大乘玄論 4.8

4.8

同異門第五。問：凡有五時二智。一照事中之法為權、鑒四諦之理為實，謂三藏教二智也。二照真空為實、鑒俗有為權，此大品教二智也。三知病識藥為權、應病授藥為實，《淨名經》二智也。四照一乘為實、鑒二乘為權。《法花》二智也。五照常住為實、鑒無常為權，《涅槃》二智也。如上所明者，乃是釋大品教意，云何以噵《淨名》經宗？答：五時之說、四宗之論，乖文傷義，古已詳之，今當略說。尋一經之內具有五文，不待始終方備諸智。如《大品》云「廣說三乘之教，菩薩遍學諸道。」即識照四諦之理為實、鑒事中之法為權，故大品教中有三藏二智也。波若鑒空、漚和涉有，九十章經盛談此法，即空有二智。論釋〈畢定品〉引《法花經》，謂三一二智也。〈法尚品〉云「諸佛色身有去來，法身無去來。」則常無常二智也。知病識藥，眾經皆具，不待言之。故《大品》一經備五二智。《淨名經》中具諸智者，〈問疾品〉明三空自調為實慧、嚴土化人為方便，即空有二智。〈弟子品〉云「佛身無為，不墮諸數，亦出現生死五濁。」則常無常二智。〈不二法門品〉明聲聞心菩薩心不二，謂一乘實智；照大小差別，名三乘權智。問：不二法門云何即一乘耶？答：不二之理則是乘本，故名為乘。由體不二之理，故生不二之觀。由不二之觀，能導眾行到薩婆若。故《十二門論》明大分深義，所謂空也。以通達是義，即通達大乘，具六波羅蜜，無所障礙。問：不二之理通為三乘之本，豈但一乘本耶？答：理既無二，乘豈三哉？但唱此言則知歸一。又無二之理，即是一乘異名也。又尚明常住，豈不顯一乘？故知《淨名》亦具五二智。《法花經》具諸智者，〈方便品〉云「我雖說涅槃，是亦非真滅。諸法從本來，常自寂滅相。」昔涅槃非真滅、今涅槃為真滅，則昔涅槃非真常、今涅槃是真常。又天親論釋〈壽量品〉具辨三身，化身則有始有終，報身則有始無終，法身則無始無終，故知具常無常義。又若一乘之果猶是無常，即因異聲聞、果同灰斷，是事不然，聲聞果則是一乘因也。〈安樂行品〉明知一切法空如實相則是實智，知因緣生謂方便智，亦具空有二智也。序品列眾，猶依小乘嘆聲聞德，故知亦具三藏二智。《涅槃》備五，不復待言。問：若一經之內具諸智者，眾經何別？答：諸大乘經通為顯道，道既無二，教豈異哉？但入有多門，故諸部差別。雖一經之內具含五種，而明義傍正不同。三藏一教，唯明事理權實，未辨餘門二智。《大品》以空有為正，餘義為傍。《法花》三一為端，餘皆汎辨。《涅槃》以常無常為正，餘悉兼明。問：眾經何故有此傍正？答：有二種菩薩，一直往佛道、二迴小入大。波若為直往菩薩，說方便實慧不，墮三界、不住二乘，有兩健人各扶一腋，直至佛道。故《法花》云「有佛子，心淨柔濡亦利根，我記如是人來世得作佛。」此則指波若時事，不須明三乘為方便、一乘為真實。又迴小入大之人，於波若時通根未成，故不正明三一之義。而〈畢定品〉引《法花經》明退不退，蓋是波若後分傍及之耳。三修比丘無常之執，至大品時其根未傾，故不廣明常住。波若漚和既是因行，復須識果德，是故《大品》後分略明法身常、迹有去來。又常啼本求波若，故以二慧為正；中道疑佛去來，故傍明本迹。問：《大品》明有為波若、無為波若，豈不正辨常無常耶？答：無為波若有二種。