二諦義 3.27

3.27

問：若真諦絕名者，經中何故說有二諦耶？彼解云：經中說有二諦名者，借世諦名詺真，故有二諦也。次難彼義。汝真諦無名，借世諦名詺真諦者，世諦中何處有此名？真只是真如、法性，世諦中何處有此名耶？世諦中若有真如、法性之名，則可借此名來詺真諦。如詺苟為烏龍、白虎，世諦中有烏龍、白虎，可借此名詺苟為烏龍、白虎。世諦中何處有真如、法性名，而云借此名詺真諦耶？此難意出《大論》第一卷「人等世界故有，第一義則無。」如法性第一義故有，世界故則無。世界既無，何所借耶？而彼通云：聖人為作真諦名，故名真諦。脫爾者，借名義壞。聖人為作真諦名，則非借世諦名詺真諦也。又難云：真諦無名，借世諦名詺真，此名為得真、為不得真？名若得真則真有名；若名不得真，借名何益？然此難可通。何者？彼云：真諦無名，為人不知真無名，借名詺真，令人知真諦無名，故借名詺真也。此難他不著。今更難之。汝云：俗諦有名、真諦無名。名無名待不？若名待無名，則名無名待。若名無名待，則真俗待，那得從來云三假是世諦？故不可也。若名不待無名，名則無所因。名無所因，自然名也。彼云：名體待，何意無因耶？難：汝世諦名體待，世諦待何物？此已如前難云云。更難云：三有為、三無為待不？開善云：三有為、三無為皆世諦故，有為無為相待也。問：有為待無為，無為有體、無為有名。無為之名，為是有為、為是無為耶？解云：無為之名，是無常、是有為；無為常法，無名也。難無為之名是無常是有為無為常法無名也難：無為無名，無為既待；真諦無名，真諦亦待。真諦無名，真諦不待；無為無名，無為不待。此正就俱無名為難也。次明今釋二諦絕名。師從來有四句：俱絕、俱不絕、真絕世不絕、世絕真不絕。絕不絕既有四句，說不說亦有四句。世諦不絕真諦絕，此義可知。言二諦俱絕者，真諦絕四句、離百非，世諦亦絕四句、離百非。然此義從來所無，唯今家有也。言二諦皆絕四句、離百非者，俗不定俗、俗名真俗，真不定真、真名俗真，真俗假俗、俗真假真，假俗則百是不能是、百非不能非，假真亦爾。何者？假俗則是是不能是、百是亦不是，非非不能非、百非亦不非。假真即非是不能是、百是亦不是，是非不能非、百非亦不非。是故皆離四句、絕百非也。雖二諦皆離四句、絕百非，然二諦俱絕而大異。何者？俗諦絕則絕實，真諦絕則絕假。俗諦絕實者，是是則是實是、非非則是性非。以俗諦絕實，故是是不能是、百是所不是，非非不能非、百非所不非也。真諦絕假者，非是是假是、是非是假非。真諦絕假故，非但是是不能是、非是亦不是，非但非非不能非、是非亦不非。是是與非是，一切不能是；非非與是非，一切不能非。真諦雙絕世諦假實，此即漸捨明二諦皆絕義。俗諦絕實、真諦絕假實，此開八不義。至八不中，當廣解釋也。

