肇論新疏 2.346

2.346

此論有無，含有二義：一有體無體之有無、二有知無知之有無，前後例同。此中之意，為超名相故曰無，無豈斷滅？為與事會故曰有，有豈常存？然般若，約表，四句皆是；約遮，四句皆非。表以顯德，遮以離過。故勝熱四火居之四邊，中有刀山，取之則四焚，虛心則通照；分別則割體，忘懷則斷惑。後有四句復拂，以真智妙存，且以有名之。此猶剩之，真豈屬有？以後例前，無亦強謂。

This discussion of being and non-being contains two meanings: first, the being and non-being of having substance or lacking substance; second, the being and non-being of having knowledge or lacking knowledge—preceding and succeeding instances follow this pattern. The meaning here is: because it transcends names and characteristics it is called non-being—how could non-being be annihilation? Because it accords with affairs it is called being—how could being be permanent existence? However, regarding prajñā, in terms of affirmation, all four propositions are correct; in terms of negation, all four propositions are incorrect. Affirmation reveals virtues; negation abandons errors. Thus, the four fires of Jayocmo reside on four sides, with a mountain of knives in the middle: grasping them burns on four sides, while an empty mind illuminates through; discriminating cuts the body, while forgetting attachments severs delusion. The subsequent four lines again sweep this away: because true knowledge marvelously exists, it is tentatively designated by 'being.' This is still redundant; how could the true belong to being? By using what follows to illustrate what precedes, non-being is also a forced designation.