一者以實相境名無為波若，所生觀智名有為波若；二者以佛果法身名無為波若，菩薩因慧名有為波若。《大品經》正明境智為無為義，傍明因果為無為也。是以論云「欲得有為波若，當學無為波若。」此明欲得觀智當學實相境。若言欲得於因當學果者，於義不便也。又云「實相能生波若」，正是以境生智。若言以果生因，義亦不便也。若以實相則是法身、以如為佛者，則此境智便是因果，上五句中以詳此意。問：《大品》何故以境智為無為是正，《涅槃》以因果為無為是正耶？答：《大品》明說菩薩行，實相能生波若，波若故有漚和，故以境智為正。《涅槃》盛明果德，故因位以來皆是無常，如來法身始是常住，故以因果為無為是正宗。問：《大品》明境智為無為，云何傍正？答：實相境雖是波若本，而《釋論》開波若為二慧，二慧則所生，是有為波若，故以有為是正；無為境傍，故不得以境為宗。問：《大品》「不住法、住波若，具足六度等萬行。」為是有為？為是無為？答：不住法者，不住一切有所得法。以不住一切法故，則住波若，此則是實相無為波若。次下具足六波羅蜜中，第六波若則是有為波若。此凡明三法次第：一者能生，謂實相無為波若；二所生觀智，有為波若；三導成因果之行。問：何以知不住法住波若是實相波若耶？答：第六度中既是有為，則知初是無為也。又論辨六家解波若，第六則是實相，仍引不住法住波若，故知第六則是實相。《法花經》正為迴小入大之人，故明三乘為方便，令其捨小；示一乘為真實，勸其取大，故正明三一二慧也。既捨小求大則發菩提心，修菩薩行須學空有權實，不著三界、不墮二乘，直至佛道。但《大品》既以廣明，故《法花》但略說也。三根聲聞，於法花之座不執無常，故未明常樂。但既說一乘之因，須辨一乘之果，是故後分略明於常。又說常住，成前一乘；若是無常，還同灰斷。既異昔三，則知常住，是故略辨常無常也。涅槃教起，正為無常之執，故開常住；三一空有前教已明，但略說之。問：《波若》為直往菩薩，《法花》為迴小入大之人，即攝緣已周，涅槃教興復何所為？答：設教多意，不可一途。《大品》為十九因緣，涅槃所為非一。依《法花》釋此意者，諸子有二：一者失心，即鈍根之人；二不失心，謂利根人。雖有直往之與迴小，聞《波若》、《法花》並順悟，謂不失心子利根人也。餘失心鈍根，猶未服藥，双林唱滅為說涅槃，方乃取信。若然者，始蓮花藏、終跋提河，但有利鈍二緣，爾前為利根人，涅槃之教為鈍根人。又波若法花之座皆已得道，今聞涅槃更復進悟。故云「為人中象王迦葉菩薩說是經也。」又有二緣：一歷教已得悟道、二但聞涅槃則便取信。故《波若》、《法花》雖為兩人，更說涅槃二智。別論二經。問：《大品》、《淨名》二智何異？答：凡有三說。五時者云：《大品》照空有分二智，《淨名》知病識藥應緣授教。如上釋之。四時義云：《大品》、《淨名》同是第二時攝，照空為實、鑒有為權，但《大品》通說淺深，《淨名》偏明八地之法。北土人云：《淨名》是圓頓之教，非染非淨染淨双遊。今謂並不然。「智度菩薩母，方便以為父，一切眾導師，無不由是生。」此則空有二慧，斯乃遍貫方等，豈局《大品》耶？又波若鑒空、漚和涉有，此總攝諸智，知病識藥、應病授藥縕在其中，豈得彼波若二智不攝淨名權實？故釋為非。