肇論 1.20

1.20

An objection states: The true mind of the sage shines uniquely bright, illuminating thing after thing; responding and engaging without fixed direction, its movements meet with affairs. Because it illuminates thing after thing, its knowing leaves nothing out; because its movements meet with affairs, its meetings do not miss the opportune moment. Because its meetings do not miss the opportune moment, there must be a meeting with what can be met; because its knowing leaves nothing out, there must be a knowing of what can be known. Because there must be a knowing of what can be known, the sage does not know in vain; because there must be a meeting with what can be met, the sage does not meet in vain. Since he already knows and already meets, why say 'unknowing' and 'unmeeting'? If one forgets knowing and abandons meeting, this is merely that the sage has no selfish partiality in knowing and meeting, in order to fulfill his own selflessness. This can be called not taking ownership of his knowing; how can it be deemed 'unknowing'?