二諦義 3.36

3.36

問：虛空既然，數滅、非數滅云何？解云：小乘數滅、非數滅，還是無常，還是世諦，但昔方便說為常；望今大涅槃，皆無常也。若今日數滅，還是大涅槃，復不得為二諦攝；非數滅同虛空。然三無為法，虛空無為常通今昔，餘二無為昔無常今常。以今常故，皆不為二諦攝。《成論》明三無為一體，開善、莊嚴皆明三無為一體。此則開善明三無為皆為二諦攝，莊嚴明三無為不為二諦攝也。然彼明涅槃非續待二假，難解。佛果續金剛心，何故非相續假？涅槃待生死，何故非相待假耶？彼解云：涅槃是續而非假，涅槃是待而非假。三假中因成假，涅槃非因成亦非假。若是相續，則是續非假。若是相待，是待非假。假是虛妄、涅槃是實，故涅槃非假而有相待。虛實待假，非假待。佛果實續金剛心，佛果是實，故續而非假，非假故非世諦。既非假不可即空，故非真諦。引《涅槃經》云「若言解脫，譬如幻化。凡夫禍得解脫者即是磨滅；有智之人應當分別，人中師子雖有去來，常住無變。」故知涅槃非虛假也。開善將前文難。《大品》云「涅槃如幻如夢，設有一法出涅槃者亦如幻夢。」云何言非假耶？莊嚴解此懸去。彼云：《大品》明空蕩相，第二時教猶帶昔教意，故云如幻化。《涅槃》極說，明涅槃是妙有，亦名善有，不可空故。經云「空者二十五有，不空者大般涅槃。」若爾，莊嚴涅槃亦為二諦攝，亦不為二諦攝。《大品》至《法華》，明涅槃為二諦攝；常住教明涅槃不為二諦攝也。開善更將一經文難懸屈，經云「迦毘羅城空，大涅槃空。」既云大涅槃空，云何非二諦攝耶？彼即曲解言：涅槃空者，涅槃空無諸相，故云涅槃空。難役置不令得去。經親云「大涅槃空」，何時噵空無諸相？空無諸相，別復是一種語。涅槃空無十相。十相者，三界、男女相及五塵相。涅槃無此十相，故云涅槃空無諸相。何時明涅槃空耶？莊嚴終明涅槃不可空，明涅槃非磨滅法常住妙有，故非假也。然《仁王經》的有此文。《仁王》云「常住薩云若覺，超出世諦第一義諦外。」此的是一文，而諸法師不引為證。不引亦有意，言此經預疑，故不足為證也。兩家互相破如此。今時若為耶？解云：此兩家明涅槃未足，今更將《大論》及《中論》足之。《中論》偈云「一切實非實，亦實亦非實，非實非非實，是名諸佛法。」是四句束為三句：一切實非實為第一句，亦實亦非實為第二句，非實非非實為第三句。一切者，即是有為無為、生死涅槃，故云一切。非實者，明有為無為、生死涅槃皆是虛假，故云不實。一切實者，亦為無為一切法，皆入真如法性，故，云一切實。如眾川入於大海同一醎味，此即開善義也。亦實亦非實者，即是莊嚴義。莊嚴明生死非實、涅槃是實，故云亦實亦非實也。非實非非實者，非一切實、非一切不實，雙彈兩家，故明非實非非實也。是名諸佛法者，論釋云：若於此三種並皆得悟，則名佛法。若於此三種各執，則成戲論，不名佛法也。所以明此三種者，欲彈從來定執。論明此三種皆是如來方便，為眾生作如此說。若是實相，非三非不三，此三句並是方便。開善、莊嚴不知是方便，於方便中復不盡。何者？兩家所計，方便中一枝義耳。得方便一枝亦好，而復於一枝中各相破射、各執是非，謂是道理實說。開善云：二諦道理攝法盡；莊嚴云：道理不盡。為是義所以成失也。

