二諦義 1.48

1.48

次問：既皆為顯道者，何不發初即為說非有非無令悟正道，而忽諸法非有非無，說有無表不有無，然後令悟非有非無。何乃迂迴者耶？解云：此可有兩意，今且作一種釋之。明若直說瓶衣等有是世諦，此賢聖真知諸法畢竟空名真諦，此已恦潛不受。明諸法實錄是有，那得言究竟無耶？此尚不受，何況說諸法非是有非是無，豈當信之？為此人故，以方便於無名相中假名相說，說有是凡諦、說空是聖諦，令其改凡學聖。如《法華》所明「眾生諸根鈍，著樂癡所盲。如斯之等類，云何而可度？諸法寂滅相，不可以言宣。我寧不說法，疾入於涅槃。」若直說世諦有、真諦無，何事言不可說耶？只為諸法非有非無，所以不可作有無說。為此故方便說三。脫珍御服，得近其子；不得正門見，於窓牖中窺之耳。若不脫珍御服，不得化子。今亦爾，若即說非有非無即不受，所以方便前說有無，令悟不有無也。若爾，斯乃物自迂迴，非關佛故曲巧也。廣洲大高釋二諦義，亦辨二諦是教門也。彼舉指為喻。為人不識月，舉指令得月。彼云：「不識月故，尋指得月。雖尋指知所指，所指竟非指。所指竟非指，指月未嘗同。尋指知所指，所指因指通。所指所指通，通之由神會。指月未嘗同，所指恒指外。」又云：「真諦以本無受秤、俗諦以假有得名，假有表有不有，為息斷見，非謂有也；本無表無不無，為除常見，非謂無也。言有不畢有、言無不畢無，名相未始一，所表未始殊。」此意明因二諦教悟不二，不二是所表；如因指得月，月是所表也。古人釋與今意同也。今明二諦如指，為小兒不識月。此為小兒，不為大老子。大老子知月，何須為？為小兒不識月，故舉指令識月。凡夫眾生亦爾，不識理故，須二諦教。故經云「眾生癡如小兒，亦名著者」，故不得前說不二之法也。前已作一種釋，明如須依二諦說法，不得發始即說諸法非有非無。何者？說有是世諦、說空是真諦，已驚潛不受，況為說非有非無耶？如脫珍御服也。今更作一種釋，明依二諦說，不得說非有非無也，然前須作一問然後乃得釋之。

The next question asks: Since both are for the sake of revealing the Way, why not right from the beginning explain non-existence and non-non-existence for them to awaken to the correct Way, rather than passing over the non-existence and non-non-existence of phenomena, explaining existence and non-existence to indicate neither existence nor non-existence, and only then causing them to awaken to non-existence and non-non-existence? Why this roundabout detour? The explanation states: There can be two meanings here; for now, we will offer one explanation. It explains that if one directly states that the existence of vases, robes, and the like is conventional truth, and that the sages' true knowledge of all phenomena as ultimately empty is ultimate truth, they are already startled and hide away, unwilling to accept it. They declare that the genuine reality of all phenomena is existence—how could one say they are definitively non-existent? If they cannot even accept this, how much less could they believe it if one said that all phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent? For the sake of such people, by skillful means, designations and characteristics are provisionally spoken of within what is devoid of designations and characteristics: explaining existence as the ordinary truth and explaining emptiness as the noble truth, so that they may change from ordinary people and study sagehood. As the Lotus Sūtra explains: 'Sentient beings have dull faculties; attached to pleasure, they are blinded by delusion. How can such kinds as these be saved? The quiescent aspect of all phenomena cannot be expounded in words. Rather than expounding the Dharma, I will quickly enter into nirvāṇa.' If one simply explained conventional truth as existence and ultimate truth as non-existence, why would one say it is inexpressible? It is precisely because all phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent that they cannot be spoken of as existence or non-existence. For this reason, the three [vehicles] were provisionally explained. One removes one's fine and precious garments to be able to approach one's son; if one cannot see him through the main gate, one only peers at him through a window. If one does not remove one's fine and precious garments, one cannot convert the son. Here it is the same: if one immediately spoke of neither existence nor non-existence, they would not accept it; therefore, by skillful means one first speaks of existence and non-existence, causing them to awaken to neither existence nor non-existence. If so, this is a detour on the part of beings themselves, not a deliberate contrivance on the part of the Buddha. Dagao of Guangzhou, in explaining the meaning of the two truths, also distinguished that the two truths are pedagogical methods. He brought up pointing with a finger as an analogy. Because a person does not recognize the moon, one raises a finger so that they can attain the moon. He said: 'Because they do not recognize the moon, by following the finger they attain the moon. Although by following the finger they know what is pointed to, what is pointed to is ultimately not the finger. What is pointed to is ultimately not the finger; the finger and the moon have never been identical. Following the finger, one knows what is pointed to; what is pointed to is communicated by relying on the finger. When what is pointed to is communicated, this communication arises from mental accord. The finger and the moon have never been identical; what is pointed to is constantly outside the finger.' He also said: 'Ultimate truth receives its name through original non-existence; conventional truth gets its designation through provisional existence. Provisional existence indicates an existence that is non-existent, in order to quell the view of annihilationism—it does not mean there is existence. Original non-existence indicates a non-existence that is not non-existent, in order to eliminate the view of eternalism—it does not mean there is non-existence. Speaking of existence is not definitive existence; speaking of non-existence is not definitive non-existence. Names and characteristics have never been one; what is indicated has never been distinct.' The meaning here clarifies that by relying on the teaching of the two truths, one awakens to the non-dual; the non-dual is what is indicated. It is like attaining the moon by relying on a finger: the moon is what is indicated. The ancients' explanation agrees with our present meaning. Now we clarify that the two truths are like a finger, intended for young children who do not recognize the moon. This is for young children, not for venerable elders. Venerable elders know the moon—why would it be needed for them? Because young children do not recognize the moon, one raises a finger so that they can recognize the moon. Ordinary sentient beings are also like this: because they do not recognize the principle, they require the teaching of the two truths. Thus a sūtra says: 'Sentient beings are as ignorant as young children, and are also called the attached.' Therefore, one cannot first expound the non-dual Dharma. A first explanation has already been given above, clarifying that because one must expound the Dharma relying on the two truths, one cannot from the outset state that all phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent. Why? Stating that existence is conventional truth and emptiness is ultimate truth already makes them startled and hide away, unwilling to accept it; how much less if one expounded neither existence nor non-existence for them? It is like removing one's fine and precious garments. Now we provide another explanation, clarifying that when expounding in reliance on the two truths, one cannot speak of neither existence nor non-existence. However, one must first pose a question before one can explain it.