肇論疏 2.45

2.45

第二、正致問也。文中有二：前，通問；後，別問。今初。通之中，先牒前文，然後作問也。夫聖心冥寂下，正作問也。謂冥然寂然，理之至極，與空無同也。不疾而疾不徐而徐者，謂至人神變寬急也。不疾而疾則無定疾，不徐而徐則無定徐也。此語出《莊子》。《莊子外篇．天道章》云：桓公讀書於堂上，輪扁斵輪於堂下。釋搥鑿而上問桓公曰：敢問公之所讀者何言？公曰：聖人之言也。曰：聖人在乎？公曰：已死矣。曰：然則公之所讀者，古人之糟粕而已矣。桓公曰：寡人讀書，輪人安得議！有說則可，無說則死。輪扁曰：臣也，以臣之事觀之，斵輪徐則甘而不固，疾則苦而不入。不徐不疾，得於手應於心，口不能言也，而有數存乎其間。臣不能以喻臣之子，臣之子亦不能受之於臣，是以行年七十而老斵輪。古人與其不可傳者死矣。然則公之所讀者，古人之糟粕已矣。是以知不廢寂下，明動靜不二也。運物成功者，運轉眾生令向善道，功業成也。雖處有名之中而遠與無名同者，《老子》云：無名天地之始，有名萬物之母。意云有名是有也，無名是無也。聖人雖在有而同無也。斯理之玄固常所彌昧者，《爾雅》云：固，久也。彌，益也。昧，冥也。此理玄妙，常來久所昧處，非但於今論方始生疑也。但今談者下，第二別問也。總有三問：第一問智體是有知是無知；第二問照境有相無相；第三問境智相對有是無是、有當無當。今初。言談者，自謂也。所疑於高論，謂疑於肇法師之論耳。欲求聖心之異者，為有知邪、為無知耶？為謂窮靈極數妙盡冥符耶者，此是有知也。為當窮般若之靈照、極聖智之心數，妙能盡知冥符法性耶？為將心體自然靈怕獨感耶者，為當般若之體自然無知、精靈恬泊，不與眾生相感應耶？然則寂照之名故是定慧之體者，雖無所不知，以慧為體，故是知也。而言定者，定心知法，名為定慧耳。此言定慧為體，猶是十大地中心數定也。慧以為般若體耳。十心數者，所謂想、欲、觸、慧、念、思、解脫、境、定、受也。則群數之應固以幾乎息矣者，若自然寂泊無所感應，此則無知。固者，《易》注云：固，牢也。幾者，此字凡有三音：一者「機」音；二者「紀」音；三者「祈」音。《易》云：知幾其神乎。又云：幾者動之微。此是「機」音也。如人幾歲，此是「紀」音。今云幾者，是「祈」音也。《論語》云：不幾乎一言而可以興邦。此是「紀」音也。《左傳》注云：幾，近也。郭象注《莊子》云：幾，盡也。夫心數既玄下，覆前句也。聖人心數既玄，何謂更有其照？照謂慧也。略，不言定。具足應言心數既玄，何得孤運定慧，以定慧為體乎？神淳化表下，覆後句也。聖人既心神恬泊淳和，在世間之表，何得復有慧明獨存，不與眾生相應會乎？當有深證者，應當有別深證悟，更為我辨之。《廣雅》云：辨，別也。疑者當以下，第二、問照境有相無相也。文中有二：前明覩變之知應是有，後明覩變之知異無相。覩變之知若是有，何得言無知？覩變之知異無相，當知必是有也。撫會者，撫化眾生，與緣契會也。應機者，應接機緣也。覩變者，覩見變動也。而論旨云本無惑取者，汝論但云無有惑取之知，不可以知名之，而未言所以不惑取之意者也。謂宜先定聖人下，第二、明覩變之知異無相也。為當見空、為當見有耶？見無相即是見空，見變動即是見有。而言惑者，兼見有也。若覩其變下，若見變動，即是有相，非無相也。若唯照無相下，若俱見空，則不見有眾生可撫接教化也。無會可撫而有撫會之功下，既無會可撫，何言聖人有撫會之功耶？幸復誨之者，幸復示誨。誨，教也。論云無當則物無不當下，第三明境智相對有是無是、有當無當也。先牒，後難。今初牒也。夫無當下，正難也。無當而物無不當，乃是當無，故云至當。無是而物無不是，乃是是無，故云真是。斯則有是有當，何謂無是無當乎？若謂至當非常當下，若言當無為至當，非謂當有是常當；是無為真是，非謂是有之常是者，理固應然。常是常當是惑，至當真是是悟，此兩義本別，不須論也。汝論本意亦不謂至當非常當為非當，真是非常是為非是也。以祛其惑者，祛，遣也。

Second, the actual raising of the questions. Within this text there are two parts: first, a general question; second, specific questions. Now, as for the first: within the general [part], he first cites the preceding text and then poses the question. From "Now, the sage's mind is profoundly quiescent..." onward, it directly poses the question. This means that profoundly and tranquilly, it is the ultimate reach of principle, identical with emptiness and non-being. "Not hurried yet swift, not lax yet slow" refers to the consummate person's divine transformations being expansive or urgent. Being not hurried yet swift, there is no fixed swiftness; being not lax yet slow, there is no fixed slowness. These words come from the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi's "Outer Chapters: The Way of Heaven" says: Duke Huan was reading a book up in the hall, while Wheelwright Bian was chiseling a wheel down in the courtyard. Putting aside his hammer and chisel, he went up and asked Duke Huan, "May I venture to ask, whose words are you reading, my Lord?" The Duke said, "The words of the sages." [Bian] asked, "Are the sages still alive?" The Duke said, "They are already dead." [Bian] said, "Then what my Lord is reading is merely the dregs of the men of old!" Duke Huan said, "When I am reading, how dare a wheelwright criticize it! If you have an explanation, well and good; if not, you die!" Wheelwright Bian said, "Your servant looks at it from the perspective of his own work: in chiseling a wheel, if one is slow, it is loose and not firm; if one is hurried, it is tight and will not fit. Being neither slow nor hurried, one gets it in hand and responds from the heart; the mouth cannot express it in words, yet there is a knack in it. I cannot teach it to my own son, nor can my son receive it from me; this is why at the age of seventy I am still chiseling wheels in my old age. The men of old died together with what could not be transmitted. Thus what my Lord is reading is merely the dregs of the men of old!" From "Therefore knowing does not abandon quiescence..." onward, this clarifies that movement and stillness are non-dual. "Directing things and accomplishing merits" means moving sentient beings and causing them to turn toward the good path, so that meritorious deeds are accomplished. As for "though dwelling within the named, yet in the distance identical with the nameless": Laozi says, "Nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth; named is the mother of the myriad things." The meaning is that the named is existence and the nameless is non-existence. Although the sage is within existence, he is identical with non-existence. As for "the profundity of this principle is truly what has always been ever more obscure": the Erya says, "Gu (固) means long-standing. Mi (彌) means increasingly. Mei (昧) means obscure." This principle is profound and marvelous, an area that has long been obscure; it is not that doubt has only now arisen with the present treatise. From "Yet what is discussed now..." onward is the second part, the specific questions. Altogether there are three questions: the first asks whether the essence of wisdom possesses knowing or lacks knowing; the second asks whether the illuminated object has marks or lacks marks; the third asks, regarding the mutual opposition of object and wisdom, whether there is rightness or no rightness, whether there is fitness or no fitness. Now, as for the first: "What is discussed" refers to himself. "Doubts regarding the exalted treatise" refers to doubts regarding Master Sengzhao's treatise. "Wishing to inquire into the distinction of the sage's mind": is it with knowing, or is it without knowing? "Is it that it exhausts the spirit and reaches the utmost of mental factors, marvelously exhausting all and profoundly tallying?": this refers to having knowing. Does it exhaust the marvelous illumination of prajñā, reach the utmost of the mental factors of sagely wisdom, and marvelously succeed in knowing all and profoundly tallying with the Dharmatā? "Or is the essence of the mind naturally tranquil, secluded, and solitary in resonance?": is the essence of prajñā naturally non-knowing, refined and tranquil, not resonating with sentient beings? "If so, then the terms 'quiescence' and 'illumination' still have concentration and wisdom as their essence": although there is nothing it does not know, since it takes wisdom as its essence, it is still knowing. As for speaking of "concentration": when a concentrated mind knows dharmas, it is called "concentration and wisdom." Here, speaking of concentration and wisdom as the essence still refers to concentration among the mental factors of the ten mahābhūmikas; wisdom is taken as the essence of prajñā. The ten mental factors are sensation, desire, contact, wisdom, mindfulness, intention, resolution, sphere of cognition, concentration, and feeling. "Then the resonance of the various factors has indeed almost ceased": if it is naturally quiescent and without resonance, then this is non-knowing. As for gu (固): the Yijing commentary says, "Gu means firm." As for ji (幾): this character has altogether three pronunciations: first, the sound jī; second, the sound jǐ; third, the sound jī (qí). The Yijing says, "Knowing the subtle stirrings (jī)—is it not divine?" It also says, "Ji is the subtlety of movement." This is the jī sound. As in asking how many years (jǐ) old a person is, this is the jǐ sound. Here, when it says ji (幾), it has the qí sound. The Analects says, "Does it not come close (jī) to: 'In a single phrase one can prosper a state'?" This is the jǐ sound. The Zuozhuan commentary says, "Ji means close." Guo Xiang's commentary on the Zhuangzi says, "Ji means exhausted." From "Now since the mental factors are profound..." onward, it reviews the preceding clause. Since the sage's mental factors are profound, why say there is further illumination? "Illumination" refers to wisdom. It is abbreviated, not mentioning concentration. If stated fully, it should say: since the mental factors are profound, how can concentration and wisdom operate in isolation, taking concentration and wisdom as essence? From "The spirit is pure beyond the transformations..." onward, it reviews the