大乘玄論 5.9.2

5.9.2

問：既破有得申無得，亦應但破性執申假名以不？ 答性執是有得，假名是無得。 今破有得申無得，即是破性執申假名也。 問：既破性申假，亦應但破有申無。 若有無兩洗，亦應性假雙破耶？ 答：不例。 有無皆是性，所以須雙破。 既分性假異，故有破不破。 問：性有性無皆是性，唯破性不破假者，亦應性有假有皆是有，唯破有不破無也。 答：雖同是有，而有不同，故但破性有，不破假有。 問：若雖同是有而有不同故，但破性有不破假有者，亦應雖同是性而性不同，不破性無但破性有耶？ 答：有例不例。 言其例者，既性有性無皆是性，所以兩破； 亦性有假有皆是有，亦須二除也。 而不例者，明性有住有，乖道故須破； 假有非有，扶道故不除也。 次時云前明破邪顯正，即是佛與菩薩。 今問：爰及正化迄平像法，傳持紹繼其人不少。 今定取何人破邪顯正？ 答：大格為論，不出四人。 一是調御世尊，是能化主，其餘三聖助佛宣揚，三者所謂馬鳴開士與龍樹、提婆也。 問：此之四人破邪顯正，為當是同？ 為當有異？ 答：一往且折彼疑，則云不同不異。 佛與菩薩，所以不同； 同顯實相，所以不異。 此是同異不同不異。 既得不同異，即得同異。 佛菩薩具足不具足勝劣故異，皆破邪顯正故同也。 言佛菩薩異者，佛即說教樹二諦赴緣，菩薩直助佛揚化，無別制作也。 就菩薩中自復有異。 若是龍樹，作論前破法，後兼淨人我。 提婆所造，先正破神我，後兼洗法。 所以然者，《中論》破內弟子雖知無我，猶計有法，是故前正除法、後兼淨人我。 故《十二門》云「有為無為尚空，何況我耶。 」《百論》破外道，如僧伽等計云有神我，不知無我，故須前正破我、後兼破法，故破神辨生空、破一異等明法空。 此為異也。 問：既同破邪皆為顯正，何故一論申大小？ 一論不申大小？ 答：若俱申大小，何有兩論殊？ 必齊顯小大，焉判兩人異？ 作折彼問已是消疑，但意趣不然，更須指掌。 《中論》破執大小緣，所以申大小。 《百論》不破執大小緣，故不明申大小，即竝。 《中論》破執真俗緣，可顯真俗。 《百論》不破執真俗緣，論末應不明真俗，結論歸旨也。 釋云：真俗二諦是諸佛教門，譬若眾流皆歸大海，凡欲悟入莫不因此教門。 論既破空破有、除斷除常，外人失彼所執，情無所寄，即問佛法為何所說。 論主應聲即答：有二諦，以世諦有故不斷、真諦無故不常，令彼斷常見息，是故須說二諦也。 問：或言破邪顯正； 或言豈離邪有正？ 即撥邪者令正，因邪故得正。 此兩言似如乖反。 若言破邪顯正，即不應言因邪有正，只令邪者正。 若言只因邪故正，又不應言破除邪顯正也。 又問：邪正一故言破邪顯正？ 為邪正異故破邪顯正？ 他人解：邪正兩端，破除邪故得顯正也。 難：若爾，瓶衣體異，破瓶顯衣耶？ 彼云：瓶衣乃異，不相違害，非相障法故，不破瓶顯衣。 邪正是相障法，邪障正故，破邪顯正也。 難：若邪正相違故破邪顯正者，水火相害，何不破水顯火？ 而不爾，故知邪正寧可碩異耶？ 今若噵邪言隱覆正教，不開破邪言顯正教，非為不爾，但此邪正疎遠，非一家意。 今明道非邪正，能體道之緣亦悟非邪正，但以向迷今悟，詺向迷僻為邪、呼今悟為正，此得悟時了無邪正。 問：若爾，定是破邪顯正？ 定是因邪顯正？ 答：具此兩義。 言破邪顯正者，向迷成斷常，所以須破此邪； 今得悟不斷不常，名為顯正義，是以言破邪顯正。 亦可言因邪有正者，只令悟斷常者不斷常，豈得離迷有悟離斷常別有不斷常耶？ 問：佛出世既有感緣所感，龍樹出世亦為感緣所感不？ 答：例爾。 問：佛與龍樹出世俱有感緣所感者，佛能照緣，龍樹亦照緣不？ 答：亦例。 又問：若爾，佛說教，龍樹亦應說教不？ 答：應例而不例。

Question: Since refuting attainment affirms non-attainment, should one also merely refute attachment to intrinsic nature and affirm conventional designation, or not? Answer: Attachment to intrinsic nature is attainment, and conventional designation is non-attainment. Now, refuting attainment and affirming non-attainment is precisely refuting attachment to intrinsic nature and affirming conventional designation. Question: Since refuting intrinsic nature affirms the conventional, should one also merely refute existence and affirm non-existence? If both existence and non-existence are washed away, should both intrinsic nature and conventional designation be doubly refuted? Answer: They are not analogous. Both existence and non-existence are intrinsic natures, which is why both must be refuted. Since intrinsic nature and the conventional are distinguished as different, there is that which is refuted and that which is not refuted. Question: If both intrinsic nature as existence and intrinsic nature as non-existence are intrinsic nature, such that one only refutes intrinsic nature and does not refute the conventional, then both intrinsic existence and conventional existence are existence, so one should only refute existence and not refute non-existence. Answer: Although they are equally existence, existence is not the same [in both cases]; therefore, one only refutes intrinsic existence and does not refute conventional existence. Question: If, because although they are equally existence the existence is not the same, one only refutes intrinsic existence and does not refute conventional existence, then should it also be that although both are equally intrinsic nature the intrinsic natures are not the same, so that one does not refute intrinsic non-existence but only refutes intrinsic existence? Answer: There is that which is analogous and that which is not analogous. To speak of that which is analogous: since both intrinsic existence and intrinsic non-existence are intrinsic nature, both are refuted; likewise, since both intrinsic existence and conventional existence are existence, both must also be eliminated. As for that which is not analogous: it is explained that intrinsic existence abides in existence and conflicts with the Way, so it must be refuted; conventional existence is non-existence and supports the Way, so it is not eliminated. Next, it was said earlier that refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct refers to the Buddha and the bodhisattvas. Now I ask: down through the true Dharma and continuing to the counterfeit Dharma, those who transmitted, upheld, and carried on the succession were not few. Exactly which persons are taken here as refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct? Answer: Speaking in terms