二諦義 1.39

1.39

問：教若為名諦耶？解：有數意。一者依實而說，故所說亦實，是故名諦。二者如來誠諦之言，是故名諦。三者說有無教，實能表道，是故名諦。外道所說何故不名諦？外道所說不能表道，所以不得名諦。諸佛所說實能表道，是故名諦也。四者說法實能利緣，是故名諦。外道說法不能實利於緣，不得名諦。諸佛菩薩實能利緣，所以名諦。五者說不顛倒，是故名諦。如《涅槃經》釋一實諦義，如來所說無有顛倒名一實諦。今亦爾，所說不顛倒故，所以名諦。外道所說皆悉顛倒，不得名諦。諸佛菩薩說無有顛倒，是故名諦。六者得如實悟，如實而說，是故名諦。故經云「如語者、實語者、不異語者、不誑語者」，此即如來誠諦不虛，故教名諦也。次明於諦。何因緣名諦耶？為從謂情為名、為從境為稱、為從解為目耶？解云：於諦從兩情解為名。但此義有兩種：一者得失判二於諦。有於凡實，名為世諦；空於聖實，名第一義諦。此有謂情有、此空真解空，謂情有為失、真解空為得。此就謂情真解判二諦也。何以知爾？故論云「諸法性空，世間顛倒謂有，名世諦。諸賢聖真知性空，名第一義諦。」既云真知性空，故是真解。前云顛倒謂有，故是謂情。若爾，故知此即謂情真解得失以判二於諦也。二者就兩謂判二於諦者，如色未曾空有，凡謂色有，於凡是實名諦；聖謂色空，於聖是實名諦。此之有無皆是謂情，故竝皆是失。既凡謂有、聖謂空，此之空有悉須洗破，無如此有、無如此空，畢竟洗淨，始得明因緣空有。因緣空有，即非空有空有，既識非空有空有即悟空有非空有也。前之空有竝是所治之病，故皆失也。以如此義名教諦，以如此義名於諦。此是師語不？然，此實是師語也。次作一疑難安中。何者？依於諦說法，於諦是境不？若非境即乖論文。論文云「諸賢聖真知諸法性空」，真知即是智，智必有境，性空即是境、真知即是智。若爾，二諦是境。依二諦境為眾生說法，生得附論文即成他義。他亦云：二諦是境，說二諦名教，故有言教法寶、境界法寶。四諦二諦是境界法寶，說四諦二諦即是言教法寶。今亦爾，與他何異？若言我不如此，即乖論文。論文云「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法」，那得言二諦是教耶？進退不可，扶論文即同他、不同他即乖論文也。又作一掩答難。有於諦、有教諦。於諦有真俗，教諦有真俗不？若言教諦亦有真俗者，成論死，三論未知。若為成論死者，今且問汝：說俗說是俗、說真說是真不？汝若言說是真，即乖汝義。何者？汝義教諦是言語，唯是俗故，不得言教諦具真俗。若畏改語言，若說非真者，那得言教諦有真俗耶？若是成論家解義者，即云：真俗二諦是境。境有真俗，說真說俗，此兩說竝俗諦。真不可說，寄俗諦說也。今問三論師：他家真俗是境，境中有真有俗。汝今明二諦是教門，教諦亦有真俗不？不解義者必云教諦亦有真俗。何者？有兩諦？有於諦、有教諦。於諦有真俗，教諦亦有真俗也。

