大乘法苑義林章 1.56

1.56

第十歸攝二空者，諸論說二空：一生空、二法空。其唯識觀通二空觀，尋思實智通生、法空。為生所依，但說觀法，意求種智觀法空故，為於二空生正解故。然且法觀必帶生空，論誠說故。何故？翻悟說迷，生執必兼法執；返迷說悟，生空不帶法空。若以解有淺深，悟生未必悟法，亦應迷有深淺，迷用不迷於體。今釋：未有解體而迷用，所以生執必帶法執；悟淺不達深，生空未必帶法。《二十唯識》云「所執法無我，復依餘教入。」此唯識教入於法空，此說法空必依唯識，非唯識觀唯是法空，獨作生空亦唯識故。但是法空觀必定是唯識；生空不定，二乘生空非唯識觀故。唯識觀寬通生法觀，法觀義局唯是唯識。生觀義寬通唯識非唯識觀，唯識觀局有生空非。由此唯識觀望生空觀，順前句分別。無唯識觀非生空，但法空觀必帶生故。有生空觀非唯識，謂二乘生空觀。法空對唯識，亦復如是。有唯識非法空，謂唯生空唯識觀。無是法觀非唯識。此二作句，其義可知。總相而言，唯識通二空觀，論但說法觀為唯識觀者，據決定故。復說諸空互相攝者，如〈空章〉說。

Tenth, subsumption under the two śūnyatās. The various treatises speak of two śūnyatās: first, the śūnyatā of persons; second, the śūnyatā of dharmas. The consciousness-only contemplation encompasses contemplations of both śūnyatās; searchings (paryeṣaṇā) and authentic knowledges (yathābhūtaparijñāna) encompass the śūnyatās of both persons and dharmas. Because they serve as the support for living beings, [the texts] speak merely of contemplating dharmas; since the intention is to seek all-aspect knowledge (sarvākārajñatā) by contemplating the śūnyatā of dharmas, they are intended to generate correct understanding regarding both śūnyatās. Furthermore, the contemplation of dharmas necessarily entails the śūnyatā of persons, as the treatises explicitly state. Why is this? Turning from awakening to speak of delusion, clinging to persons necessarily includes clinging to dharmas; turning from delusion to speak of awakening, the śūnyatā of persons does not entail the śūnyatā of dharmas. If one maintains that understanding has degrees of shallowness and depth so that awakening to persons does not necessarily mean awakening to dharmas, then delusion should likewise have depth and shallowness—delusion about function without delusion about substance. Now it is explained: there has never been understanding of substance with delusion about function, which is why clinging to persons necessarily entails clinging to dharmas; yet awakening to what is shallow does not reach what is deep, so the śūnyatā of persons does not necessarily entail dharmas. The Viṃśikā states: "The non-self of imputed dharmas is further entered relying on other teachings." This consciousness-only teaching enables entry into the śūnyatā of dharmas; this means that the śūnyatā of dharmas must rely on consciousness-only, not that consciousness-only contemplation is exclusively the śūnyatā of dharmas, for singly practicing the śūnyatā of persons is also consciousness-only. Whatever is a contemplation of the śūnyatā of dharmas is definitely consciousness-only; the śūnyatā of persons is not definite, because the two vehicles' śūnyatā of persons is not a consciousness-only contemplation. Consciousness-only contemplation is broad, encompassing the contemplations of persons and dharmas; the contemplation of dharmas is narrow in scope, being exclusively consciousness-only. The contemplation of persons is broad in scope, encompassing both consciousness-only and non-consciousness-only contemplations; consciousness-only contemplation is narrow, possessing the śūnyatā of persons and not [being confined to it]. From this, comparing consciousness-only contemplation to contemplation of the śūnyatā of persons, they are distinguished according to the standard affirmative proposition: There is no consciousness-only contemplation that is not the śūnyatā of persons, because the contemplation of the śūnyatā of dharmas necessarily entails persons. There is contemplation of the śūnyatā of persons that is not consciousness-only, namely the contemplation of the śūnyatā of persons of the two vehicles. Correlating the śūnyatā of dharmas with consciousness-only is likewise so: There is consciousness-only that is not the śūnyatā of dharmas, namely the consciousness-only contemplation of merely the śūnyatā of persons. There is no contemplation of dharmas that is not consciousness-only. Formulating the propositions with these two, their meaning can be understood. In general terms, consciousness-only encompasses contemplations of both śūnyatās; the treatise speaks only of the contemplation of dharmas as consciousness-only contemplation based on its invariable certainty. Furthermore, regarding the mutual subsumption of the various śūnyatās, this is as explained in the "Chapter on Śūnyatā."