of the general framework, they do not exceed four persons. The first is the Tamer, the World-Honoured One, who is the master capable of transforming beings; the remaining three sages assist the Buddha in proclaiming and propagating [the teaching], the three being the great being Aśvaghoṣa, together with Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Question: In refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct, are these four persons the same or are they different? Answer: Provisionally, to resolve the doubt for the moment, one says they are neither different nor the same. As the Buddha and bodhisattvas, they are therefore not the same; in jointly revealing the true mark, they are therefore not different. This is being neither the same nor different with respect to sameness and difference. Once one understands neither difference nor sameness, one understands sameness and difference. Because of the superior and inferior nature of being complete or incomplete as Buddha and bodhisattvas, they are different; because all refute the erroneous and reveal the correct, they are the same. Speaking of the difference between Buddha and bodhisattvas: the Buddha speaks the teaching, establishes the two truths, and responds to conditions; the bodhisattvas merely assist the Buddha in propagating the transformation and make no separate production. Among the bodhisattvas themselves, there are again differences. In the case of Nāgārjuna, when composing treatises he first refutes phenomena, and afterward cleanses the personal self as well. In the case of Āryadeva's composition, he first directly refutes the ātman, and afterward washes away phenomena as well. Why is this? The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes internal disciples who, although knowing there is no self, still grasp at the existence of phenomena; therefore, it first directly eliminates phenomena and afterward cleanses the personal self as well. Thus the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra says: 'Even conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are empty, how much more so the self!' The Śataśāstra refutes non-Buddhists such as the Sāṃkhyas who postulate that there is an ātman and do not know selflessness; therefore, it must first directly refute the self and afterward refute phenomena as well. Hence, refuting the spirit explains the emptiness of persons, and refuting identity and difference clarifies the emptiness of phenomena. This is the difference. Question: Since both equally refute the erroneous to reveal the correct, why does one treatise affirm both the Greater and Lesser [Vehicles], while the other treatise does not affirm both the Greater and Lesser? Answer: If both affirmed the Greater and Lesser, how would there be a distinction between the two treatises? If they necessarily revealed the Lesser and Greater equally, how could one determine the difference between the two persons? Having formulated this to resolve that question, the doubt is settled; however, the intended purport is not merely this, and must be explained even more clearly. The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes the conditions of attachment to the Greater and Lesser [Vehicles], and therefore affirms the Greater and Lesser. The Śataśāstra does not refute the conditions of attachment to the Greater and Lesser, and so it does not explicitly affirm the Greater and Lesser. This is parallel. The Madhyamakaśāstra refutes conditions of attachment to the ultimate and the conventional, so it can reveal the ultimate and conventional. Since the Śataśāstra does not refute conditions of attachment to the ultimate and conventional, at the end of the treatise it should not clarify the ultimate and conventional to conclude the treatise's destination. The explanation states: The two truths of the ultimate and conventional are the teaching gates of all buddhas. They are like the myriad streams all returning to the great sea; whoever wishes to awaken and enter does so by relying on this teaching gate. When the treatises have refuted emptiness and refuted existence, and eliminated annihilationism and eliminated eternalism, the non-Buddhists lose their attachments and their minds have nowhere to lodge, so they immediately ask what the Buddha's Dharma