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大乘法苑義林章 2.46

大乘法苑義林章 2.46

Language
Classical Chinese

2.46.1

第三相攝問答門,於中有二:一諸教相攝、二問答分別。 諸教相攝者,如《涅槃經》第十三卷,迦葉菩薩白佛言:「昔佛一時在恒河岸尸首林中,爾時如來取其樹葉告諸比丘問其多少,乃至未所說法如林中葉等。 迦葉難言:『如來所了無量諸法,若入四諦即為已說,若不入者應有五諦。 』佛讚迦葉:『如是諸法悉已攝在四聖諦中。 』迦葉復言:『若在四諦,如來何故唱言不說? 』佛言:『善男子! 雖復入中,猶不名說。 何以故? 善男子! 知聖諦有二種智:一者中、二者上。 中者聲聞緣覺智,上者諸佛菩薩智。 善男子! 知諸陰苦名為中智。 分別諸陰有無量相悉是諸苦,非二乘所知,是名上智。 我於彼經曾不說之。 處界及色受想行識此為苦諦,并集滅道皆說有中智及上智。 善男子! 知世諦者是名中智,總相知故。 分別世諦有無量無邊,非一乘所知,是名上智,別相知故。 知一切行無常等,是第一義中智,總知三法印故。 知第一義無量無邊不可稱計,非二乘所知,是名上智。 』」古來解云:即恒沙萬德無量無邊。 此上經文因迦葉問二諦所由,世尊答中顯一一法皆有上中智,以明二諦別故。 諦者實也,凡夫不了,唯聖者證。 凡夫智緣而不能證,名為下智。 由對彼智,但說依中上二智立於二諦。 據實而說,法有勝劣、智有深淺,但立二諦。 今形凡位,智說中上,證實唯二。 若總相說,二乘形上下,即下上攝故。 如根上下智力,隨其所應,次經當顯。 文殊白言:「第一義中有世諦不? 世諦之中有第一義不? 如其有者,即是一諦。 如其無者,將非佛妄語耶? 」「善男子! 世諦者即第一義諦。 」此明二諦不相離義。 「世尊! 若爾者,即無二諦。 」佛言:「善男子! 有善方便,隨順眾生說有二諦。 善男子! 若隨言說即有二種,一者世法、二者出世法。 善男子! 如出世人之所知者,名第一義諦。 世人知者,名為世諦。 」此明依人智有淺深,顯二諦別。 「善男子! 五陰和合稱言某甲,凡夫眾生隨其所稱,是名世諦。 解陰無有某甲名字,離陰亦無某甲名字,出世之人如其性相而能知之,名第一義諦。 復次善男子! 或有法有名有實,或復有法有名無實。 善男子! 有名無實者,即是世諦。 有名有實者,是第一義諦。 善男子! 如我、眾生、壽命、知見、養育、丈夫、受者、作者、熱時之炎、乾闥婆城、龜毛、兔角、旋火之輪、諸陰界入,是名世諦。 苦集滅道名第一義諦。 善男子! 世法有五種:一者名世、二者句世、三者縛世、四者法世、五者執著世。 善男子! 云何名世? 男女、瓶衣、車乘、屋舍,如是等物是名名世。 云何句世? 四句一偈,如是等偈名為句世。 云何縛世? 捲合、繫結、束縛、合掌是名縛世。 云何法世? 如鳴鐘集僧、嚴鼓試兵、吹貝知時,是名法世。 云何執著世? 如望遠人有染衣者,生想執著言是沙門非婆羅門; 見有結繩橫佩身上,便生念言是婆羅門非沙門也,是名執著世。 善男子! 如是名為五種世法。 善男子! 若有眾生於如是等五種世法,心無顛倒如實而知,是名第一義諦。 復次善男子! 若燒、若割、若死、若壞是名世諦。 無燒、無割、無死、無壞是名第一義諦。 復次善男子! 有八苦相名為世諦。 無生、無老、無病、無死、無愛別離、無怨憎會、無求不得、無五盛陰,是名第一義諦。 復次善男子! 譬如一人多有所能,若其走時即名走者,或收刈時復名刈者,若作飲食名作食者,若治林木即名工匠,鍛金銀時言金銀師。 如是一人有多名字,法亦如是,其實是一而有多名。 依因父母和合而生名世諦,十二因緣和合生者名第一義諦。 」古來釋云:五陰和合以來,後之七番當法辨相。 於中麁分有二:一大、二小。