Question: Space being such, what about cessation through deliberation and cessation not through deliberation? Answer: The Hīnayāna cessation through deliberation and cessation not through deliberation are still impermanent, and still conventional truth; they were only conventionally said to be eternal in the past as an expedient. In comparison with the Great Nirvāṇa of today, they are all impermanent. If it is the cessation through deliberation of today, it is still the Great Nirvāṇa, and furthermore cannot be subsumed by the two truths; cessation not through deliberation is the same as space. However, among the three unconditioned phenomena, space unconditioned has always extended through past and present; the other two unconditioned phenomena were impermanent in the past and are eternal today. Because they are eternal today, none of them are subsumed by the two truths. The *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* explains that the three unconditioned phenomena are of one identical nature; both Kaishan and Zhuangyan explain that the three unconditioned phenomena are of one identical nature. In this case, then, Kaishan explains that the three unconditioned phenomena are all subsumed by the two truths, whereas Zhuangyan explains that the three unconditioned phenomena are not subsumed by the two truths. However, that Zhuangyan explains nirvāṇa to not be the two provisionalities of succession and relativity is difficult to understand. The Buddha-fruit succeeds the vajra-like mind—why is it not the provisionality of succession? Nirvāṇa is relative to saṃsāra—why is it not the provisionality of relativity? He explains: Nirvāṇa is succession, but not provisional; nirvāṇa is relative, but not provisional. Among the three provisionalities, as for the provisionality of causal formation, nirvāṇa is neither causally formed nor provisional. If it is succession, then it is succession and not provisional. If it is relativity, it is relative and not provisional. Provisionality is false; nirvāṇa is real; therefore nirvāṇa is not provisional, yet has relativity. Falsehood and reality are relative to the provisional, not provisional relativity. The Buddha-fruit genuinely succeeds the vajra-like mind; the Buddha-fruit is real; therefore it is succession and not provisional. Because it is not provisional, it is not conventional truth. Since it is not provisional, it cannot be identical to emptiness; therefore it is not ultimate truth. He cites the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, which says: 'If it is said that liberation is like a phantom illusion, the liberation obtained by ordinary worldlings is indeed annihilation; a person of wisdom should distinguish that although the Lion among Men has coming and going, he is eternally present and changeless.' Therefore we know that nirvāṇa is not insubstantial or provisional. Kaishan used the earlier text to challenge him: The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* says, 'Nirvāṇa is like an illusion, like a dream; even if there were any phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa, it too would be like an illusion and a dream.' How can you say it is not provisional? Zhuangyan explained this away from a distance, saying: The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* explains the clearing away of characteristics; as the teaching of the second period, it still carries the intention of the earlier teaching, and therefore says it is like a phantom illusion. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* is the ultimate exposition, explaining that nirvāṇa is subtle existence, also named virtuous existence, because it cannot be empty. The sūtra says: 'What is empty is the twenty-five realms of existence; what is not empty is the Great Nirvāṇa.' If so, Zhuangyan's nirvāṇa is also subsumed by the two truths, and also not subsumed by the two truths. From the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* to the *Lotus Sūtra*, they explain that nirvāṇa is subsumed by the two truths; the teaching of eternal presence explains that nirvāṇa is not subsumed by the two truths. Kaishan further used another sūtra passage to challenge and corner him from afar. The sūtra says: 'The city of Kapilavastu is empty; the Great Nirvāṇa is empty.' Since it says the Great Nirvāṇa is empty, how is it not subsumed by the two truths? He then distorted the explanation, saying: Nirvāṇa being empty means that nirvāṇa is empty of all characteristics; hence it says nirvāṇa is empty. [Kaishan] pressed him hard and would not let him get away with it: The sūtra explicitly says 'the Great Nirvāṇa is empty'—when did it ever say 'empty of all characteristics'? 'Empty of all characteristics' is an entirely different kind of phrasing. Nirvāṇa is empty of the ten characteristics. The ten characteristics are: the three realms, the characteristics of male and female, and the characteristics of the five sense-objects. Nirvāṇa lacks these ten characteristics; hence it is said that nirvāṇa is empty of all characteristics. When did it ever explain that nirvāṇa [itself] is empty? In the end, Zhuangyan explained that nirvāṇa cannot be empty, explaining that nirvāṇa is not an annihilated phenomenon, but eternally present subtle existence, and therefore not provisional. However, the *Renwang jing* indeed contains this passage. The *Renwang jing* says: 'The eternally present sarvajñā-awakening transcends beyond the conventional truth and the ultimate truth.' This is indeed a passage, but the masters do not cite it as evidence. In not citing it there is also a purpose: they say that this sūtra is beforehand suspect, and thus insufficient to serve as evidence. The two schools mutually refuted each other in this manner. How should it be understood at present? Answer: These two schools' explanations of nirvāṇa are incomplete; now we will further complete them using the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. A verse in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* says: 'Everything is real, not real, / Both real and not real, / Neither real nor not real: / This is called the Dharma of all Buddhas.' These four lines are condensed into three lines: 'Everything is real, not real' is the first line; 'both real and not real' is the second line; 'neither real nor not real' is the third line. 'Everything' refers to conditioned and unconditioned, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; hence it says 'everything'. 'Not real' explains that conditioned and unconditioned, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are all insubstantial and provisional; hence it says 'not real'. 'Everything is real' means that all phenomena, conditioned and unconditioned, all enter the True Suchness of the Dharma-nature; hence it says 'everything is real'. Just as the many rivers enter the great ocean and share the same single salty taste, this is precisely Kaishan's position. 'Both real and not real' is precisely Zhuangyan's position: Zhuangyan explains that saṃsāra is not real and nirvāṇa is real; hence it says 'both real and not real'. 'Neither real nor not real' means neither that everything is real nor that everything is unreal, dual-reproving both schools; hence it explains 'neither real nor not real'. 'This is called the Dharma of all Buddhas': the commentary explains that if one attains awakening to all three of these together, then it is called the Buddha's Dharma; if one clings to each of these three individually, then it becomes conceptual proliferation and is not called the Buddha's Dharma. The reason for explaining these three is to reprove longstanding fixed attachments. The commentary explains that these three are all the expedient means of the Tathāgata, spoken in this manner for sentient beings. If it is the true mark of reality, it is neither three nor not-three; these three lines are all expedient means. Kaishan and Zhuangyan did not realize they are expedient means, and within these expedient means they were also incomplete. Why? What the two schools clung to was merely a single branch of meaning within expedient means. To grasp a single branch of expedient means is also fine, but furthermore within that single branch they mutually attacked and shot at each other, each clinging to their own right and wrong, claiming that this was the real exposition of the principle. Kaishan said: The principle of the two truths subsumes phenomena exhaustively; Zhuangyan said: As a principle it is not exhaustive. It is on account of this meaning that it resulted in an error.