teaches. The treatise master answers promptly: There are two truths; because conventional truth exists, there is no annihilation, and because ultimate truth is non-existent, there is no permanence. Causing their annihilationist and eternalist views to cease, one must therefore expound the two truths. Question: Some say 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'; others say 'how could the correct exist apart from the erroneous? One simply turns the erroneous person toward the correct; because of the erroneous, one attains the correct.' These two statements seem to be contradictory. If one says 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct', then one should not say 'because of the erroneous there is the correct, merely making the erroneous person correct.' If one says 'only because of the erroneous is there the correct', then one should not say 'eliminating the erroneous reveals the correct.' Again, I ask: is it because the erroneous and the correct are one that one speaks of 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'? Or is it because the erroneous and the correct are different that one speaks of 'refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct'? Others explain: The erroneous and the correct are two separate poles; because one eliminates the erroneous, one is able to reveal the correct. Objection: If so, a jar and a garment are different in substance—does refuting a jar reveal a garment? They say: A jar and a garment are indeed different, but they do not mutually harm or obstruct each other; because they are not mutually obstructing dharmas, refuting a jar does not reveal a garment. The erroneous and the correct are mutually obstructing dharmas; because the erroneous obstructs the correct, refuting the erroneous reveals the correct. Objection: If it is because the erroneous and the correct conflict that refuting the erroneous reveals the correct, then water and fire harm each other—why does refuting water not reveal fire? Since that is not the case, one knows: how could the erroneous and the correct be radically different? Now, if one says that erroneous words conceal the correct teaching, and without refuting erroneous words one cannot reveal the correct teaching—it is not that this is not so, but this erroneous and correct are distant and alien, not our school's intention. Now we clarify that the Way is neither erroneous nor correct, and the condition capable of realizing the Way also awakens to being neither erroneous nor correct. But because one was previously deluded and is now awakened, one designates the previous delusion and deviation as 'erroneous' and calls the present awakening 'correct'; when this awakening is attained, there is completely no erroneous and correct. Question: If so, is it definitively refuting the erroneous to reveal the correct? Or is it definitively revealing the correct because of the erroneous? Answer: Both of these meanings are present. When speaking of refuting the erroneous to reveal the correct: previous delusion constituted annihilationism and eternalism, and therefore this erroneous view must be refuted; now attaining the awakening of non-annihilation and non-permanence is called the meaning of revealing the correct; therefore one speaks of refuting the erroneous and revealing the correct. One may also say that because of the erroneous there is the correct: it merely causes one who is deluded by annihilationism and eternalism to be non-annihilated and non-permanent; how could there be awakening apart from delusion, or a non-annihilation and non-permanence apart from annihilationism and eternalism? Question: Since the Buddha's appearing in the world had conditions of response by which he was moved to appear, was Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world also moved by conditions of response, or not? Answer: It is analogous. Question: If the Buddha's and Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world were both moved by conditions of response, then the Buddha could illuminate conditions—could Nāgārjuna also illuminate conditions, or not? Answer: That is also analogous. Question again: If so, the Buddha spoke teachings—should Nāgārjuna also speak teachings, or not? Answer: It should be analogous, but it is not analogous.