二諦義 1.51

1.51

問：從來明有三諦義，一世諦、二真諦、三非真非俗諦。故經云「有諦、無諦、中道第一義諦。」若爾，云何言諸佛常依二諦說法耶？諸佛常依二諦說法？此即時長佛廣，常依故時長、諸佛故佛廣。此即十方三世諸佛常依二諦說法，那得有三諦？既有三諦，何得復言常依二諦耶，解云：常依二諦說法，不妨三諦；雖有三諦，不乖常依二諦說法。何者？今真俗是二諦，攝真俗二為世諦、不真俗為第一義。若爾，唯是二諦，故云諸佛常依二諦說法也。次時明二諦廢立義。問：有無表不有無，悟不有無時，為廢有無、為不廢耶？次結二難。若悟不有無廢有無，如得月忘指者，不然。何者？本了有無得不有無，若廢有無即無有無，無有無寧有不有無？《涅槃經》云「菩薩具二莊嚴，即能解知一種二種。若言無一二者，是義不然。何以故？若無一二，云何得說無一無二？要由一二得有無一二。」若爾，要由有無得悟不有無，何得廢耶？若便不廢有無者，亦不然。若不廢有無者，何得從來云得月忘指、會理忘筌耶？師解云：具有廢不廢義。所言廢者，約謂情邊，即須廢之。何者？明汝所見有者，竝顛倒所感，如瓶衣等皆是眾生顛倒所感、妄想見有。故《中論》云「若謂以現見而有生滅者，即為是癡妄而見有生滅。顛倒感得此眼，求此眼不可得，諸法亦不可得，特癡妄見有。」是故須廢也。此則用空廢有，若更著空亦復須廢。何者？本由有故有空；既無有，何得有空？故《中論》云「若使無有有，云何當有無」，又云「若有不空法，可有於空法。不空法尚無，何得有空法？」此之空有皆是情謂，故皆須廢。乃至第三節，謂情言有亦皆須廢。何者？竝是謂情，皆須廢之也。

Question: Traditionally, it has been explained that there is the meaning of three truths: first, conventional truth; second, ultimate truth; third, the truth of neither ultimate nor conventional. Thus the sūtra says: "The truth of existence, the truth of non-existence, and the middle way ultimate truth." If so, how can it be said that the Buddhas always rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma? That the Buddhas always rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma—this means the time is vast and the Buddhas are extensive: because of "always relying," the time is vast; because of "the Buddhas," the Buddhas are extensive. This means that the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times always rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma; how could there be three truths? Since there are three truths, how can it further be said that they always rely on the two truths? Explanation: That they always rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma does not conflict with the three truths; although there are three truths, it does not contravene always relying on the two truths to preach the Dharma. How so? Now, the ultimate and the conventional are two truths; subsuming both the ultimate and conventional as the conventional truth, and neither ultimate nor conventional as the ultimate [truth]. If so, there are only the two truths; therefore it is said that the Buddhas always rely on the two truths to preach the Dharma. Next is to explain the meaning of setting aside and retaining the two truths. Question: Existence and non-existence indicate neither existence nor non-existence; when one awakens to neither existence nor non-existence, are existence and non-existence set aside, or are they not set aside? Next, the two objections are formulated. If upon awakening to neither existence nor non-existence one sets aside existence and non-existence, like forgetting the finger upon grasping the moon, that is not correct. How so? Originally, through understanding existence and non-existence one attained neither existence nor non-existence; if one sets aside existence and non-existence, then there would be no existence and non-existence; without existence and non-existence, how could there be neither existence nor non-existence? The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The bodhisattva possesses the two adornments, and is thus able to understand and know one kind and two kinds. If one says that there is neither one nor two, this meaning is not correct. Why? If there were neither one nor two, how could one speak of neither one nor two? One must rely on one and two to have neither one nor two." If so, one must rely on existence and non-existence to attain awakening to neither existence nor non-existence; how could they be set aside? If one then does not set aside existence and non-existence, that is also not correct. If one does not set aside existence and non-existence, why has it traditionally been said: "forgetting the finger upon grasping the moon, forgetting the fish trap upon encountering the principle"? The Master explains: It has both the meanings of setting aside and not setting aside. What is called 'setting aside' is from the side of conceptual attachment, where it must be set aside. How so? It is explained that what you see as existing is all what is produced by inversion; like vases and robes, they are all produced by sentient beings' inversion and seen as existing through false conceptualisation. Thus the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "If one claims that through direct observation there is arising and ceasing, that is deluded falsehood seeing arising and ceasing. Through inversion one obtains this eye; seeking this eye it cannot be found, and all phenomena also cannot be found; it is solely through deluded falsehood that one sees existence." Therefore it must be set aside. This uses emptiness to set aside existence; if one further clings to emptiness, it also must be set aside. Why? Originally, because of existence there is emptiness; since there is no existence, how could there be emptiness? Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "If there is no existence, how could there be non-existence?" And it also says: "If there were a non-empty dharma, there could be an empty dharma. A non-empty dharma does not even exist; how could there be an empty dharma?" Both this emptiness and existence are conceptual attachments, and therefore must both be set aside. Up to the third tier, whatever is conceptually asserted to exist must also be set aside. Why? Because they are all conceptual attachments, they must all be set aside.