二諦義 2.52

2.52

次更正前二於諦。問：前二於諦，一往判有得失、有凡聖。故論云「諸法性空，世間顛倒謂有，於凡為實，名之為諦。諸賢聖真知顛倒性空，於聖是實，名之為諦。」有於凡實，凡但有有諦；空於聖實，聖但有空諦。如此已不？解云：然。一往於凡聖兩實名諦，有於凡實為諦、空於聖實為諦。若兩互望，二竝非諦。何者？有於凡是諦，空於凡非諦。凡夫謂瓶衣等法現見定有，故有為實，空非實；聖人瓶衣等空是實，瓶衣等有非實。故一家云：凡實為聖虛、聖實為凡虛，凡虛為聖實、聖虛為凡實。若爾，凡聖各有一諦，凡但有有諦、聖但有空諦也。難：凡但有有諦、聖但有空諦，亦應凡但有權智、聖但有實智。解云：有例不例。言例者，於兩情有二諦、於兩情有二智。凡作有解，凡有有智；聖作空解，聖有空智也。言不例者，不可言聖人但有一智，聖人具權實二智也。若言但有一智則謗聖人，信一半、不信一半。故經云「信六部、不信六部，信不具足。」今若言聖有空智無有智，則信不具足也。

Next, the former two truths from perspective are further corrected. Question: Previously, the two truths from perspective provisionally determined gain and loss, ordinary and noble. Therefore, the treatise states: 'All dharmas are in their nature empty; the worldly, due to inversion, claim existence, which from the ordinary [perspective] is real, and it is named truth. The noble ones truly know that inversion is in its nature empty, which from the noble [perspective] is real, and it is named truth.' Existence is real from the ordinary [perspective], so the ordinary only have the truth of existence; emptiness is real from the noble [perspective], so the noble only have the truth of emptiness. Is it like this? Explanation: Yes. Provisionally, what is real to both ordinary and noble is named truth: existence being real from the ordinary [perspective] is truth; emptiness being real from the noble [perspective] is truth. If viewed mutually, neither is a truth. How so? Existence from the ordinary [perspective] is truth, but emptiness from the ordinary [perspective] is not a truth. Ordinary persons claim that dharmas such as vases and clothes are presently seen to definitely exist; therefore, existence is real and emptiness is not real. For the noble ones, the emptiness of vases, clothes, and so forth is real, and the existence of vases, clothes, and so forth is not real. Therefore, one school says: 'What is real for the ordinary is unreal for the noble; what is real for the noble is unreal for the ordinary. What is unreal for the ordinary is real for the noble; what is unreal for the noble is real for the ordinary.' If so, the ordinary and the noble each have one truth: the ordinary only have the truth of existence, and the noble only have the truth of emptiness. Objection: If the ordinary only have the truth of existence and the noble only have the truth of emptiness, then likewise the ordinary should only have provisional cognition and the noble only have real cognition. Explanation: There are cases of analogy and non-analogy. Regarding the case of analogy: in the two dispositions there are two truths, and in the two dispositions there are two cognitions. The ordinary make an understanding of existence, so the ordinary have the cognition of existence; the noble make an understanding of emptiness, so the noble have the cognition of emptiness. Regarding the case of non-analogy: it cannot be said that the noble ones only have one cognition; the noble ones possess both provisional and real cognitions. If one says they only have one cognition, then one slanders the noble ones, having faith in one half and lacking faith in the other half. Therefore, the sūtra states: 'Having faith in six sections and lacking faith in six sections, faith is incomplete.' Now, if one says the noble have the cognition of emptiness and lack the cognition of existence, then faith is incomplete.