The third gate is the gate of mutual subsumption and questions-and-answers, which has two parts: first, mutual subsumption among the various teachings; second, differentiation through questions and answers. Regarding mutual subsumption among the various teachings: in the thirteenth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "Formerly, the Buddha was once on the bank of the Gaṅgā in the Śīsavā Grove. At that time, the Tathāgata picked up tree leaves and asked the monks how many they were, up to saying that the dharmas he had not yet spoken were like the leaves in the grove. Kāśyapa challenged him, saying: 'If the immeasurable dharmas understood by the Tathāgata enter into the four truths, then they have already been spoken; if they do not enter, there should be five truths.' The Buddha praised Kāśyapa: 'Such dharmas are all subsumed within the four noble truths.' Kāśyapa further said: 'If they are within the four truths, why did the Tathāgata proclaim that they have not been spoken?' The Buddha said: 'Good son! Although they enter into them, they are still not called spoken. Why is this? Good son! Knowing the noble truths involves two kinds of wisdom: the first is intermediate, and the second is superior. The intermediate is the wisdom of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; the superior is the wisdom of the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Good son! Knowing that the aggregates are suffering is called intermediate wisdom. Discerning that the aggregates have immeasurable aspects that are all various sufferings, which is not what the two vehicles know, is called superior wisdom. In that sūtra I never spoke of this. The āyatanas, dhātus, and rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna are the truth of suffering; and for origination, cessation, and the path as well, both intermediate wisdom and superior wisdom are spoken of. Good son! Knowing the worldly truth is called intermediate wisdom, because it knows the general aspect. Discerning that the worldly truth is immeasurable and boundless, which is not what the one vehicle knows, is called superior wisdom, because it knows the specific aspects. Knowing that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, and so forth, is the intermediate wisdom of paramārtha, because it generally knows the three Dharma seals. Knowing that paramārtha is immeasurable, boundless, and incalculable, which is not what the two vehicles know, is called superior wisdom.'" The ancient masters interpreted this as referring to the immeasurable and boundless myriad virtues, [numerous as] the sands of the Gaṅgā. The above passage of the sūtra is occasioned by Kāśyapa's question on the reason for the two truths, and in his reply the World-Honoured One reveals that each and every dharma has superior and intermediate wisdom in order to clarify the distinction between the two truths. A truth is what is real; ordinary persons do not understand it, and only the noble ones realize it. Ordinary persons' wisdom cognizes it as an object yet cannot realize it, and thus is called inferior wisdom. Because of contrast with that wisdom, it is merely said that the two truths are established based on the two wisdoms, intermediate and superior. Speaking according to reality, dharmas have superior and inferior [aspects], and wisdom has shallow and deep [levels]; yet only two truths are established. Here, by contrast with the stage of ordinary persons, wisdom is spoken of as intermediate and superior, while the realization of reality is only twofold. If spoken of in terms of general aspects, the two vehicles are inferior when contrasted with the superior, and thus are subsumed under the inferior and superior. According to the superiority or inferiority of their faculties and the power of their wisdom, as appropriate, the following sūtra passage will make this clear. Mañjuśrī said: "Is there a worldly truth within the paramārtha? Is there a paramārtha within the worldly truth? If there is, then it is a single truth. If there is not, would that not make the Buddha's words false?" "Good son! The worldly truth is none other than the paramārtha-satya." This clarifies the meaning of the non-separation of the two truths. "World-Honoured One! If that is so, then there are not two truths." The Buddha said: "Good son! There are skillful means that, in accord with sentient beings, speak of the existence of two truths. Good son! If according to linguistic expression, then there are two kinds: the first is worldly dharmas, and the second is transworldly dharmas. Good son! That which is known by transworldly persons is called paramārtha-satya. That which is known by worldly persons is called worldly truth." This clarifies that, based on persons, wisdom has shallow and deep [levels], revealing the distinction between the two truths. "Good son! When the five aggregates combine, they are called 'so-and-so'; ordinary sentient beings follow that designation—this is called the worldly truth. Understanding that within the aggregates there is no name of 'so-and-so', and that apart from the aggregates there is also no name of 'so-and-so', transworldly persons are able to know them according to their nature and characteristics—this is called paramārtha-satya. Furthermore, good son! There may be a dharma that has a name and has reality, or there may be a dharma that has a name but lacks reality. Good son! That which has a name but lacks reality is the worldly truth. That which has a name and has reality is paramārtha-satya. Good son! Such as the self, sentient being, lifespan, knower and seer, nourished one, puruṣa, experiencer, agent, mirage in the heat, city of gandharvas, tortoise hair, hare horns, circle of a whirling firebrand, the aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas—these are called the worldly truth. Suffering, origination, cessation, and the path are called paramārtha-satya. Good son! Worldly dharmas are of five kinds: the first is the world of names; the second is the world of phrases; the third is the world of binding; the fourth is the world of conventions; and the fifth is the world of attachment. Good son! What is the world of names? Men, women, pots, clothes, carts, and houses—such things as these are called the world of names. What is the world of phrases? A four-line verse—such verses as these are called the world of phrases. What is the world of binding? Rolling together, tying, binding, and joining palms—these are called the world of binding. What is the world of conventions? Striking the bell to gather the Saṅgha, beating the martial drum to inspect the troops, and blowing the conch to know the time—these are called the world of conventions. What is the world of attachment? Seeing from afar a person wearing dyed robes and generating the conceptual attachment, saying, 'This is a śramaṇa, not a brāhmaṇa'; seeing someone with a sacred cord tied across their body and generating the thought, saying, 'This is a brāhmaṇa, not a śramaṇa'—this is called the world of attachment. Good son! These are called the five kinds of worldly dharmas. Good son! If there are sentient beings who, with regard to these five kinds of worldly dharmas, have minds without error and know them as they truly are, this is called paramārtha-satya. Furthermore, good son! Burning, cutting, dying, and disintegrating are called the worldly truth. Non-burning, non-cutting, non-dying, and non-disintegrating are called paramārtha-satya. Furthermore, good son! The characteristics of the eight sufferings are called the worldly truth. No birth, no aging, no illness, no death, no separation from what is loved, no association with what is hated, no not-getting what is sought, and no five grasping aggregates—these are called paramārtha-satya. Furthermore, good son! Just as a single man has many capabilities: when he runs, he is called a runner; or when he harvests, he is called a harvester; when he prepares food, he is called a cook; when he works with wood, he is called a carpenter; and when he smiths gold and silver, he is called a goldsmith or silversmith. Just as this single man has many names, dharmas are also like this: in reality they are one, yet have many names. What is born based on the union of father and mother is called the worldly truth; what is born of the union of the twelve links of dependent origination is called paramārtha-satya." The ancient masters explained: from "the union of the five aggregates" onward, the subsequent seven rounds distinguish the characteristics of dharmas themselves. Broadly divided within them, there are two: first, the Mahāyāna; second, the Hīnayāna.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