Question: Why is the teaching called truth? Explanation: There are several meanings. First, it is spoken in reliance on the real; therefore, what is spoken is also real, and for this reason it is called truth. Second, these are the sincere and true words of the Tathāgata, and for this reason they are called truth. Third, the teaching that speaks of existence and non-existence can truly express the Way, and for this reason it is called truth. Why are the teachings spoken by tīrthikas not called truth? What tīrthikas speak cannot express the Way, and therefore cannot be called truth. What the Buddhas speak can truly express the Way, and for this reason it is called truth. Fourth, preaching the Dharma can truly benefit conditions/beings, and for this reason it is called truth. Tīrthikas preaching the Dharma cannot truly benefit conditions/beings, and cannot be called truth. Buddhas and bodhisattvas can truly benefit conditions/beings, and so it is called truth. Fifth, what is spoken is not inverted, and for this reason it is called truth. Just as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra explains the meaning of the one real truth: what the Tathāgata speaks has no inversion and is called the one real truth. Here it is also like this: because what is spoken is not inverted, it is called truth. What tīrthikas speak is entirely inverted, and cannot be called truth. What Buddhas and bodhisattvas speak has no inversion, and for this reason it is called truth. Sixth, obtaining awakening as it truly is, it is spoken as it truly is, and for this reason it is called truth. Thus the sūtra states: "Speaker of what is as it is, speaker of reality, speaker of what is not different, speaker of what is not deceptive." This refers to the Tathāgata's sincerity and non-deceptiveness, and therefore the teaching is called truth. Next, explaining truth from perspective. By what cause and condition is it called truth? Is it named from the sentiment of judgment, designated from the object, or named from the understanding? It is explained: Truth from perspective is named from the two sentiments and understandings. But this meaning has two types: First, determining the two truths from perspective by success and failure. Existence being real for the ordinary person is called conventional truth; emptiness being real for the noble one is called ultimate truth. This existence is existence according to the sentiment of judgment; this emptiness is emptiness according to true understanding. Existence from the sentiment of judgment is failure; emptiness from true understanding is success. This determines the two truths in terms of the sentiment of judgment and true understanding. How is this known to be so? Thus the treatise says: "All phenomena are empty in nature; the world, being inverted, calls them existing, which is called conventional truth. The noble ones truly know that their nature is empty, which is called ultimate truth." Since it says "truly know that their nature is empty," this is true understanding. Earlier it said "inverted, calls them existing," so this is the sentiment of judgment. If so, we know that this determines the two truths from perspective by success and failure in terms of the sentiment of judgment and true understanding. Second, determining the two truths from perspective in terms of two judgments: just as form has never been empty or existing, the ordinary person judges form to be existing, which is real for the ordinary person and called truth; the noble one judges form to be empty, which is real for the noble one and called truth. These instances of existence and non-existence are both sentiments of judgment, and therefore are both failures. Since ordinary persons judge it as existing and noble ones judge it as empty, both this emptiness and this existence must be washed away and broken down: there is no such existence and no such emptiness; once they are completely washed pure, only then can conditioned emptiness and existence be explained. Conditioned emptiness and existence are precisely non-empty-or-existing emptiness and existence; once one recognizes non-empty-or-existing emptiness and existence, one awakens to the fact that emptiness and existence are not empty or existing. The former emptiness and existence are both the illnesses to be treated, and therefore are both failures. It is through such meaning that it is called truth as teaching, and through such meaning that it is called truth from perspective. Are these the master's words or not? Indeed, these are truly the master's words. Next, posing a doubt and objection to consider. What is it? In preaching the Dharma relying on truth from perspective, is truth from perspective an object or not? If it is not an object, it contradicts the text of the treatise. The treatise says: "The noble ones truly know that all phenomena are empty in nature." True knowledge is cognition; cognition must have an object; emptiness of nature is the object, and true knowledge is cognition. If so, the two truths are objects. Relying on the objects of the two truths to preach the Dharma for sentient beings—if one manages to conform to the text of the treatise, it turns into the other school's doctrine! The others also say: the two truths are objects, and speaking the two truths is called teaching, hence there are the Dharma-jewel of spoken teachings and the Dharma-jewel of objects/realms. The four truths and two truths are the Dharma-jewel of objects/realms; speaking the four truths and two truths is the Dharma-jewel of spoken teachings. Now you are also like this; how is it different from the others? If you say, "I am not like this," then you contradict the text of the treatise. The text of the treatise says: "The Buddhas rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma for sentient beings"; how can you say that the two truths are teaching? Neither progressing nor retreating works: if you support the treatise text, you are identical to the others; if you are not identical to the others, you contradict the treatise text. Also posing an objection that covers and corners the answer: There is truth from perspective and there is truth as teaching. Truth from perspective has ultimate and conventional; does truth as teaching have ultimate and conventional or not? If one says that truth as teaching also has ultimate and conventional, the Tattvasiddhi school is finished, while the Three Treatises school remains unknown. How is the Tattvasiddhi school finished? Now let us ask you: does speaking of the conventional mean the speech is conventional, and speaking of the ultimate mean the speech is ultimate or not? If you say the speech is ultimate, you contradict your own principle. Why? According to your principle, truth as teaching is verbal speech, which is exclusively conventional; therefore one cannot say that truth as teaching possesses both ultimate and conventional. If you fear altering your words and say that the speech is not ultimate, how can you say that truth as teaching has both ultimate and conventional? If it is the explanation of the Tattvasiddhi master, they then say: the two truths of ultimate and conventional are objects. Objects have ultimate and conventional; speaking of the ultimate and speaking of the conventional—these two speeches are both conventional truth. The ultimate cannot be spoken; it relies on conventional truth to be spoken. Now I ask the Three Treatises masters: in the other school, ultimate and conventional are objects, and among objects there are ultimate and conventional. You now explain that the two truths are portals of teaching; does truth as teaching also have ultimate and conventional or not? Those who do not understand the principle will certainly say that truth as teaching also has ultimate and conventional. Why? There are two kinds of truths: there is truth from perspective and truth as teaching; truth from perspective has ultimate and conventional, and truth as teaching also has ultimate and conventional.