龍樹烈十大經，謂《法花》等，而《波若》最勝，豈言《大品》通說淺深、《淨名》獨明妙道？若言淨名是八地已上之人故法妙者，如來為究竟果德說於波若，即應最深。又身子、善吉小人，說之便非大法。若云《淨名》辨不思議巨細容入故為深者，《大品》明指障風力毛舉大千，豈不明耶？又波若漚和不思議之本也，借座請飯不思議之迹也。如《大品》盛明二慧則辨不思議本，《淨名》現通乃顯不思議迹，何得本通淺深、迹獨為妙？若云三乘通學波若故通淺深者，《淨名》亦辨二乘之人皆以無得為得，豈不通耶？若言此經是圓頓教者，是亦不然，《大品》等辨菩薩權道方便適化不同，寧獨以此經為圓頓耶？今所明者，《大品》、《淨名》所明二智有同有異。「智度菩薩母，方便以為父」二經同辨斯法，但《大品》前明實慧、後辨方便，故九十章經開為二道，六十六品明波若、後二十四品明方便道。所以前明實慧、後辨方便者，實相為本，諸法為末。波若照實相，故波若為本；方便照諸法，故方便為末。此示二本二末，從本至末、從體起用，故前明實慧、後辨方便。二者一切諸見凡有二種：一者有見、二者無見，波若斥其有見、方便破其無見，即顯中道，遠離二邊故。前明實慧、後辨方便，謂破見次第也。三者菩薩退有二事：一貪三界二取小乘。方便實慧故不著三界，實慧方便故不墮二乘，即入菩薩位，得至佛道。要前離三界、後離二乘，故前辨實慧、後明方便。此如《法花經》五百由旬嶮難惡道，三界為三百、二乘為二百，先離三百、後離二百，故先明實慧、後辨權慧。故《大品》中以二乘合為一百，但明四百。雖開合為異，與《法花》大同，如彼廣說。又叡公《釋論．序》云「正覺知邪思之自起，故《阿含》為之作，鑒滯有之由惑，故《波若》為之照。」若然者，波若即破小乘之有，故前明實慧。雖破著有，復恐證空，故方便破空。此約教之前後為次第也。五就位明次第者，前明波若道，謂六地已還；次約方便道，則七地已上無生法忍。此皆大判為言。龍樹云「波若中非無方便，方便中非無波若。」但前多明波若、後多明方便。次《淨名經》辨二慧者，前明方便、後辨於實。所以然者，此教所興正起於疾，故云「其以方便現身有疾。」以有疾故，便有方丈二會、菴薗兩集，故前明方便、後辨實也。又成就眾生淨佛國土，此是菩薩方便用故。〈佛國〉一品明淨佛土，〈方便〉已去辨成就眾生，是以此經多明方便。又《大品》多明實相、少現神通，《淨名》多現神通、少明實相。又《大品》多明實慧方便，《淨名經》多辨權實二慧。問：權與方便有何異耶？答：通即無別，皆是善巧之義。別而為言，方便則長、權語則短。今總明三句：一照實相為實慧，鑒萬法為權。二靜鑒萬法為實，外反動為權。三就動用，以不疾之身為實，託疾方丈為權。初照實相名為實慧，自餘三門皆屬方便故。權義短者，但取外示反動名之為權，故權是方便中之別用，所以言短。問：權與方便既有短長，兩實亦得爾不？答：方便之實則長、權實則短。所以然者，方便既無所不為，實慧照無所不為而實無所為，是故長也。權智但是有中反動，實智是有中之靜鑒，故權實則短。問：外示反動為權，則照動無所動為實。但立此二，成權實不？答：外示反動為權，此是應病授藥，必須內靜鑒根藥為實，方成二慧。空慧不知根藥，故不成二慧也。