2.46.2

細分有四:一立性宗,即小乘中淺說諸法各有體性,薩婆多等也; 二破性宗,即小乘中深說諸法假有無性,《成實論》等也; 三破相宗,即大乘中淺破諸法因緣之相,宣說諸法畢竟空寂,《中》、《百》等論也; 四顯實宗,即大乘中深說妄情所取諸法畢竟非有,真實法界常住不壞,《涅槃》等也。 於此四中皆有二諦。 上七番中,初三是其立性宗中所辨二諦,次二是其破性宗中所辨二諦,次一破相宗中所辨二諦,後一顯實宗中所辨二諦。 今此文中,以深攝淺故備論之。 就初宗中,依婆沙等,具說有七番,不能繁引。 一情理分別,妄情所取我眾生等以為世諦,無我之理為第一義。 二假實分別,瓶衣、車乘、舍宅、軍林,如是一切假名之有名為世諦; 陰、界、入等實法之有為第一義。 故《雜心》云「若法分別時,捨名即說等。 分別無所捨,是說第一義。 」三理事分別,陰、界、入等事名為世諦,其十六行法相道理為第一義。 四縛解分別,苦集是世,滅道第一。 五劣勝分別,苦集及道,理中非上,同名世諦; 滅諦精勝,說為第一。 六空有分別,於彼四諦十六行中,除空無我皆名世諦; 空與無我理中精妙,說為第一。 七行教分別,教名世諦,行名第一。 故《雜心》云「經律阿毘曇,是名俗正法。 三十七覺品,是名第一義。 」今此但彰初之三門,餘略不辨。 第一先就情理分二。 五陰和合稱言某甲,凡隨所稱計有我人,是名世諦; 聖人解陰無有某甲,離陰亦無,名第一義。 第二約就假實分二。 先分二法; 有名有實是其實法; 陰、界、入等依名求法,有體可得,故言有實。 有名無實是其假法,瓶衣、車乘、舍宅、軍眾,如是一切假施設其名,推求無體,故曰無實。 下就諦辨,假為世諦,實為第一。 第三約就理事分二。 事為世諦,理為第一。 事有假實,如我眾生乃至兔角、旋火輪等,是其假事,諸陰、界、入是其實事,此等一切同名世諦; 苦集滅道法相道理為第一義。 次下就其破性宗中以辨二諦,於中兩門:前門就其假法空有以辨二諦,後門就其實法空有以辨二諦。 就前門中,先明世諦。 世法有五,後於是五法心無顛倒名第一者,知其性空不亦實性名無顛倒。 就後門中,若燒割等名世諦者,五陰諸法同名世諦。 無燒割等名第一者,諸法性空名第一義。 次下就其破相宗中以辨二諦。 八苦之相以為世諦,無八苦相為第一義。 問曰:此宗所辨二諦,與前何別? 古來釋云:前說因緣假有以為世諦,此宗宣說妄相之有以為世諦。 前宗宣說無性之空為第一義,此宗宣說無相之空為第一義。 有斯別耳。 次就第四顯實宗中以辨二諦,事相緣起以為世諦,法性緣起名第一義。 先喻、後合。 喻相云何? 譬如一人隨用分多,若其走時名為走者,收刈之時名收刈者,如是所說父母生邊名為世諦,因緣生邊名為第一。 古來解云:因緣所生凡有六重。 一事因緣所生,如《毘曇》說。 二法因緣所生,唯苦無常生滅法數。 三假因緣所生,如《成實》說。 四妄相因緣所生,猶如幻化。 五是妄想因緣所生,如夢所見。 六是真實因緣所生,所謂佛性十二因緣如水起波。 前五緣生竝是世諦,今據第六故名第一。 上解雖精,今解小別。 此中二諦,唯明顯實宗中二諦,不說小乘及破相二諦,顯實自有破於相故。 諸小乘計二十部殊,佛豈懸為大唐所有說二小宗所有二諦? 由此應言:後七番中,初番舉事釋前依人以立二諦。 經言「凡夫隨其所稱名為世諦,出世之人如其性相而能知之名第一義。 」故知但是重顯前義,令知二諦依人相待亦建立之。 以下六番,依法勝劣相對建立。 雖不分明差別分別,義推即是此中四重。 前第二番有名無實是世俗者,即此初俗,《顯揚》等說如我有情等,正與此同。