subsequent clause. Since the sage's mental spirit is tranquil, pure, and harmonious beyond the worldly realm, how could a bright wisdom remain in isolation, not meeting and responding to sentient beings? "There must be a profound realization": there should be a distinct, profound realization and awakening; please distinguish it for me again. The Guangya says, "Bian (辨) means to distinguish." From "The doubter ought to..." onward is the second question, asking whether the illuminated object has marks or lacks marks. In this text there are two parts: first, clarifying that the knowledge that observes changes ought to be existent; second, clarifying that the knowledge that observes changes is distinct from the signless. If the knowledge that observes changes is existent, how can one say it is without knowing? If the knowledge that observes changes is distinct from the signless, one must know that it is definitely existent. "Guiding and meeting" means guiding and transforming sentient beings, tallying and meeting with conditions. "Responding to capacities" means responding to and receiving capacities and conditions. "Observing changes" means observing changes and movements. "Yet the import of the treatise says that originally there is no deluded grasping": your treatise merely says that there is no knowledge of deluded grasping and that it cannot be named 'knowing', but it has not yet stated the rationale for not deludedly grasping. From "It is proper first to determine the sage..." onward is the second part, clarifying that the knowledge that observes changes is distinct from the signless. Does he see emptiness, or does he see existence? Seeing the signless is seeing emptiness; seeing change and movement is seeing existence. As for mentioning "deluded," it also encompasses seeing existence. From "If he observes their changes..." onward: if he sees changes and movements, then there are marks, not signlessness. From "If he only illuminates the signless..." onward: if he entirely sees emptiness, then he does not see that there are sentient beings to be guided, received, and instructed. From "Having no encounter to guide yet possessing the merit of guiding encounters..." onward: since there is no encounter to guide, why say that the sage possesses the merit of guiding encounters? "It is hoped that you will again instruct me": it is hoped that you will again show and instruct me. Hui (誨) means to teach. From "The treatise says: if there is no fitness, then nothing is unfit..." onward is the third question, clarifying, regarding the mutual opposition of object and wisdom, whether there is rightness or no rightness, whether there is fitness or no fitness. First it cites, and then it challenges. Here first is the citation. From "Now, non-fitness..." onward, it directly challenges. Being without fitness yet nothing being unfit is actually being fit with non-being; hence it is called "ultimate fitness." Being without rightness yet nothing being not right is actually being right with non-being; hence it is called "true rightness." These, then, possess rightness and possess fitness; why say there is no rightness and no fitness? From "If one says that ultimate fitness is not ordinary fitness..." onward: if one says that being fit with non-being is ultimate fitness, not that being fit with existence is ordinary fitness; and that being right with non-being is true rightness, not that being right with existence is ordinary rightness—the principle should indeed be so. Ordinary rightness and ordinary fitness are delusion, while ultimate fitness and true rightness are awakening; these two meanings are fundamentally distinct and need not be debated. The original intent of your treatise also does not mean that ultimate fitness is not ordinary fitness, making it non-fitness, or that true rightness is not ordinary rightness, making it non-rightness. "To dispel their delusions": qu (祛) means to dispel.