Chapter 5: The Gate of Sameness and Difference.

Question: In general, there are five periods and two gnoses: (1) illuminating phenomena within empirical events is the provisional, while examining the principle of the four truths is the real—this refers to the two gnoses of the Tripiṭaka teaching; (2) illuminating true emptiness is the real, while examining conventional existence is the provisional—this is the two gnoses of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā teaching; (3) knowing the disease and discerning the medicine is the provisional, while dispensing the medicine in response to the disease is the real—this is the two gnoses of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa; (4) illuminating the One Vehicle is the real, while examining the Two Vehicles is the provisional—this is the two gnoses of the Lotus Sūtra; (5) illuminating eternal abiding is the real, while examining impermanence is the provisional—this is the two gnoses of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. What has been explained above merely interprets the intent of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā teaching; how can it express the central theme of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa?

Answer: As for the theory of the five periods and the thesis of the four tenets, which run counter to the scriptures and do violence to their meaning, ancient masters have already examined them in detail; we shall now speak of them briefly. When examining within a single scripture, it completely possesses the five texts; one does not need to wait for beginning and end to fully possess all gnoses. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: 'Extensively preaching the teachings of the Three Vehicles, the bodhisattva universally studies all paths.' This specifically recognizes that illuminating the principle of the four truths is the real, and examining phenomena within empirical events is the provisional; therefore, within the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā teaching, there are the two gnoses of the Tripiṭaka. Prajñā examines emptiness, and upāya engages existence; the ninety chapters of the scripture extensively discuss this dharma, which constitutes the two gnoses of emptiness and existence. The commentary [the Dazhidulun], in explaining the 'Chapter on Certainty' (Biding pin), cites the Lotus Sūtra, which refers to the two gnoses of the Three [Vehicles] and the One [Vehicle]. The 'Chapter on Dharmodgata' (Fashang pin) says: 'The form bodies of all buddhas have coming and going; the dharmakāya has no coming and going'—these are the two gnoses of the permanent and impermanent. Knowing the disease and discerning the medicine is possessed by all scriptures; it does not need to be mentioned. Therefore, the single scripture of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā fully possesses the five pairs of two gnoses.

As for the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa possessing all gnoses: the 'Chapter on Inquiring about Illness' explains that self-regulation through the three emptinesses is real wisdom, while adorning lands and transforming people is expedient means (upāya)—these are the two gnoses of emptiness and existence. The 'Chapter on the Disciples' says: 'The Buddha's body is unconditioned, not falling into any categories, yet it also appears in the five turbidities of birth and death'—these are the two gnoses of the permanent and impermanent. The 'Chapter on the Gate of Non-Duality' explains that the mind of the śrāvaka and the mind of the bodhisattva are non-dual, which refers to the real gnosis of the One Vehicle; illuminating the distinction between great and small is termed the provisional gnosis of the Three Vehicles.

Question: How is the gate of non-duality the One Vehicle?

Answer: The principle of non-duality is the root of the vehicle; hence it is named 'vehicle'. Because one embodies the principle of non-duality, non-dual contemplation arises. Because of non-dual contemplation, one can guide all practices to sarvajñā. Therefore, the Dvādaśamukhaśāstra explains that the greatly profound meaning is emptiness. By thoroughly comprehending this meaning, one thoroughly comprehends the Mahāyāna, fully possesses the six pāramitās, and is without obstacle.

Question: The principle of non-duality serves universally as the root of the Three Vehicles; how could it only be the root of the One Vehicle?

Answer: Since the principle is non-dual, how could the vehicles be three? Merely by voicing this phrase, one knows that all return to the One. Furthermore, the principle of non-duality is simply another name for the One Vehicle. Moreover, since it also clarifies eternal abiding, how could it not reveal the One Vehicle? Hence we know that the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa also fully possesses the five pairs of two gnoses.

As for the Lotus Sūtra possessing all gnoses: the 'Chapter on Expedient Means' says: 'Although I speak of nirvāṇa, this is not true extinction. All dharmas from the very beginning are constantly and naturally of the mark of quiescent extinction.' Former nirvāṇa was not true extinction; current nirvāṇa is true extinction. Thus, former nirvāṇa was not truly permanent; current nirvāṇa is truly permanent. Furthermore, Vasubandhu's commentary on the 'Chapter on the Life Span' fully distinguishes the three bodies: the nirmāṇakāya has a beginning and an end, the saṃbhogakāya has a beginning but no end, and the dharmakāya has neither beginning nor end; hence we know it fully possesses the meaning of permanent and impermanent. Moreover, if the fruit of the One Vehicle were still impermanent, then the cause would differ from that of the śrāvakas while the fruit would be the same as [their] ash-like extinction—this cannot be so; the fruit of the śrāvaka is in fact the cause of the One Vehicle. The 'Chapter on Peaceful and Happy Practice' clarifies that knowing that all dharmas are empty like the true mark is real gnosis, while knowing arising through causes and conditions is expedient gnosis; it also fully possesses the two gnoses of emptiness and existence. The 'Introductory Chapter' lists the assembly, still following the Hīnayāna in praising the virtues of the śrāvakas; hence we know it also fully possesses the two gnoses of the Tripiṭaka. That the Nirvāṇa Sūtra fully possesses the five needs no further comment.

Question: If within a single scripture all gnoses are possessed, what is the distinction between scriptures?