Dividing in detail, there are four: First, the school that establishes intrinsic nature (立性宗), which is the shallow explanation within the Hīnayāna that all phenomena each possess an essential nature—the Sarvāstivādins and so forth. Second, the school that refutes intrinsic nature (破性宗), which is the profound explanation within the Hīnayāna that phenomena are provisionally existent and without intrinsic nature—the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* and so forth. Third, the school that refutes marks (破相宗), which is the shallow refutation within the Mahāyāna of the conditioned marks of phenomena, proclaiming that all phenomena are ultimately empty and tranquil—treatises such as the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Śata-śāstra*. Fourth, the school that reveals reality (顯實宗), which is the profound explanation within the Mahāyāna that all phenomena grasped by deluded sentiment are ultimately non-existent, while the true dharmadhātu is eternal and indestructible—the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* and so forth. Within these four, each has two truths. Among the seven pairs above, the first three are the two truths distinguished within the school that establishes intrinsic nature; the next two are the two truths distinguished within the school that refutes intrinsic nature; the next one is the two truths distinguished within the school that refutes marks; and the last one is the two truths distinguished within the school that reveals reality. Now in this text, because the profound encompasses the shallow, they are fully discussed. Regarding the first school, according to the *Vibhāṣā* and others, seven pairs are fully set forth, which cannot be cited at length. First, distinguishing between sentiment and principle: the self, sentient beings, and so forth grasped by deluded sentiment are taken as conventional truth; the principle of non-self is the supreme truth. Second, distinguishing between the provisional and the real: provisional existents such as vases, garments, carts, houses, armies, and forests are called conventional truth; real existents such as the aggregates, realms, and bases are the supreme truth. Thus the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: 'When a phenomenon is analyzed, and upon discarding its name, [it is no longer identified as such], it is said [to be conventional]. When upon analysis nothing is discarded, that is said to be the supreme [truth].' Third, distinguishing between facts and principle: facts such as the aggregates, realms, and bases are called conventional truth; their principle regarding the characteristics of phenomena with respect to the sixteen aspects of the noble truths is the supreme truth. Fourth, distinguishing between bondage and liberation: suffering and origination are conventional; cessation and the path are supreme. Fifth, distinguishing between the inferior and the superior: suffering, origination, and the path, not being the highest within principle, are together called conventional truth; the truth of cessation is refined and superior, so it is said to be supreme. Sixth, distinguishing between emptiness and existence: among the sixteen aspects of those four truths, excluding emptiness and non-self, all are called conventional truth; emptiness and non-self are refined and subtle within principle, so they are said to be supreme. Seventh, distinguishing between practice and teaching: teaching is called conventional truth; practice is called supreme. Thus the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: 'The sūtras, vinaya, and abhidharma are called the conventional true Dharma. The thirty-seven factors of awakening are called the supreme truth.' Here we merely indicate the first three gates, leaving the rest unelaborated. First, dividing into two based on sentiment and principle: when the five aggregates assemble, they are designated as 'so-and-so'; ordinary persons follow that designation and reckon there to be a self and a person—this is called conventional truth. The noble ones understand that within the aggregates there is no 'so-and-so', nor is there one apart from the aggregates—this is called the supreme truth. Second, dividing into two according to the provisional and the real: first divide into two classes of phenomena. Those having names and having reality are real phenomena: seeking the phenomena according to their names regarding the aggregates, realms, and bases, their substance can be found, hence they are said to 'have reality'. Those having names but lacking reality are provisional phenomena: vases, garments, carts, houses, and armies—regarding all such things, their names are provisionally established, but upon investigation no substance exists, hence they are said to 'lack reality'. Below, distinguishing them according to the truths: the provisional is the conventional truth; the real is the supreme truth. Third, dividing into two according to facts and principle: facts are conventional truth; principle is supreme. Facts include both provisional and real: the self, sentient beings, and up to a rabbit's horn or a whirling firebrand are provisional facts; the aggregates, realms, and bases are real facts; all of these are together called conventional truth. The principle of the characteristics of the phenomena of suffering, origination, cessation, and the path is the supreme truth. Next, below, distinguishing the two truths within the school that refutes intrinsic nature, wherein there are two gates: the former gate distinguishes the two truths according to the emptiness and existence of provisional phenomena; the latter gate distinguishes the two truths according to the emptiness and existence of real phenomena. In the former gate, conventional truth is explained first. There are five worldly phenomena; subsequently having an mind free of inversion regarding these five phenomena is called the supreme: knowing their intrinsic nature to be empty and not taking it to be a real nature is called non-inversion. In the latter gate, if burning, cutting, and so forth are called conventional truth, then all phenomena of the five aggregates are together called conventional truth. That there is no burning, cutting, and so forth being called the supreme means that the emptiness of the intrinsic nature of all phenomena is called the supreme truth. Next, below, distinguishing the two truths within the school that refutes marks: the marks of the eight sufferings are taken as conventional truth; the absence of the marks of the eight sufferings is the supreme truth. Question: What is the difference between the two truths distinguished by this school and the preceding one? The ancient explanation states: The former school stated that provisional existence through dependent arising is the conventional truth; this school proclaims that existence as delusive marks is the conventional truth. The former school proclaimed that the emptiness of intrinsic nature is the supreme truth; this school proclaims that the emptiness of marks is the supreme truth. There is merely this difference. Next, distinguishing the two truths within the fourth school that reveals reality: dependent arising of phenomenal marks is taken as conventional truth; dependent arising of the dharmatā is called the supreme truth. First an analogy, then the application. What is the mark of the analogy? Just as one single person has many divisions according to function: when running, he is called a runner; when harvesting, he is called a harvester. Likewise, what is spoken of from the side of being born of parents is called conventional truth; from the side of being produced by causes and conditions, it is called supreme. The ancient explanation states: That which is produced by causes and conditions has altogether six levels: 1. Produced by the causes and conditions of facts, as explained in the *Abhidharma*. 2. Produced by the causes and conditions of dharmas: solely the categories of phenomena that are suffering, impermanent, arising, and ceasing. 3. Produced by provisional causes and conditions, as explained in the *Tattvasiddhi*. 4. Produced by causes and conditions of delusive marks, like an illusion or apparition. 5. Produced by causes and conditions of delusive conceptualization, like what is seen in a dream. 6. Produced by causes and conditions of reality: namely, the twelve links of dependent arising of Buddha-nature, like water rising as waves. The first five produced by conditions are all conventional truth; now taking the sixth, it is called supreme. Although the above explanation is refined, the present explanation is slightly different. The two truths here exclusively reveal the two truths within the school that reveals reality, without speaking of the Hīnayāna or the two truths of the school that refutes marks, because the revelation of reality itself refutes marks. The various Hīnayāna tenets differ across the twenty schools; how could the Buddha have spoken in advance of the two truths of the two Hīnayāna schools present in the Great Tang? Because of this, one should say: Among the latter seven pairs, the first pair raises facts to explain the former establishment of the two truths based on persons. The sūtra states: 'Ordinary persons follow their designations, which is called conventional truth; supramundane persons are able to know them according to their nature and marks, which is called supreme truth.' Therefore we know this merely re-manifests the former meaning, allowing one to know that the two truths are also established in mutual dependence based on persons. The following six pairs are established relative to each other based on the superiority or inferiority of dharmas. Although they do not make clear-cut distinctions, inferred by principle they are precisely the four levels here. The second pair above, stating that having names without reality is conventional, is precisely the first conventional truth here; what the *Xianyang* and other treatises explain regarding the self, sentient beings, and so forth precisely accords with this.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

