二諦義 1.16

1.16

Question: Since it says that all conventional truths, from the perspective of the Tathāgata, are ultimate truth, can one also say that all ultimate truths, if from the perspective of ordinary beings, are conventional truth? / Explanation: It is indeed so; this simply comes from the text of the treatise. The treatise states: "As for conventional truth, all dharmas are of the nature of emptiness, yet the world inverted[ly] regards them as existing; from the perspective of worldly people, this is real, and it is called truth." In explaining conventional truth, it first brought forward "all dharmas are of the nature of emptiness" to explain it, clarifying that all dharmas are of the nature of emptiness, but the world inverted[ly] regards them as existing, which is real from the perspective of worldly people, and called truth. You should know that all ultimate truths, from the perspective of ordinary beings, are conventional truth. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "All dharmas have no existence, yet exist in this manner; existing in this manner, they have no existence." Existing in this manner, from the perspective of the noble person, has no existence, which means conventional truth is ultimate truth. Having no existence, from the perspective of ordinary beings, exists in this manner, which means ultimate truth is conventional truth.