Answer: All Mahāyāna scriptures universally serve to reveal the Way. Since the Way is non-dual, how could the teachings differ? It is only that there are many gateways of entry; hence the differences among the various texts. Although a single scripture completely contains the five kinds, their elucidation of meaning has primary and secondary differences. The single teaching of the Tripiṭaka only clarifies the provisional and real of phenomena and principle, and does not yet distinguish the two gnoses of the other gates. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā takes emptiness and existence as primary, and the other meanings as secondary. The Lotus Sūtra takes the Three and the One as primary, and discusses the others only cursorily. The Nirvāṇa takes the permanent and impermanent as primary, and concurrently illuminates all the others.

Question: Why do the various scriptures have this primary and secondary [emphasis]?

Answer: There are two kinds of bodhisattvas: first, those who advance straight to the Buddha path; second, those who turn from the small to enter the great. For the straight-advancing bodhisattva, the Prajñāpāramitā speaks of expedient and real wisdom so that they do not fall into the three realms and do not abide in the Two Vehicles—like two strong men supporting one by each armpit, proceeding straight to the Buddha path. Therefore the Lotus Sūtra says: 'There are sons of the Buddha whose minds are pure, pliant, and of sharp faculties; I predict that such people will become buddhas in a future age.' This points to the events of the Prajñāpāramitā period; there was no need to clarify the Three Vehicles as provisional and the One Vehicle as real. Furthermore, for those who turn from the small to enter the great, during the Prajñāpāramitā period their root of comprehension was not yet matured; hence it did not primarily clarify the meaning of the Three and the One. That the 'Chapter on Certainty' cites the Lotus Sūtra to clarify retrogressing and non-retrogressing was merely touched upon secondarily in the latter part of the Prajñāpāramitā. The three-cultivations bhikṣus' clinging to impermanence had not yet been toppled by the time of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; therefore it did not extensively clarify eternal abiding. Since prajñā and upāya are causal practices, one must also recognize the virtues of the fruit; for this reason, the latter part of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā briefly clarifies that the dharmakāya is permanent and traces have coming and going. Furthermore, Sadāprarudita originally sought prajñā, so the two wisdoms are taken as primary; mid-way he doubted whether the Buddha had coming and going, so root and trace were clarified secondarily.

Question: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies conditioned prajñā and unconditioned prajñā; does it not primarily distinguish the permanent and impermanent?

Answer: Unconditioned prajñā is of two kinds: first, the cognitive object of the true mark is named unconditioned prajñā, and the contemplative gnosis generated thereby is named conditioned prajñā; second, the dharmakāya of the Buddha fruit is named unconditioned prajñā, and the causal wisdom of the bodhisattva is named conditioned prajñā. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā primarily clarifies cognitive object and gnosis in terms of the unconditioned and conditioned, and secondarily clarifies cause and fruit as the unconditioned. Thus the treatise says: 'If one wishes to obtain conditioned prajñā, one should learn unconditioned prajñā.' This explains that if one wishes to obtain contemplative gnosis, one should learn the cognitive object of the true mark. If one were to say that wishing to obtain the cause one should learn the fruit, the meaning would not be suitable. It also says: 'The true mark can produce prajñā'—this is precisely producing gnosis through the cognitive object. If one were to say producing the cause through the fruit, the meaning would also not be suitable. If one takes the true mark to be the dharmakāya and suchness to be the Buddha, then this cognitive object and gnosis are simply cause and fruit; this meaning has already been examined in the five propositions above.

Question: Why is it that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā takes cognitive object and gnosis as unconditioned to be primary, while the Nirvāṇa takes cause and fruit as unconditioned to be primary?

Answer: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā explicitly speaks of bodhisattva practice: the true mark can produce prajñā, and due to prajñā there is upāya; hence it takes cognitive object and gnosis as primary. The Nirvāṇa extensively clarifies the virtues of the fruit: from the causal stages onward, all are impermanent, and only the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is eternally abiding; hence it takes cause and fruit as unconditioned as its primary theme.

Question: As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies cognitive object and gnosis as unconditioned, how are they primary and secondary?