2.46.3

有名有實名第一義,即論所說四種勝義,皆有名體故,即顯我有情等唯俗非真實最為卑劣,餘皆勝此可為勝義。 或唯三科對我眾生等有名有實名第一義,亦不違理,相可知故。 第三番中,如我眾生乃至諸陰、界、入是名世諦,四諦是第一義者,此以二類對四諦理俱名世俗,我乃至旋火之輪但有其名無體用法,更重說為世俗諦者,顯不唯形於三科法名為世俗,亦形四諦等名世俗故。 准餘世俗,皆可通形。 其陰、界、入等有名有體,前第二番以初有名無體用法,形陰、界、入,陰界入法名為真諦,即四真中初勝義攝。 顯此非唯是勝義故,復以三科形於四諦,事劣於理即為俗故。 即是論中第二世俗,四諦即是第二勝義。 第四番中,世法有五,名為世俗。 知世俗如此名真者,顯初世俗不唯我等,但有其名無體用法,其無實體有用之法亦初俗故。 《顯揚》等說房舍、軍林等亦初世俗故,以無實體,我等類同,最卑劣故。 無倒知此唯有蘊等都無真實名句等法,是第一義。 四勝義中皆無所說五世法故,或三科中實無此五。 此番狀似說之非次。 以蘊,界,入既說通真,恐此有用無體之法亦通真諦。 為顯不然,因釋彼疑,故今方說:五種世中,初二能詮、次二所詮、後一標相。 顯能所詮,若情若事皆有假立,非真實故,作差別說,更無異義。 第五番中若燒、割等名世諦等者,此之一對顯二無我名為世俗,外道異生執我常一,佛說為無,以五蘊等可燒割等。 無彼實我一常之相,故燒割等二無我也。 後番以此無我形於苦諦理等說為真諦,即第三真。 今以之對一實真如,真如不依可燒割等詮門顯故,即勝義勝義故。 二無我等依詮顯實名為世俗,第四勝義世俗所攝。 不爾,此言有何詮理? 世尊不說無義言故。 一實真如即是第四勝義勝義。 第六番中,八苦相等名世等者,前以四諦對蘊等名真,今以之對二無我等無八苦相法即成世俗。 第三證得世俗所攝八苦,即是苦諦理故,偏舉一苦類餘三諦。 此番應在第五番說,前第五番應第六說,以言便故前後不定。 第七番中所說法喻,總明二諦體無差別,隨其人智,及於法中空有、事理、淺深、詮旨四重二諦,勝劣相形成真俗故。 世人但知父母所生名為世俗,出世之人知因緣生名第一義,此隨人智以分二諦。 父母所生假事麁淺名為世俗,因緣生者實法細深名為勝義,此隨於法以分二諦。 總明二諦差別法喻,更無別門。 審觀經意雖有七重,以義而推與論無別。 經為根本義,依法相以宣揚; 論是末宗,稟佛言而成理。 豈復自為𭿺楯? 苟出胸襟而已哉。 故知經論所說無別,但由解者分別不同。 作此會經亦應允當。 何以得知? 形無燒割等,即一實真如勝義勝義所攝。 《涅槃》又說「文殊師利菩薩摩訶薩白佛言:『世尊! 所言實諦,其義云何? 』佛言:『善男子! 言實諦者名曰真法。 善男子! 若法非真不名實諦。 善男子! 實諦者無顛倒,無顛倒者乃名實諦。 善男子! 實諦者無有虛妄,有虛妄者不名實諦。 善男子! 實諦者名曰大乘,非大乘者不名實諦。 善男子! 實諦者是佛所說、非魔所說,非佛說者不名實諦。 善男子! 實諦者一道清淨無有二也。 善男子! 有常、有樂、有我、有淨,是即名為實諦之義。 』」此意即說無燒割等真如為諦,唯是勝義,非俗諦攝,最殊勝故。 「文殊師利白佛言:『世尊! 若以真實為實諦者,此真實法即是如來虛空佛性。 若如是者,如來虛空及與佛性無有差別。 』佛告文殊師利:『有苦有諦有實,有集有諦有實,有滅有諦有實,有道有諦有實。 善男子! 如來非苦非諦是實,虛空非苦非諦是實,佛性非苦非諦是實。 文殊師利! 所言苦者為無常相,是可斷相,是為實諦。 如來之性非苦非無常,非可斷相,是故為實。 虛空佛性亦復如是。

Those that have both name and reality are termed the ultimate truth, which corresponds to the four kinds of paramārtha spoken of in the treatises, because all have both name and substance. This shows that the 'self', 'sentient beings', and so forth are exclusively conventional and not real, being the most inferior; while all the rest surpass these and can serve as the ultimate truth. Alternatively, taking only the three categories (aggregates, realms, and entrances) as having both name and reality in contrast to the self, sentient beings, and so forth to be the ultimate truth also does not contradict principle, since their characteristics can be known. In the third iteration, where [it is said that] the self, sentient beings, and so forth, up to the aggregates, realms, and entrances, are the conventional truth, and the four truths are the ultimate truth: here both types, contrasted with the principle of the four truths, are together called conventional. The self and so on, up to a whirling firebrand, which have only names without substance or function, are reiterated as the conventional truth to show that they are not called conventional merely in comparison to the phenomena of the three categories, but are called conventional also in comparison to the four truths and so forth. By extension, other conventional [designations] may all be compared in like manner. The aggregates, realms, entrances, and so forth possess both name and substance. In the preceding second iteration, taking the former class which has names but lacks substance and function to contrast with the aggregates, realms, and entrances, the phenomena of the aggregates, realms, and entrances were termed the true truth, which is subsumed under the first paramārtha among the four truths. To demonstrate that this is not exclusively the ultimate truth, the three categories are again contrasted with the four truths: since facts are inferior to principle, they are conventional. This is precisely the second conventional [truth] in the treatises, and the four truths are precisely the second ultimate truth. In the fourth iteration, where the five kinds of worldly phenomena are called conventional, and knowing the conventional to be such is called true: this shows that the first conventional [truth] is not limited to the self and so forth—which have only a name without substance or function—for phenomena that lack substantial reality yet possess function are also of the first conventional [truth]. As the Xianyang and other treatises state that houses, armies, forests, and so on are also of the first conventional [truth], because lacking substantial reality, they belong to the same class as the self and are the most inferior. Knowing without inversion that there are only the aggregates and so forth, and that there are entirely no real phenomena such as names, phrases, and so forth, is the ultimate truth. Because none of the four kinds of ultimate truth contain the five worldly phenomena spoken of, or because within the three categories these five do not truly exist. This iteration might appear out of sequence. Since the aggregates, realms, and entrances have already been said to extend to the true, there might be a fear that these phenomena which have function but lack substance would also extend to the true truth. To show that this is not so and to resolve that doubt, it is only now explained that among the five kinds of the worldly: the first two are the expressing [factors], the next two are the expressed, and the last one is the designating mark. This shows that whether subjective concepts or objective facts, both expressing and expressed factors are nominally posited and not real; thus they are distinguished, with no other meaning. In the fifth iteration, where [phenomena] subject to burning, cutting, and so forth are called conventional truth, etc.: this pair reveals that the two kinds of selflessness are designated conventional. Heterodox non-Buddhists and ordinary beings cling to a self as permanent and single; the Buddha taught that it is nonexistent, because the five aggregates and so on can be burned, cut, and so forth. They lack the characteristic of being that real, single, permanent self; hence burning, cutting, and so on are the two kinds of selflessness. The subsequent iteration contrasts this selflessness with the principle of the truth of suffering and so forth, speaking of it as the true truth, which is the third true [truth]. Now contrasting it with the one true tathatā, because tathatā is not revealed relying on the expressive gate of things that can be burned, cut, and so on, it is the paramārtha of paramārtha. The two kinds of selflessness and so forth, which reveal reality by relying on expressions, are called conventional, being subsumed under the fourth conventional truth of the paramārtha level. Were it not so, what principle would these words express? For the World-Honoured One does not speak meaningless words. The one true tathatā is precisely the fourth paramārtha of paramārtha. In the sixth iteration, where the characteristics of the eight sufferings and so forth are called conventional, etc.: previously, the four truths contrasted with the aggregates and so forth were called true; now, contrasted with the phenomena that lack the characteristics of the eight sufferings, such as the two kinds of selflessness, they become conventional. The third [is] the realization of the conventional, subsuming the eight sufferings, which is precisely the principle of the truth of suffering; one suffering is singled out to stand for the other three truths. This iteration should properly be explained in the fifth iteration, and the previous fifth iteration should be the sixth; but for ease of phrasing their order is not fixed. In the seventh iteration, the dharmas and parables spoken collectively elucidate that the substance of the two truths has no differentiation; rather, in accordance with the wisdom of the person, as well as the fourfold two truths of emptiness and existence, fact and principle, shallow and deep, and expression and purport among phenomena, their mutual comparison of superior and inferior forms the true and the conventional. Worldly people only know that what is born of father and mother is called conventional; those who have transcended the world know that what is born of causes and conditions is called the ultimate truth: this distinguishes the two truths according to the wisdom of the person. That which is born of father and mother is a nominal, coarse, and shallow fact, termed conventional; that which is born of causes and conditions is a real, subtle, and profound phenomenon, termed ultimate: this distinguishes the two truths according to the phenomena. These collectively elucidate the differences in phenomena and parables of the two truths, with no separate category. Examining the meaning of the sūtra closely, although there are seven layers, deduced by their significance they are no different from the treatises. The sūtras are the root meaning, expounded in reliance on the characteristics of phenomena; the treatises are the branch lineages, receiving the Buddha’s words to establish principle. How could they contradict one another like spears and shields, as if fabricated merely out of personal fancy? Therefore we know that the teachings of the sūtras and treatises are without difference; it is only that commentators distinguish them differently. Reconciling the sūtras in this manner should also be appropriate. How is this known? In contrast to that which is without burning, cutting, and so forth, it is subsumed under the one true tathatā, the paramārtha of paramārtha. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also states: 'Mañjuśrī Bodhisattva Mahāsattva addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One! What is the meaning of the so-called real truth?" The Buddha said: "Good son! That which is called the real truth is named the true Dharma. Good son! If a dharma is not true, it is not named the real truth. Good son! The real truth is devoid of inversion; that which is devoid of inversion is then named the real truth. Good son! The real truth is devoid of falsity; that which has falsity is not named the real truth. Good son! The real truth is named the Great Vehicle; that which is not the Great Vehicle is not named the real truth. Good son! The real truth is spoken by the Buddha, not spoken by Māra; that which is not spoken by the Buddha is not named the real truth. Good son! The real truth is the pure Single Path, without duality. Good son! Having permanence, having bliss, having self, and having purity—this is precisely the meaning of the real truth."' This intention means that the tathatā devoid of burning, cutting, and so forth is the truth, which is exclusively ultimate and not subsumed under conventional truth, being the most supreme. 'Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One! If reality is taken as the real truth, this real dharma is none other than the Tathāgata, space, and the Buddha-nature. If that is so, the Tathāgata, space, and the Buddha-nature are without difference." The Buddha told Mañjuśrī: "There is suffering, there is truth, there is reality; there is origination, there is truth, there is reality; there is cessation, there is truth, there is reality; there is the path, there is truth, there is reality. Good son! The Tathāgata is neither suffering nor truth, but is reality; space is neither suffering nor truth, but is reality; the Buddha-nature is neither suffering nor truth, but is reality. Mañjuśrī! What is called suffering has the characteristic of impermanence and the characteristic of being abandonable; this is the real truth. The nature of the Tathāgata is neither suffering nor impermanent, nor has it the characteristic of being abandonable; therefore it is reality. Space and the Buddha-nature are also like this."'

