二諦義 2.87

2.87

次更正前二於諦待義，明凡於諦無待義。但聖於諦有待義，有兩種待：一者知俗於聖虛，即虛實待；二者知俗於凡實，即兩實待、兩諦待也。凡於諦無兩種待：一者凡不知真，故無虛實待；二者凡不知真於聖實，故無兩實待。此則聖於有待、凡於無待。以聖於有待，是得是悟是因緣；以凡於無待，故是失是迷是自性。此正開能所得失凡聖故也。然二諦雖有十重，餘重不可要急，今遂要急者以辨之。《涅槃．聖行品》明十種二諦義，今次第依經釋之。經中，前文殊問、次如來釋。文殊問中有三：一牒、二定開、三詰難。文殊白佛言：「世尊所說世諦、第一義諦，其義云何？」即牒二諦。「世尊！第一義中有世諦不？世諦之中有第一義不？」即定開。「如其有者，即是一諦。」第三詰難。亦前是領佛語、次問佛語、第三難佛語。難中有二：初難第一義中有世諦義。然此中言有者，非如穴中有蛇、屋中有人，人屋二諦論有。今言有者，乃明世諦即第一義諦，二諦一義名之為有也。舉譬如僧佉因中有果，因果一體名之為有也。為是故難云「如其有者，即是一諦」也。「如其無者，將非如來虛妄說耶？」第二難第一義中無世諦。前難若有即是一，今難無則是二。如外道僧佉因中有果是一，衛世因中無果即是二。今亦爾，如其有即是一諦，如其無當知是二諦也。

Next, to further rectify the previous meaning of interdependence for the two perspectives: it is clarified that from the ordinary perspective of truth there is no meaning of interdependence. It is only from the noble perspective of truth that there is the meaning of interdependence, which has two kinds of interdependence: first, knowing the conventional to be insubstantial from the perspective of the noble one, which is the interdependence between the insubstantial and the real; second, knowing the conventional to be real from the perspective of the ordinary person, which is the interdependence between the two reals and the interdependence between the two truths. From the ordinary perspective of truth there are not these two kinds of interdependence: first, ordinary persons do not know the ultimate, and therefore lack the interdependence between the insubstantial and the real; second, ordinary persons do not know that the ultimate is real from the perspective of the noble one, and therefore lack the interdependence between the two reals. Thus from the noble perspective there is interdependence, and from the ordinary perspective there is no interdependence. Because from the noble perspective there is interdependence, it is attainment, awakening, and conditioned arising; because from the ordinary perspective there is no interdependence, it is loss, delusion, and self-nature. This precisely unfolds the active and passive, loss and attainment, ordinary and noble. Although there are ten layers of the two truths, the remaining layers are not urgent, so we now distinguish those that are urgent. The "Chapter on Noble Conduct" in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra explains ten kinds of meanings of the two truths; now we explain them in order according to the sūtra. In the sūtra, first Mañjuśrī asks, and next the Tathāgata explains. Mañjuśrī's inquiry has three parts: first, restating the topic; second, positing the alternatives; third, interrogating with an objection. Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: "What is the meaning of the conventional truth and ultimate truth spoken of by the World-Honoured One?" This restates the two truths. "World-Honoured One! Is there conventional truth within the ultimate? Is there ultimate truth within the conventional?" This posits the alternatives. "If there is, then it is just one truth." This is the third, interrogating with an objection. Alternatively, the first receives the Buddha's words, the second questions the Buddha's words, and the third objects to the Buddha's words. Within the objection there are two parts: first, objecting to the conventional truth existing within the ultimate truth. Here, saying "there is" is not like a snake existing in a hole or a person existing in a house, discussing the existence of person and house as two truths. Now, saying "there is" clarifies that conventional truth is itself ultimate truth, and the two truths being of one meaning is called "there is". To cite an analogy, it is like the Sāṃkhya view that the effect exists within the cause, where cause and effect being of one substance is called "there is". For this reason, the objection says: "If there is, then it is just one truth." "If there is not, would that not be the Tathāgata speaking falsely?" This is the second objection, that conventional truth does not exist within the ultimate truth. The previous objection was that if there is, it is one; the present objection is that if there is not, it is two. Just as the tīrthika Sāṃkhya holding that the effect exists within the cause is one, while the Vaiśeṣika holding that the effect does not exist within the cause is two. Here it is also like this: if there is, then it is one truth; if there is not, one should know it is two truths.