Answer: Although the cognitive object of the true mark is the root of prajñā, the Expository Treatise (Dazhidulun) opens prajñā into two wisdoms; the two wisdoms are what is produced, which is conditioned prajñā, and therefore the conditioned is primary; the unconditioned cognitive object is secondary, so one cannot take the cognitive object as the central theme.

Question: When the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā speaks of 'not abiding in phenomena, abiding in prajñā, completely fulfilling the ten thousand practices such as the six pāramitās'—is this conditioned or unconditioned?

Answer: 'Not abiding in phenomena' means not abiding in any dharma of attainment. Because of not abiding in all dharmas, one abides in prajñā; this is the unconditioned prajñā of the true mark. Directly below, within completely fulfilling the six pāramitās, the sixth pāramitā, prajñā, is conditioned prajñā. Here, in general, a sequence of three dharmas is clarified: first, that which can produce, namely the unconditioned prajñā of the true mark; second, that which is produced, contemplative gnosis, conditioned prajñā; third, guiding and perfecting the practices of cause and fruit.

Question: How does one know that 'not abiding in phenomena, abiding in prajñā' is the prajñā of the true mark?

Answer: Since the sixth pāramitā is conditioned, one knows that the initial one is unconditioned. Furthermore, the treatise distinguishes the six schools interpreting prajñā, and the sixth is the true mark, quoting 'not abiding in phenomena, abiding in prajñā'; hence we know the sixth is the true mark.

The Lotus Sūtra was taught primarily for people who turn from the small to enter the great; hence it clarifies the Three Vehicles as provisional to cause them to abandon the small, and reveals the One Vehicle as real to encourage them to adopt the great; thus it primarily clarifies the two wisdoms of the Three and the One. Having abandoned the small and sought the great, they give rise to the bodhi-mind; in cultivating bodhisattva practice, they must learn the provisional and real of emptiness and existence, not clinging to the three realms and not falling into the Two Vehicles, proceeding straight to the Buddha path. However, since the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā had already extensively explained this, the Lotus Sūtra explains it only briefly. The śrāvakas of the three faculties, at the assembly of the Lotus, did not cling to impermanence, so it did not yet explain permanence and bliss. Yet having explained the cause of the One Vehicle, it had to distinguish the fruit of the One Vehicle; therefore, the latter part briefly clarifies permanence. Furthermore, speaking of eternal abiding completes the preceding One Vehicle; if it were impermanent, it would revert to being the same as ash-like extinction. Since it is different from the former Three, one knows it is eternally abiding; therefore it briefly distinguishes permanent and impermanent. The teaching of the Nirvāṇa arose primarily because of the clinging to impermanence, so it discloses eternal abiding; the Three and One, and emptiness and existence, were already explained in previous teachings, so it explains them only briefly.

Question: If the Prajñāpāramitā was for straight-advancing bodhisattvas, and the Lotus Sūtra was for people who turn from the small to enter the great, then the gathering of conditions was already complete; what was the purpose of the arising of the Nirvāṇa teaching?

Answer: In establishing teachings there are many purposes; it cannot be reduced to a single track. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā was for nineteen causes and conditions; what the Nirvāṇa was for is not merely one. Explaining this meaning based on the Lotus Sūtra: the children are of two kinds: first, those who have lost their minds, namely people of dull faculties; second, those who have not lost their minds, namely people of sharp faculties. Although there are the straight-advancing and those who turn from the small, hearing the Prajñāpāramitā and Lotus Sūtra they both smoothly attained awakening—these are called the children who have not lost their minds, people of sharp faculties. The remaining dull-facultied who lost their minds had not yet taken the medicine; only when [the Buddha] proclaimed extinction in the Twin Trees and spoke the Nirvāṇa for them did they then accept it with faith. If so, from the beginning at the Padmagarbha to the end at the Bhadrakā River, there are only the two conditions of sharp and dull: prior to that was for people of sharp faculties, and the teaching of the Nirvāṇa was for people of dull faculties. Furthermore, those at the assemblies of the Prajñāpāramitā and Lotus had already attained the Way, but now upon hearing the Nirvāṇa they advanced in awakening even further. Therefore it is said: 'This scripture was spoken for the king of elephants among men, the Bodhisattva Kāśyapa.' Furthermore, there are two kinds of conditions: first, those who attained awakening through traversing the teachings; second, those who only needed to hear the Nirvāṇa to immediately accept it with faith. Therefore, although the Prajñāpāramitā and Lotus were for two kinds of people, the two gnoses of the Nirvāṇa were spoken further.