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

2.46.4

』」此經文意:一實真如在纏名佛性,在果名如來。 法性空如,亦因空顯,故名虛空。 非安立故,非四諦攝。 此經即是廢詮談旨一真法界。 苦集滅道是四諦事,諦即四理,實為四如,由此真如非苦非諦但是實攝。 又如前所引,《瑜伽》、《顯揚》說有二諦。 但說俗有四,與此四同。 唯說真有一,即非安立。 唯第四真,前三不離俗後三故,所以不說。 又有差別名為安立,故說四俗。 無有差別名非安立,故唯一真。 《成唯識論》第九卷中四真具有,廣具顯故。 示勝於俗亦有差別。 《勝鬘》一諦,第四真收。 《仁王》二諦各自名攝。 《中邊論》、《顯揚》、《唯識》第八,說此二諦各有三種。 俗諦三者,一假世俗、二行世俗、三顯了世俗,如次應知即三自性。 真諦三者,一義勝義謂真如、二得勝義謂涅槃、三行勝義謂聖道。 此假世俗,第一俗攝,唯有假名都無體故。 此行世俗,第二第三世俗所攝,有為事故。 心上變似四諦相理,理不離事,故依他攝,第二第三世俗攝也。 顯了世俗,第四俗攝,依二空門所顯了故。 准義應入四勝義中,易可知也。 其義勝義,第四真攝,此得勝義,第三真攝,因證顯故,約得辨故。 此行勝義,第二真攝,無漏真智理稍勝故。 若隨其事,第一真攝,隨其所應入四世俗,易可知也。 若說四諦苦集滅道為得勝義,即第三俗、第二真攝,論自說故。 《瑜伽》第四十六云「何名諦施設建立? 謂無量種。 或立一諦,謂不虛妄諦,第四真攝。 」或立二諦:一世俗諦、二勝義諦。 《仁王般若》波斯匿王白言:「世尊! 世諦中有第一義諦不? 若有者諦不應一,若無者智不應二。 」與《瑜伽》同。 隨名次第,二諦所攝。 或立三諦,一相諦、二語諦、三用諦,所詮能詮體用離合有差別故。 相諦通真俗,語用初三俗,唯非真中後二所攝。 或立四諦,一苦、二集、三滅、四道,如前已說。 雜染清淨二類各有,因果殊故。 或立五諦,一因諦、二果諦、三智諦、四境諦、五勝諦。 前四安立,後一非安立。 安立之中能有、所有心境異故。 初因果諦,第三俗諦、第二真攝。 境通真俗,智唯第二第三俗諦、第一第二真攝。 第五勝諦,第四俗諦、第三第四真諦所攝。 或初四種,集苦道滅如次配攝,後一真如。 或立六諦,一諦諦、二妄諦、三遍知諦、四應永斷諦、五應作證諦、六應修習諦。 勝義世俗二類有殊,染淨因果兩各異故。 諦諦通四真,義理皆勝故。 妄諦通四俗,義理皆劣故。 或諦諦是理,非初二俗,是後三真。 妄諦如幻,是初二俗、真第一攝。 後四如次即是四諦,第三俗諦、第二真攝。 或立七諦,一愛味諦、二過患諦、三出離諦、四法性諦、五勝解諦、六聖諦、七非聖諦。 集苦道滅次第初四,意解思惟聖凡所知種類異故。 初四諦者,第三俗諦、第二真攝。 意解思惟,第四俗諦、第三真攝,依詮行相二無我故。 四真四俗皆是聖諦,聖知有無事理別故。 凡於初俗堅著妄說以為實故,非二聖諦。 聖知為無,可初俗攝。 餘處或立七諦,愛味、過患、出離、應知、應斷、應證、應修,單重二觀觀於四諦。 第二觀中除道諦故,亦第三俗、第二真攝。 或立八諦,一行苦性諦、二壞苦性諦、三苦苦性諦、四流轉諦、五還滅諦、六雜染諦、七清淨諦、八正加行諦,依於三苦、生死、涅槃、有無漏品,聖因別故。 初四及第六,第二第三俗諦、第一第二真諦所攝。 第五及第七,第三俗諦、第二真諦所攝,淨因果故; 或第四俗、第三第四真諦所攝。 第八正加行諦,第三第四俗諦、第二第三真諦所收。 《勝鬘經》中亦說八諦,有作、無作各有四種,對劣勝機說淺深理,種類別故。 有作聲聞四諦,定屬第三俗諦、第二真攝。 無作四諦菩薩四諦,第三俗諦、第二真攝。 或第四俗第三真攝,依詮顯旨非安立故。

