二諦義 2.84

2.84

問：若皆相待，師何意云真俗待諦、諦不待耶？解云：此語有意，人不解師語耳。原相待義，必須相顯相成，如長短相待，非短不長、非長不短，由長顯是短、由短顯是長，名曰相待。故《中論》云「非如長短彼此待他，而有無自性」也。若直云諦諦，若為得相顯？若為相成？故諦諦不得相待也。今言相待者，諦帶真俗，名真諦俗諦。論相待，由性空是真俗，則顯有是俗諦；亦由瓶衣等法是俗諦，顯性空是真諦。此則由真諦顯俗諦、由空諦顯有諦、由聖諦顯凡諦。就此義故，明二諦相待也。舉事如善人惡人，直言人不得相待。由此是善人，顯彼是惡人，善惡二人待，二諦亦爾也。次斷鄭二諦相待義，彈他釋非，顯山門正意。彈他者，凡彈兩人：一者彈成論、二斥學三論不得意者。彈成論者，彼釋俗諦審是浮虛，此解定非，今不將三論難，彼不學三論，聞三論不信。今將《涅槃經》文以彈之。經云「世人知者名為世諦，出世人知者名第一義諦。」汝若謂審浮虛是俗諦者，世人應知諸法審是虛假。既有此理，世人豈能知諸法虛假耶？世人既不知諸法虛假，故不得以審虛為俗諦也。今釋是諦實義，正會經文。世人所知，於世人是實，名為世諦；出世人所知，於出世人是實，名第一義諦。今得作此解，論釋如此，故云世若無論，即為邪智所障也。次斥學三論不得意者，明二諦真俗待非真俗。二諦待，此義不然，如前所彈。今反此，釋明真俗故宜相待，只二諦正論相待。何者？由二諦相待故有二諦，若不相待則無二諦、唯有一諦。何以故？若不相待，則無可簡別，混成一諦。要由相待顯別，所以得有二諦。雖二諦相待，要須真俗標別，由真諦顯是俗諦、由俗諦顯是真諦，故真俗二諦待。雖真俗二諦待，正是二諦待。正是二諦待，故經論皆云：諸佛常依二諦說法。二諦若不待則無二諦，無二諦佛無所依，故是二諦相待也。

Question: If all are mutually dependent, why did the Master say that ultimate and conventional depend on truth, while truth is not dependent? Explanation: These words have a purpose; people simply did not understand the Master's words. Originally, the meaning of mutual dependence requires manifesting each other and establishing each other, just as long and short are mutually dependent: without short there is no long, without long there is no short; by long it is manifested as short, by short it is manifested as long—this is called mutual dependence. Thus the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "It is not like long and short, or this and that, depending on another, yet existence and non-existence having intrinsic nature." If one merely speaks of truth and truth, how could they manifest each other? How could they establish each other? Therefore, truth and truth cannot be mutually dependent. What we now call mutual dependence means that truth carries the ultimate and conventional, being called ultimate truth and conventional truth. In discussing mutual dependence, through the nature of emptiness being the ultimate, it is manifested that existence is conventional truth; also, through phenomena like vases and clothing being conventional truth, it is manifested that the nature of emptiness is ultimate truth. This means that through ultimate truth, conventional truth is manifested; through the truth of emptiness, the truth of existence is manifested; through the truth of the noble, the truth of the ordinary is manifested. Based on this meaning, it clarifies the mutual dependence of the two truths. To give an analogy: it is like good persons and evil persons; merely speaking of "persons" cannot constitute mutual dependence. Through this one being a good person, that one is manifested as an evil person; the two persons, good and evil, are mutually dependent. The two truths are also like this. Next is to determine the meaning of the mutual dependence of the two truths, refuting others' incorrect explanations and revealing the correct intention of our tradition. In refuting others, two groups are refuted in all: first, refuting the Tattvasiddhi school; second, criticizing those who study the Three Treatises without grasping their purport. In refuting the Tattvasiddhi school: they explain conventional truth as being definitively insubstantial and false. This explanation is definitely wrong. We do not now use the Three Treatises to challenge them, for they do not study the Three Treatises and do not believe upon hearing the Three Treatises. We now use the text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra to refute them. The sūtra states: "What worldly persons know is called conventional truth; what world-transcending persons know is called ultimate truth." If you maintain that being definitively insubstantial and false is conventional truth, worldly persons should know that phenomena are definitively insubstantial and provisional. Given such a principle, how could worldly persons know that phenomena are insubstantial and provisional? Since worldly persons do not know that phenomena are insubstantial and provisional, one cannot take definitive insubstantiality as conventional truth. Now we explain that it means real and true, which correctly accords with the sūtra text. What worldly persons know is real to worldly persons and is called conventional truth; what world-transcending persons know is real to world-transcending persons and is called ultimate truth. Now we are able to produce this explanation because the treatise explains it like this; hence it is said that if the world lacked the treatises, it would be obstructed by mistaken cognition. Next, criticizing those who study the Three Treatises without grasping their purport: they clarify that the two truths are mutually dependent in terms of ultimate and conventional, not in terms of the two truths. This interpretation is not correct, as previously refuted. Now, reversing this, the explanation clarifies that because of the ultimate and conventional, they ought to be mutually dependent, and it is precisely the two truths that are discussed as mutually dependent. How so? Because the two truths are mutually dependent, there are two truths; if they were not mutually dependent, there would be no two truths, only one truth. Why so? If they were not mutually dependent, there would be nothing to distinguish them, and they would blend into one truth. It requires mutual dependence to manifest distinction; therefore, there can be two truths. Although the two truths are mutually dependent, it definitely requires ultimate and conventional to mark their distinction: through ultimate truth it is manifested as conventional truth, through conventional truth it is manifested as ultimate truth; hence, the two truths of ultimate and conventional are mutually dependent. Although the two truths of ultimate and conventional are mutually dependent, it is precisely the two truths that are dependent. Because it is precisely the two truths that are dependent, both sūtras and treatises say: "The Buddhas constantly teach the Dharma relying on the two truths." If the two truths were not mutually dependent, there would be no two truths; without two truths, the Buddha would have nothing to rely on. Therefore, it is the mutual dependence of the two truths.