps into one heap, or one can also say one converges two heaps to return to the one heap. Converging three and converging two are still a single meaning, without contradiction.

If we speak ultimately, the Middle Way is the central tenet; the treatise calls it the vehicle of nature. If we discuss it in terms of function, the myriad goods are the essence of the vehicle; among the myriad goods, prajñā is the essence. Between the two kinds of goodness—retribution and habituation—the cause of habituation is taken as the essence of the vehicle; the cause of retribution abides in saṃsāra and is not taken.

Question: If so, one should not converge the five vehicles of humans and devas into the Ekayāna.

Answer: Humans and devas are fruition of retribution, yet this essence of the vehicle possesses the meaning of the cause of habituation, and is therefore converged; this is in the sense of the predominant condition. Distinguishing them: conditioned goodness is not the essence of the vehicle; unconditioned goodness is the essence of the vehicle. There are two kinds of vehicles: conditioned goodness is the remote vehicle, and unconditioned goodness is the proximate vehicle. There are two kinds of vehicles: first, the moving vehicle; second, the unmoving vehicle. The myriad practices are the moving vehicle; the tathāgatagarbha buddha-nature Middle Way is the unmoving vehicle.

Question: The vehicle has the meaning of conveying out. The Middle Way buddha-nature does not convey out; how is it named the essence of the vehicle?

Answer: Because it is unmoving, it can cause the myriad goods to move and emerge, and also causes practitioners to move and emerge from saṃsāra to abide in that nirvāṇa; therefore, it is called the vehicle. The initial teaching of the Hīnayāna takes fruition as the vehicle, hence saying the three carts are outside the gate; this is the fruition of the gnosis of exhaustion and the gnosis of the unborn. The Mahāyāna takes both cause and fruition as the vehicle.

Question: If the Mahāyāna takes cause and fruition as the vehicle, why does the sūtra state: "Above the Buddha's fruition, there is no further matter of preaching an Ekayāna Dharma"?

Answer: This is said in the sense that it does not convey itself; it does not say that it does not convey others.