"' The meaning of this sūtra passage is: the one reality of tathatā, when within defilement, is called Buddha-nature; when in the fruition, it is called the Tathāgata. The emptiness-suchness of dharmatā is also revealed through emptiness; hence it is called space. Because it is non-established, it is not subsumed under the four truths. This sūtra is precisely [a teaching that] sets aside verbal explanations to speak of the essential purport, the one real dharmadhātu. Suffering, origination, cessation, and path are the facts of the four truths; truth refers to the four principles; in reality they are the four suchnesses. Therefore, this tathatā is neither suffering nor truth, but is only subsumed under reality. Furthermore, as cited earlier, the Yogācārabhūmi and the Xianyang [shengjiao lun] state that there are two truths. They only state that the conventional has four [levels], identical with these four. They only state that the ultimate is one—namely, the non-established. It is only the fourth ultimate; because the preceding three [ultimates] are not distinct from the latter three conventional [levels], they are not mentioned. Furthermore, having distinctions is called 'established,' hence they speak of four conventional [levels]. Being without distinctions is called 'non-established,' hence there is only one ultimate. In the ninth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun, all four ultimates are fully present, because they are extensively and completely revealed. It shows that the ultimate, like the conventional, also has distinctions. The one truth of the Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] is subsumed under the fourth ultimate. The two truths of the Benevolent Kings [Sūtra] are each subsumed under their respective designations. The Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, the Xianyang, and the eighth [fascicle] of the Weishi lun state that each of these two truths has three kinds. The three conventional truths are: first, nominal conventionality; second, operational conventionality; third, explicit conventionality; as should be known, they correspond in order to the three natures. The three ultimate truths are: first, the ultimate of meaning, namely tathatā; second, the ultimate of attainment, namely nirvāṇa; third, the ultimate of practice, namely the noble path. This nominal conventionality is subsumed under the first conventional [truth], because it has only nominal designations and entirely lacks substance. This operational conventionality is subsumed under the second and third conventional truths, because it consists of conditioned facts. What manifests on the mind resembling the phenomena and principles of the four truths—since principle is not separate from fact—is therefore subsumed under the other-dependent, and subsumed under the second and third conventional truths. Explicit conventionality is subsumed under the fourth conventional truth, because it is made explicit based on the two gates of emptiness. By analogy of meaning, it should enter into the four ultimate truths, as can be easily known. The ultimate of meaning is subsumed under the fourth ultimate. This ultimate of attainment is subsumed under the third ultimate, because it is revealed by verification and distinguished in terms of attainment. This ultimate of practice is subsumed under the second ultimate, because the principle of untainted true cognition is slightly superior. If considered according to its facts, it is subsumed under the first ultimate; entering into the four conventional [truths] as appropriate can be easily known. If one speaks of the four truths—suffering, origination, cessation, and path—as the ultimate of attainment, they are subsumed under the third conventional and the second ultimate, as the treatise itself states. The forty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'What is the provisional establishment of truths? It is of immeasurable kinds. Either one truth is established—namely, the non-deceptive truth, subsumed under the fourth ultimate.' Or two truths are established: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth. In the Benevolent Kings Prajñā[-sūtra], King Prasenajit addressed [the Buddha], saying: 'World-Honoured One! Is there an ultimate truth within the conventional truth, or not? If there is, truth should not be one; if there is not, cognition should not be two.' This is the same as the Yogācārabhūmi. In order of designation, they are subsumed under the two truths. Or three truths are established: first, the truth of marks; second, the truth of speech; third, the truth of function; because there are distinctions in the signified and the signifier, substance and function, separation and combination. The truth of marks applies to both the ultimate and conventional; speech and function belong to the first three conventional [truths], and are subsumed only under the latter two of the non-ultimate. Or four truths are established: first, suffering; second, origination; third, cessation; fourth, path; as has already been stated before. The two categories of defilement and purification each have [causes and effects], because cause and effect are distinct. Or five truths are established: first, the truth of cause; second, the truth of fruit; third, the truth of cognition; fourth, the truth of object; fifth, the truth of superiority. The first four are established; the last one is non-established. Within the established, the cognizing mind and the cognized object are distinct. The first truths of cause and fruit are subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate. Object applies to both ultimate and conventional; cognition is subsumed only under the second and third conventional truths, and the first and second ultimates. The fifth, the truth of superiority, is subsumed under the fourth conventional truth and the third and fourth ultimate truths. Or the first four correspond in order to origination, suffering, path, and cessation, while the latter one is tathatā. Or six truths are established: first, the truth of truth; second, the truth of delusion; third, the truth to be fully known; fourth, the truth to be forever abandoned; fifth, the truth to be realized; sixth, the truth to be cultivated. The two categories of the ultimate and conventional are distinct, because the causes and effects of defilement and purification are each different. The truth of truth applies to the four ultimates, because their meanings and principles are all superior. The truth of delusion applies to the four conventional truths, because their meanings and principles are all inferior. Or, the truth of truth is principle, which is not the first two conventional truths, but is the latter three ultimates. The truth of delusion is like an illusion, subsumed under the first two conventional truths and the first ultimate. The latter four are in order precisely the four truths, subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate. Or seven truths are established: first, the truth of gratification; second, the truth of danger; third, the truth of escape; fourth, the truth of dharmatā; fifth, the truth of resolve; sixth, the truth of the noble; seventh, the truth of the non-noble. Origination, suffering, path, and cessation are in order the first four, because the kinds of mental resolution and reflection, and what is known by noble ones and ordinary beings, are distinct. The first four truths are subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate. Mental resolution and reflection are subsumed under the fourth conventional truth and the third ultimate, because they are based on verbal expression and the mental aspects of the two kinds of selflessness. All four ultimates and four conventional [truths] are noble truths, because the noble ones know the distinction between existence and non-existence, facts and principles. Ordinary beings cling firmly to the first conventional truth and falsely proclaim it to be real; thus it is not the two noble truths. When noble ones know it to be non-existent, it can be subsumed under the first conventional truth. Elsewhere, seven truths are also established: gratification, danger, escape, to be known, to be abandoned, to be realized, and to be cultivated—single and double contemplations contemplating the four truths. In the second contemplation, since the truth of the path is excluded, it is also subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate. Or eight truths are established: first, the truth of the nature of the suffering of conditioned existence; second, the truth of the nature of the suffering of change; third, the truth of the nature of the suffering of suffering; fourth, the truth of saṃsāra; fifth, the truth of cessation; sixth, the truth of defilement; seventh, the truth of purification; eighth, the truth of correct preparation; because they are based on the three kinds of suffering, birth-and-death, nirvāṇa, tainted and untainted factors, and the distinction of noble causes. The first four and the sixth are subsumed under the second and third conventional truths and the first and second ultimate truths. The fifth and seventh are subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate truth, because they are pure causes and effects; or they are subsumed under the fourth conventional truth and the third and fourth ultimate truths. The eighth, the truth of correct preparation, is subsumed under the third and fourth conventional truths and the second and third ultimate truths. The Śrīmālā-sūtra also speaks of eight truths: conditioned and unconditioned, each having four kinds; because it teaches shallow and profound principles to inferior and superior capacities, and their types are distinct. The conditioned four truths of the śrāvakas definitely belong to the third conventional truth and are subsumed under the second ultimate. The unconditioned four truths, the four truths of the bodhisattvas, belong to the third conventional truth and are subsumed under the second ultimate. Or they are subsumed under the fourth conventional truth and the third ultimate, because they reveal the essential purport based on verbal expression and are non-established.