To discuss the two scriptures separately: Question: What is the difference between the two gnoses of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa?

Answer: There are three theories in all. The five-period theorists say: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā divides the two gnoses by illuminating emptiness and existence, while the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa knows the disease, discerns the medicine, and dispenses teachings according to conditions—as explained above. The four-period theory says: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa are both subsumed under the second period, illuminating emptiness as the real and examining existence as the provisional, but the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā universally speaks of shallow and deep, while the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa exclusively clarifies the dharma of the eighth stage. People of the northern regions say: the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is the perfect and sudden teaching; neither defiled nor pure, it roams equally in defilement and purity.

We now consider that none of these is correct. 'The perfection of wisdom is the bodhisattva's mother, expedient means is the father; all guides of the assembly are born without exception from them.' These are the two wisdoms of emptiness and existence, which universally run through the Vaipulya; how could they be confined to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā? Furthermore, prajñā examines emptiness and upāya engages existence; this generally encompasses all gnoses. Knowing the disease and discerning the medicine, and dispensing medicine according to the disease, are contained within them; how could those two gnoses of prajñā fail to encompass the provisional and real of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa? Therefore that interpretation is incorrect. Nāgārjuna enumerated the ten great scriptures, referring to the Lotus and others, and the Prajñāpāramitā is supreme; how can one say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā universally speaks of shallow and deep, while the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa alone clarifies the marvelous Way? If one says that because Vimalakīrti was a person on the eighth stage or above his teaching is marvelous, then the Tathāgata spoke the Prajñāpāramitā for the ultimate fruit-virtue, so it should be the most profound. Furthermore, if Śāriputra and Subhūti were lesser persons and speaking it made it not a great dharma—[that is absurd]. If one says that because the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa distinguishes the inconceivable accommodation of the vast and the minuscule it is profound, does not the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā also clearly state that a finger can block the power of wind and a tip of hair can lift the great chiliocosm? Furthermore, prajñā and upāya are the root of the inconceivable; borrowing seats and asking for food are traces of the inconceivable. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā extensively clarifies the two wisdoms, it distinguishes the root of the inconceivable; as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa manifests supernormal powers, it displays the traces of the inconceivable. How could the root universally encompass shallow and deep while the trace alone is marvelous? If one says that because the Three Vehicles universally study prajñā it encompasses shallow and deep, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa also distinguishes that persons of the Two Vehicles all take non-attainment as attainment; how does it not also universally encompass them? If one says that this scripture is the perfect and sudden teaching, this is also not so: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and others distinguish the bodhisattva's provisional path and expedient means in adapting to transform others differently; why take this scripture alone as perfect and sudden?