Question: If ultimate truth transcends designations, why do the sūtras say that there are two truths? They explain: When the sūtras state the names of two truths, they borrow conventional designations to name the ultimate, and therefore there are two truths. Next, we object to their position: You say that ultimate truth has no designations, and one borrows conventional designations to name ultimate truth; where in conventional truth is there such a designation? The ultimate is simply tathatā and dharmatā; where in conventional truth are there such designations? If conventional truth had the designations of tathatā and dharmatā, then one could borrow these designations to name ultimate truth. Just as when calling a dog 'Black Dragon' or 'White Tiger', in conventional truth there are black dragons and white tigers, so one can borrow these names to call a dog 'Black Dragon' or 'White Tiger'. Where in conventional truth are there the designations 'tathatā' and 'dharmatā', that you say one borrows these designations to name ultimate truth? The point of this objection comes from the first roll of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa: 'Persons and the like exist from the perspective of the worldly, but do not exist in the ultimate sense.' Just as dharmatā exists from the perspective of the ultimate sense, but does not exist from the perspective of the worldly. Since it does not exist in the worldly, what could be borrowed? Yet they reply: The noble one created the designation 'ultimate truth' for its sake, and therefore it is named 'ultimate truth'. If so, the doctrine of borrowing designations collapses. If the noble one created the designation 'ultimate truth', then it is not borrowing conventional designations to name ultimate truth. Further objection: Ultimate truth has no designations, and one borrows conventional designations to name the ultimate; does this designation reach the ultimate, or does it not reach the ultimate? If the designation reaches the ultimate, then the ultimate possesses designations; if the designation does not reach the ultimate, what benefit is there in borrowing the designation? Yet this objection can be resolved. How? They say: Ultimate truth has no designations; because people do not know that the ultimate has no designations, one borrows designations to name the ultimate in order to cause people to know that ultimate truth has no designations; therefore one borrows designations to name the ultimate. This objection does not hit them. Now we raise another objection against them: You say that conventional truth has designations and ultimate truth has no designations. Are designations and designationlessness interdependent or not? If designations depend on designationlessness, then designations and designationlessness are interdependent. If designations and designationlessness are interdependent, then ultimate and conventional are interdependent; how could it have been said all along that the three provisionalities are conventional truth? Hence this is untenable. If designations do not depend on designationlessness, then designations have no cause. If designations have no cause, they are uncaused designations. They say: Designation and referent are interdependent; why would they be uncaused? Objection: In your conventional truth, designation and referent are interdependent; on what thing does conventional truth depend? This has already been objected to above, and so forth. Further objection: Are the three conditioned and three unconditioned interdependent or not? Kaishan says: Because the three conditioned and three unconditioned are both conventional truth, the conditioned and unconditioned are interdependent. Question: The conditioned depends on the unconditioned; the unconditioned has a referent, and the unconditioned has a designation. Is the designation of the unconditioned conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Explanation: The designation of the unconditioned is impermanent and conditioned; the eternal phenomenon of the unconditioned has no designation. Objection to 'the designation of the unconditioned is impermanent and conditioned, and the eternal phenomenon of the unconditioned has no designation': The unconditioned has no designation, yet the unconditioned is interdependent; ultimate truth has no designation, so ultimate truth is also interdependent. If ultimate truth has no designation and ultimate truth is not interdependent, then the unconditioned has no designation and the unconditioned is not interdependent. This precisely uses their both having no designations to formulate the objection. Next, we clarify our school's current explanation of the two truths transcending designations. The master has always held four propositions: both transcend, neither transcends, the ultimate transcends while the conventional does not transcend, and the conventional transcends while the ultimate does not transcend. Since transcending and not transcending have four propositions, expressing and not expressing also have four propositions. That conventional truth does not transcend while ultimate truth transcends is understandable. That both truths transcend means: ultimate truth transcends the four propositions and is free from the hundred negations; conventional truth also transcends the four propositions and is free from the hundred negations. However, this doctrine was never held in the past; it exists only in our school. Saying that both truths transcend the four propositions and are free from the hundred negations means: the conventional is not fixedly conventional, so the conventional is named 'ultimate conventional'; the ultimate is not fixedly ultimate, so the ultimate is named 'conventional ultimate'. The ultimate conventional is provisional conventional, and the conventional ultimate is provisional ultimate. As provisional conventional, a hundred affirmations cannot affirm it, and a hundred negations cannot negate it; provisional ultimate is also like this. How so? Provisional conventional is such that affirmative affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; negative negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Provisional ultimate is such that non-affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; non-negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Therefore, both are free from the four propositions and transcend the hundred negations. Although both truths are free from the four propositions and transcend the hundred negations, yet the transcendence of both truths has a great difference. How so? Conventional truth's transcendence transcends the real; ultimate truth's transcendence transcends the provisional. Conventional truth transcending the real means: affirmative affirmation is real affirmation, and negative negation is essential negation. Because conventional truth transcends the real, affirmative affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; negative negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Ultimate truth transcending the provisional means: non-affirmation is provisional affirmation, and non-negation is provisional negation. Because ultimate truth transcends the provisional, not only can affirmative affirmation not affirm it, but non-affirmation also cannot affirm it; not only can negative negation not negate it, but non-negation also cannot negate it. Affirmative affirmation and non-affirmation cannot affirm anything at all; negative negation and non-negation cannot negate anything at all. Ultimate truth transcends both the provisional and the real of conventional truth; this is explaining the meaning of both truths transcending through gradual relinquishment. Conventional truth transcending the real and ultimate truth transcending the provisional and real opens up the meaning of the eight negations. When we come to the eight negations, this will be explained in detail.