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2.46.5

或說九諦,一無常諦、二苦諦、三空諦、四無我諦、五有愛諦、六無有愛諦、七彼斷方便諦、八有餘依涅槃諦、九無餘依涅槃諦。 依苦四境後有常斷,二種愛集一道二滅而分成故。 此是四諦,即第三俗、第二真攝。 或說十諦,一逼切苦諦、二財位匱乏苦諦、三界不平等苦諦、四所愛變壞苦諦、五麁重苦諦、六業諦、七煩惱諦、八聽聞正法如理作意諦、九正見諦、十正見果諦。 初五有漏果,次二異熟因,次二出世道,後一無為滅。 苦諦五中,初一攝四苦,謂生、老、死、怨憎會苦。 第二即是求不得苦。 第三是病苦。 第四是愛別離苦。 第五是略攝一切五取蘊苦。 八苦二集兩道一滅有差別故,第三俗諦、第二真攝。 此中且略配諦相攝,巨細義門皆應別說。 頌曰「不虛、真、相、苦,因諦及愛、行,無常與逼切,增十諦各初。 」

Or nine truths are spoken of: first, the truth of impermanence; second, the truth of suffering; third, the truth of emptiness; fourth, the truth of selflessness; fifth, the truth of craving for existence; sixth, the truth of craving for non-existence; seventh, the truth of the means for abandoning them; eighth, the truth of nirvāṇa with residue; ninth, the truth of nirvāṇa without residue. They are divided and established based on the four objects of suffering, the future states of eternalism and annihilationism, the two kinds of craving as origination, one path, and two cessations. These are the four truths, and are precisely subsumed under the third conventional and second ultimate. Or ten truths are spoken of: first, the truth of the suffering of affliction; second, the truth of the suffering of the lack of wealth and position; third, the truth of the suffering of disharmony among the elements; fourth, the truth of the suffering of the ruin of the beloved; fifth, the truth of the suffering of coarse heaviness; sixth, the truth of karma; seventh, the truth of afflictions; eighth, the truth of hearing the correct Dharma and proper attention; ninth, the truth of right view; tenth, the truth of the fruit of right view. The first five are tainted fruits; the next two are causes of vipāka; the next two are the supramundane path; the last one is unconditioned cessation. Among the five of the truth of suffering, the first one subsumes four sufferings, namely the sufferings of birth, old age, death, and meeting with the disliked. The second is precisely the suffering of not getting what one seeks. The third is the suffering of illness. The fourth is the suffering of separation from the beloved. The fifth briefly subsumes all sufferings of the five clinging aggregates. Because the eight sufferings, two originations, two paths, and one cessation are distinct, they are subsumed under the third conventional truth and the second ultimate. Here, the mutual subsumption of the marks of the truths has been briefly correlated; both broad and fine doctrinal approaches should be explained separately. The verse says: / 'Non-deceptive, true, marks, suffering, / Truth of cause and craving, operational, / Impermanence, and affliction: / Each begins the increasing counts up to ten truths.'

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