What we now clarify is that the two gnoses clarified in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and Vimalakīrtinirdeśa have sameness and difference. 'The perfection of wisdom is the mother, expedient means is the father'—both scriptures equally distinguish this dharma. However, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā first clarifies real wisdom and later distinguishes expedient means; hence the ninety chapters of the scripture are divided into two paths: sixty-six chapters clarify the path of prajñā, and the latter twenty-four chapters clarify the path of expedient means. Why it first clarifies real wisdom and later distinguishes expedient means is that the true mark is the root and all dharmas are the branches. Prajñā illuminates the true mark, so prajñā is the root; expedient means illuminates all dharmas, so expedient means is the branches. This shows the two roots and two branches: from root to branch, from substance arising function; hence it first clarifies real wisdom and later distinguishes expedient means. Second, all views are of two kinds: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā rebukes the view of existence, and expedient means destroys the view of non-existence, thereby revealing the Middle Way and leaving behind the two extremes; hence first clarifying real wisdom and later distinguishing expedient means refers to the sequence of destroying views. Third, as for a bodhisattva's retrogression, there are two matters: first, coveting the three realms; second, adopting the Hīnayāna. Through expedient real wisdom one does not cling to the three realms; through real expedient wisdom one does not fall into the Two Vehicles; thus one enters the bodhisattva stage and can reach the Buddha path. One must first leave the three realms and later leave the Two Vehicles; hence it first distinguishes real wisdom and later clarifies expedient means. This is like the dangerous, evil path of five hundred yojanas in the Lotus Sūtra: the three realms are three hundred, and the Two Vehicles are two hundred; first leaving the three hundred and later leaving the two hundred, hence first clarifying real wisdom and later distinguishing provisional wisdom. Thus in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, combining the Two Vehicles into one hundred, it speaks only of four hundred. Although their division and combination differ, it is broadly identical with the Lotus Sūtra, as extensively explained there. Furthermore, Master Sengrui's 'Preface to the Commentary' says: 'The Truly Awakened One knew that perverted thoughts arise of themselves, and therefore the Āgamas were made for them; examining the confusion born of clinging to existence, the Prajñāpāramitā illuminated it.' If so, prajñā destroys the existence of the Hīnayāna, so it first clarifies real wisdom. Although it destroys clinging to existence, fearing that one might realize emptiness, expedient means destroys emptiness. This is the sequence according to earlier and later in the teachings. Fifth, clarifying sequence in terms of stages: first clarifying the path of prajñā refers to the sixth stage and below; next, the path of expedient means refers to the seventh stage and above with the patience of the unborn dharma. These are all broad demarcations. Nāgārjuna says: 'Within prajñā there is no absence of expedient means, and within expedient means there is no absence of prajñā.' It is only that earlier it mostly clarifies prajñā, and later it mostly clarifies expedient means.

Next, as for the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa distinguishing the two wisdoms, it first clarifies expedient means and later clarifies the real. Why this is so is that the arising of this teaching specifically began with illness; hence it says: 'Through expedient means he manifested his body as having illness.' Because he had an illness, there were the two assemblies in the ten-foot room and the two gatherings in Āmrapālī's garden; hence it first clarifies expedient means and later clarifies the real. Furthermore, maturing sentient beings and purifying the buddha-land are the bodhisattva's expedient functions. The single chapter 'Buddha-land' clarifies purifying the buddha-land, and from 'Expedient Means' onward it distinguishes maturing sentient beings; for this reason, this scripture mostly clarifies expedient means. Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies the true mark and rarely manifests supernormal powers, while the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa mostly manifests supernormal powers and rarely clarifies the true mark. Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies real wisdom and expedient means, while the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa mostly distinguishes the two wisdoms of the provisional and real.

Question: What is the difference between the provisional (quan) and expedient means (fangbian)?

Answer: Generally speaking there is no difference; both bear the meaning of skillfulness. Speaking specifically, 'expedient means' is broader, while the term 'provisional' is narrower. Now we broadly clarify three propositions: (1) illuminating the true mark is real wisdom, while examining the ten thousand dharmas is the provisional; (2) quiescently examining the ten thousand dharmas is the real, while externally manifesting reverse activity is the provisional; (3) regarding dynamic function, taking the un-diseased body as the real, while relying on illness in the ten-foot room is the provisional. The first, illuminating the true mark, is named real wisdom, and the other three gates all belong to expedient means. Therefore, the meaning of 'provisional' is narrower, taking only the outward display of reverse activity as provisional; hence the provisional is a specific function within expedient means, which is why it is called narrower.

Question: Since 'provisional' and 'expedient means' have narrow and broad [meanings], can the two 'reals' also be like this?

Answer: The real of expedient means is broader, while the provisional's real is narrower. Why this is so: since expedient means leaves nothing undone, real wisdom illuminates leaving nothing undone while in reality doing nothing; therefore it is broad. Provisional gnosis is merely reverse activity within existence, while real gnosis is quiescent examination within existence; hence the provisional's real is narrow.

Question: Outwardly displaying reverse activity is the provisional, while illuminating that in movement there is no movement is the real. If one establishes only these two, does it complete the provisional and real?

Answer: Outwardly displaying reverse activity is the provisional—this is dispensing medicine according to the disease. One must inwardly and quiescently examine faculties and medicine as the real, only then completing the two wisdoms. Wisdom of emptiness does not know faculties and medicine, and therefore cannot complete the two wisdoms.